



HANDBOUND  
AT THE



UNIVERSITY OF  
TORONTO PRESS



Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2007 with funding from  
Microsoft Corporation









7a

(65)

APHORISMS, MAXIMS, &c.,  
FOR LEARNERS.

ΦΩΝΑΝΤΑ ΣΥΝΕΤΟΙΣΙ.

SELECTED AND ARRANGED BY

ROBERT POTTS, M.A.,

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE;

HON. LL.D., WILLIAM AND MARY COLLEGE, VA.

London:

LONGMANS AND CO.

1875.

114777  
716111



CAMBRIDGE :

PRINTED BY W. METCALFE AND SON, TRINITY STREET.

THE following selection of Maxims, &c., was originally prefixed to the first edition of *Liber Cantabrigiensis*. Shortly after that publication appeared, the Editor was requested to reprint the Maxims, &c., in a separate form, as likely to become useful to other students, not intended to finish their course of studies at the University.

A few additions have been made to the collection, and the Editor ventures to express the hope, that they may become as useful and suggestive to other students in the formation of their mental habits, as he has found them in his own experience.

R. P.

CAMBRIDGE,  
20 Oct., 1875.

“ Some high or humble enterprise of good  
Contemplate, till it shall possess thy mind,  
Become thy study, treasure, rest, and food,  
And kindle in thy breast a flame refined ;  
Pray heaven for firmness thy whole soul to bind  
To this thy purpose, to begin, pursue,  
With thoughts all fixed, and feelings purely kind,  
Strength to complete, and with delight review,  
And grace to give the praise where all the praise is due.”

MRS. SIGOURNEY.

## APHORISMS, MAXIMS, &c.

---

### 1.

APHORISMS representing a knowledge broken, do invite men to enquire farther; whereas methods carrying the show of a total, do secure men as if they were at farthest.—*Bacon*.

### 2.

Exclusively of the Abstract Sciences, the largest and worthiest portion of our knowledge consists of Aphorisms; and the greatest and best of men is but an Aphorism.

Truths, of all others the most awful and interesting, are too often considered as so true, that they lose all the power of truth, and lie bed-ridden in the dormitory of the soul, side by side with the most despised and exploded errors.

There is one way of giving freshness and importance to the most common-place maxims—that of reflecting on them in direct reference to our own state and conduct, to our own past and future being.—*S. T. Coleridge*.

### 3.

Mature and sedate wisdom has been fond of summing up the results of its experience in weighty sentences. Solomon did so: the wise men of India and Greece did so: Bacon did so: Goethe in his old age took delight in doing so... They who cannot weave an uniform web, may at least produce a piece of patchwork, which may be useful, and not without a charm of its own. The very sharpness and abruptness with which truths must be asserted,

when they are to stand singly, is not ill-fitted to startle and rouse sluggish and drowsy minds. Nor is the present shattered and disjointed state of the intellectual world unaptly represented by a collection of fragments.—*Guesses at Truth*.

4.

A collection of good sentences resembles a string of pearls.—*Chinese saying*.

5.

Nor do Apophthegms only serve for ornament and delight, but also for action and civil use: as being the edge-tools of speech, which cut and penetrate the knots of business and affairs.—*Bacon*.

6.

I call a complete and generous education that which fits a man to perform justly, skilfully, and magnanimously all the offices, both private and public, of peace and war. . . . But here the main skill and groundwork will be, to temper them [the learners] with lectures and explanations upon every opportunity, as may lead and draw them in willing obedience, inflamed with a study of learning and the admiration of virtue; stirred up with high hopes of living to be brave men and worthy patriots, dear to God, and famous to all ages.—*John Milton*.

7.

I hesitate not to assert, as a Christian, that religion is the first rational object of Education. Whatever may be the fate of my children in this transitory world, about which I hope I am as solicitous as I ought to be, I would, if possible, secure a happy meeting with them in a future and everlasting life. I can well enough bear their reproaches for not enabling them to attain to worldly honours and distinctions; but to have been in any measure accessory, by my neglect, to their final perdition, would be the occasion of such reproach



and blame, as would be absolutely insupportable.  
—*Dr. Priestley.*

## 8.

St. Jerome's advice was, let a child begin to be instructed as soon as he begins to blush. As soon as they are capable of shame they are capable of discipline. From the time that they shew the marks of their conscience upon their countenance, it ought to be believed that remorse has taken the place of innocence, since they already know how to put a difference between good and evil.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

## 9.

Education, in the most extensive sense of the word, may comprehend every preparation that is made in our youth for the sequel of our lives; and in this sense I use it. Some such preparation is necessary for all conditions, because without it they must be miserable, and probably will be vicious, when they grow up, either from the want of the means of subsistence, or from want of rational and inoffensive occupation. In civilized life, every thing is effected by art and skill. Whence, a person who is provided with neither (and neither can be acquired without exercise and instruction) will be useless; and he that is useless will generally be at the same time mischievous to the community. So that to send an uneducated child into the world, is injurious to the rest of mankind; it is little better than to turn out a mad dog or a wild beast into the streets.—*Paley.*

## 10.

**The object of a liberal education is to develope the whole mental system of man;—to make his speculative inferences coincide with his practical convictions;—to enable him to render a reason for the belief that is in him, and not to leave him in the condition of Solomon's sluggard, who is wiser**

in his own conceit than seven men that *can* render a reason.—*Dr. Whewell.*

## 11.

The influence of physical causes, in the formation of intellectual and moral character, has never been sufficiently regarded in any system of education. Organic structure, temperament, things affecting the senses or bodily functions, are as closely linked with a right play of the faculties, as the material and condition of an instrument of music with that wonderful result called melody.—*W. B. Clulow.*

## 12.

We must not proceed in forming the moral character as a statuary proceeds in forming a statue, who works sometimes on the face, sometimes on one part, and sometimes on another: but we must proceed, and it is in our power to proceed, as Nature does in forming a flower, an animal, or any other of her productions; *rudimenta partium omnium simul parit et producit*: she throws out altogether and at once the whole system of every being and the rudiments of all the parts. The vegetable or the animal grows in bulk, and increases in strength, but is the same from the first.—*Bolingbroke.*

## 13.

Because Education is a dynamical, not a mechanical process, and the more powerful and vigorous the mind of the teacher, the more clearly and readily he can grasp things, the better fitted he is to cultivate the mind of another. And to this I find myself coming more and more; I care less and less for information, more and more for the true exercise of the mind; for answering questions concisely and comprehensively, for shewing a command of language, a delicacy of taste, and a comprehensiveness of thought, and a power of combination.—*Dr. Arnold.*

## 14.

Why should my son be a scholar, when it is not intended that he should live by his learning? By this rule, if what is commonly said be true, that '*money answereth all things*;' why should my son be honest, temperate, just, or charitable, since he hath no intention to depend upon any of these qualities for a maintenance?—*Dean Swift*.

## 15.

It is an ill-judged thrift, in some rich parents, to bring up their sons to mean employments, for the sake of saving the charge of a more expensive education; for these sons, when they become masters of their liberty and fortune, will hardly continue in occupations by which they think themselves degraded, and are seldom qualified for anything better.—*Paley*.

## 16.

The instructions which are given to youth ought not to be tedious; for being pithy and short they will the sooner learn them, and the better keep them.

## 17.

Always remember that whatever is worth doing at all, is worth doing well.—*Lord Chesterfield*.

## 18.

Attempt not everything, for then thou shalt excel in nothing.—

## 19.

The better that a child is by birth, the better ought he in his youth to be instructed.—

## 20.

Diligente and holy bringing up is the founteyne of al vertue: as to folye and myschief, the fyrst, seconde, and thirde poynte is undiligence and corrupte educacion.—*Erasmus*.

## 21.

The culture of the affections and the fancy is a most important branch of Education, though in general it is entirely neglected.—*W. B. Chulow*.

22.

By learning, the sons of the common people become public ministers; without learning, the sons of public ministers become mingled with the mass of the people.—*Chinese maxim.*

23.

Tell me not what thou hast heard and read, and only so; but what (after thy hearing and reading) thou hast taken into thy meditation, found to be truth, settled in thy judgment, fixed in thy memory, embraced in thy affections, and then a long time practiced, and so made it to be truly thine own. This, and only this, is rightly called learning.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

24.

The end of learning is to repair the ruins of our first parents, by regaining to know God aright, and out of that knowledge to love Him, to imitate Him, to be like Him, as we may the nearest, by possessing our souls of true virtue, which, being united to the heavenly grace of faith, makes up the highest perfection.—*John Milton.*

25.

Let everything you see represent to your spirit the presence, the excellency, and the power of God, and let your conversation with the creatures lead you unto the Creator, for so shall your actions be done more frequently with an actual eye to God's presence, by your often seeing Him in the glass of the creation.—*Bp. Jeremy Taylor.*

26.

You have been bred in a land abounding with men, able in arts, learning, and knowledge, manifold, this man in one, that in another, few in many, none in all. But there is one art of which every man should be master, *the art of reflection.* If you are not a thinking man, to what purpose are you a man at all? In like manner, there is one

knowledge, which it is every man's interest and duty to acquire, namely, *self-knowledge*; or to what end was man alone, of all animals, endued by the Creator with the faculty of self-consciousness? Truly, said the Pagan Moralist—

e cœlo descendit. Γνωθὶ σεαυτόν.

But you are likewise born in a Christian land, and Revelation has provided for you new subjects for reflection and new treasures of knowledge, never to be unlockde by him who remains self-ignorant. Self-knowledge is the key to this casket, and by reflection alone can it be attained. Reflect on your own thoughts, actions, circumstances, and—which will be of especial aid to you in forming a habit of reflection—accustom yourself to reflect on the words you use, hear, or read, their birth, derivation and history. For if words are not things they are living powers, by which the things of most importance to mankind are actuated, combined, and humanized.—*S. T. Coleridge.*

27.

All knowledge, of whatsoever kind, must have a two-fold groundwork of faith,—one *subjectively*, in our own faculties and the laws which govern them; the other *objectively*, in the matter submitted to our observations. We must believe in the being who knows, and in that which is known: knowledge is the copula of these two acts. Even scepticism must have the former. Its misfortune and blunder is, that it will keep standing on one leg, and so can never get a firm footing. We must stand on both before we can walk, although the former act is often the more difficult.—*Guesses at Truth.*

28.

Real knowledge, like every thing else of the highest value, is not to be obtained easily. It must be worked for,—studied for,—thought for,

—and, more than all, it must be prayed for. And that is Education, which lays the foundation of such habits,—and gives them, so far as a boy's early age will allow, their proper exercise.—*Dr. Arnold.*

## 29.

I call by the name of wisdom,—knowledge, rich and varied, digested and combined, and pervaded through and through by the light of the Spirit of God.—*Dr. Arnold.*

## 30.

For all learning, be it never so great, except it be sifted with much use and experience to the finest, can be no wisdom, but only a void and a waste knowledge; and, therefore, this kind can be learned by no book, but only by diligent hearing of sage and experienced counsellors, and following more their good advice, who doth foresee the greatness of dangers to come, unconceived and unthought of by others, than their own sudden fancies, who, for lack of further insight, do judge their own counsel best, because they do perceive in themselves no reason against themselves; although there be in the thing itself, and wise men's heads, never so much to the contrary.—*Sir John Cheke.*

## 31.

Wisdom of itself is delectable and satisfactory, as it implies a revelation of truth and a detection of error to us. 'Tis like light, pleasant to behold, casting a sprightly lustre, and diffusing a benign influence all about; presenting a goodly prospect of things to the eyes of our mind; displaying objects in their due shapes, postures, magnitudes, and colours; quickening our spirits with a comfortable warmth, and disposing our minds to a cheerful activity; dispelling the darkness of ignorance, scattering the mists of doubt, driving away the



spectres of delusive fancy ; mitigating the cold of sullen melancholy ; discovering obstacles, securing progress, and making the passages of life clear, open, and pleasant. We are all naturally endowed with a strong appetite to know, to see, to pursue truth ; and with a bashful abhorrency from being deceived and entangled in mistake. And as success in enquiry after truth affords matter of joy and triumph ; so being conscious of error and miscarriage therein, is attended with shame and sorrow. These desires wisdom in the most perfect manner satisfies, not entertaining us with dry, empty, fruitless theories upon mean and vulgar subjects, but by enriching our minds with excellent and useful knowledge, directed to the noblest objects and serviceable to the highest ends.  
—*Dr. Barrow.*

## 32.

Wisdom is exceedingly pleasant and peaceable ; in general, by disposing us to acquire and enjoy all the good delight and happiness we are capable of ; and by freeing us from all the inconveniences, mischiefs, and infelicities our condition is subject to. For whatever good from clear understanding, deliberate advice, sagacious foresight, stable resolution, dexterous address, right intention, and orderly proceeding doth naturally result, wisdom confers : whatever evil blind ignorance, false presumption, unwary credulity, precipitate rashness, unsteady purpose, ill contrivance, backwardness, inability, unwieldiness and confusion of thought begets, wisdom prevents. From a thousand snares and treacherous allurements, from innumerable rocks and dangerous surprises, from exceedingly many needless incumbrances and vexatious toils of fruitless endeavours, she redeems and secures us.  
—*Dr. Barrow.*

## 33.

Widsom makes all the troubles, griefs, and pains, incident to life, whether casual adversities or natural afflictions, easy and supportable, by rightly valuing the importance and moderating the influence of them. It suffers not busy fancy to alter the nature, amplify the degree, or extend the duration of them, by representing them more sad, heavy and remediless than they truly are. It allows them no force beyond what naturally and necessarily they have, nor contributes nourishment to their increase. It keeps them at a due distance, not permitting them to encroach upon the soul or to propagate their influence beyond their proper sphere.—*Dr. Barrow.*

## 34.

Wisdom is the principal thing, therefore get wisdom.—*Solomon's Proverbs.*

## 35.

In the search after God and contemplation of Him, our wisdom doth consist; in our worship of God and our obedience to Him, our religion doth consist; in both of them our happiness doth consist.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

## 36.

We are born under a law: it is our wisdom to find it out, and our safety to comply with it.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

## 37.

Since the time that God did first proclaim the edicts of His law upon the world, heaven and earth have hearkened unto His voice, and their labour hath been to do His will. "He made a law for the rain;" he gave His "decree unto the sea, that the waters should not pass His commandment." Now, if nature should intermit her course, and leave altogether, though it were for a while, the observation of her own laws; if these principal and mother



elements of the world, whereof all things in this lower world are made, should lose the qualities which they now have; if the frame of that heavenly arch erected over our heads should loosen and dissolve itself; if celestial spheres should forget their wonted motions, and by irregular volubility turn themselves any way as it may happen; if the prince of the lights of heaven, which now, as a giant, doth run his unwearied course, should, as it were, through a languishing faintness, begin to stand and to rest himself; if the moon should wander from her beaten way, the times and seasons of the year blend themselves by disordered and confused mixture, the winds breathe out their last gasp, the clouds yield no rain, the earth be defeated of her heavenly influence, the fruits of the earth pine away, as children at the withered breasts of their mother no longer able to yield them relief;—what would become of man himself, whom these things do now all serve? See we not plainly, that obedience of creatures unto the law of nature is the stay of the whole world?—*Hooker.*

38.

The Laws of God are not impositions of will or of power and pleasure, but the resolutions of truth, reason, and justice.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

39.

To *believe* and *not to do* is to hold the truth in unrighteousness.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

40.

Never do evil that good may come thereby; for that would be serving the devil, that God might serve thee.

41.

Let us begin from God, and shew that our pursuit from its exceeding goodness clearly proceeds from Him, the Author of good and Father of light. Now, in all Divine works, the smallest

beginnings lead assuredly to some result ; and the remark in spiritual matters, that “ the kingdom of God cometh without observation,” is also found to be true in every work of Divine Providence ; so that everything glides quietly on without confusion or noise, and the matter is achieved before men either think or perceive that it is commenced.—*Bacon.*

## 42.

God hath set up two lights to enlighten us in our way—the light of reason, which is the light of His creation, and the light of Scripture, which is an after-revelation from Him. Let us make use of these two lights, and suffer neither to be put out.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

## 43.

Men have entered into a desire of learning and knowledge sometimes upon a natural curiosity and inquisitive appetite ; sometimes to entertain their minds with variety and delight ; sometimes for ornament and reputation ; and sometimes to enable them to victory of wit and contradiction ; and most times for lucre and profession ; and seldom sincerely to give a true account of the gift of reason to the benefit and use of man. As if there were wrought in knowledge a couch whereupon to rest a searching and restless spirit ; or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect ; or a tower of state for a proud mind to raise itself upon ; or a fort or commanding ground for strife and contention ; or a shop for profit or sale ; and not a rich storehouse for the glory of the Creator and the relief of man’s estate.—*Bacon.*

## 44.

With whatever faculties we are born, and to whatever studies our genius may direct us, *studies* they must still be. I am persuaded that Milton did not write his *Paradise Lost*, nor Homer his *Iliad*,

nor Newton his Principia, without immense labour.  
— *W. Cooper.*

## 45.

Children and fools choose to please their senses rather than their reason, because they still dwell within the regions of sense, and have but little residence among intellectual essences. And because the needs of nature first employ the sensual appetites, these being first in possession would also fain retain it, and therefore for ever continue the title, and perpetually fight for it; but because the inferior faculty fighting against the superior is no better than a rebel, and that it takes reason for its enemy, it shews such actions which please the sense, and do not please the reason, to be unnatural, monstrous, and unreasonable. And it is a great disreputation to the understanding of a man to be so cozened and deceived as to chuse money before a moral virtue; to please that which is common to him and beasts rather than that which is a communication of the Divine nature; to see him run after a bubble which himself hath made and the sun hath particoloured.—*Bp. Jeremy Taylor.*

## 46.

The end answers the means. The childe was taught no obedience when it might; now it is too olde to learn. The childe was not bended when it was tender; now it is too stiffe, it will follow its own bent. The parent may thank himselfe for the evill consequences from that neglect, and humble himselfe to smart patiently, for smart he must, if he have any feeling. He had his childe in his hande, and might have carried him on fairly, and have taught him to knowe God, himselfe, and his parents.  
— *Woodward.*

## 47.

For if ye suffer the eye of a young gentleman once to be entangled with vain sights, and the ear

to be corrupted with fond or filthy talk, the mind shall quickly fall sick, and soon vomit and cast up all the wholesome doctrine that he received in childhood, though he were never so well brought up before. And being once ingluttured with vanity, he will straightway loathe all learning and all good counsel to the same; and the parents, for all their great cost and charge, reap only in the end the fruit of grief and care.—*Roger Ascham.*

48.

A young man, born with the certainty of succeeding to an opulent fortune, is commonly too much indulged during infancy for submitting to the authority of a governor. Prone to pleasure, he cannot bend to the fatigues of study; his mind is filled with nothing but plans of imagined happiness when he shall have command of that great fortune. No sooner is he in possession than he lets loose all his appetites in pursuit of pleasure. After a few years of gratification, his enjoyments, by familiarity and easiness of attainment, become languid, and at length, perfectly insipid.—*Lord Kaimes.*

49.

There is no earthly thing more mean and despicable in my mind than an English gentleman destitute of all sense of his responsibilities and opportunities, and only revelling in the luxuries of our high civilization, and thinking himself a great person.—*Dr. Arnold.*

50.

As for the modern species of human bucks, I impute their brutality to the negligence or fondness of their parents. It is observed in parks among their betters—the real bucks—that the most troublesome and mischievous are those who were bred up tame, fondled, and fed out of the hand when fawns. They abuse, when grown up, the indulgence they met with in their youth, and their

familiarity grows troublesome and dangerous with their horns.—*Lord Chesterfield.*

51.

Natural good is so intimately connected with moral good, and natural evil with moral evil, that I am as certain as if I heard a voice from heaven proclaim it, that God is on the side of virtue. He has learnt much, and has not lived in vain, who has practically discovered that most strict and necessary connection, that does and ever will exist, between vice and misery, and virtue and happiness. The greatest miracle that the Almighty could perform would be to make a bad man happy, even in heaven; he must unparadise that blessed place to accomplish it. In its primary signification, all vice, *that is, all excess*, brings its own punishment even here. By certain fixed, settled, and established laws of Him who is the God of nature, excess of every kind destroys that constitution that temperance would preserve. The debauchee, therefore, offers up his body a “living sacrifice” to sin.—*Lacon.*

52.

It is worthy our observation, that all the virtues that God requires us to exercise, which respect ourselves, are not only pleasing to Him, but are profitable and conducive to our present well-being and tranquillity—such as temperance, chastity, meekness, contentedness, &c. And all the vices He has forbidden have a direct tendency to our ill-being and disquiet—such as gluttony, drunkenness, anger, envy, &c.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

53.

The worst vices springing from the worst principles, the excesses of the libertine, and the outrages of the plunderer, usually take their rise from early and unsubdued idleness.—*Dr. Parr.*

54.

A young man intemperate and full of carnal

affection, quickly turneth the body into age and feeble infirmities.—*Anaxagoras.*

55.

It has been ascertained, that from about the age of 18 to 28, the mortality is much greater in males than in females, being at its maximum at 25, when the *viability* [or probability of life] is only half what it is at puberty. This fact is a very striking one, and shews most forcibly that the indulgence of the passions not only weakens the health, but in a great number of instances is the cause of a very premature death.—*Dr. Carpenter.*

56.

Providence seems to permit sometimes the abuse of the highest talents, that it may be seen of how little value they are when so abused.—*W. Danby.*

57.

If there be one thing on earth which is truly admirable, it is to see God's wisdom blessing an inferiority of natural powers, where they have been honestly, truly, and zealously cultivated.—*Dr. Arnold.*

58.

Nothing deserves more compassion than wrong conduct with good meaning ; than loss or obloquy suffered by one who, as he is conscious only of good intentions, wonders why he loses that kindness which he wishes to preserve ; and not knowing his own fault, if, as may sometimes happen, nobody will tell him, goes on to offend by his endeavours to please.—*Dr. Samuel Johnson.*

59.

Youth is eminently the fittest season for establishing habits of industry. Rare, indeed, are the examples of men who, when their earlier years have been spent in dull inactivity or trifling amusements, are afterwards animated by the love of



glory, or instigated even by the dread of want, to undergo that labour to which they have not been familiarized. They find a state of indolence, indeed, not merely joyless, but tormenting. They are racked with cares which they can neither explain nor alleviate, and through the mere want of pursuits they are harassed with more galling solicitude than even disappointment occasions to other men. Not trained up "in the way in which they should go," when they are young they have not the inclination, and when they are old they have not the power, to depart from idleness. Wearied they are with doing nothing: they form hasty resolutions and vain designs of doing something; and then starting aside from the very approach of toil, they leave it undone for ever and ever.—*Dr. Parr.*

60.

Accustom yourself to submit on all and every occasion, and on the most minute, no less than on the most important circumstances of life, to a small present evil, to obtain a greater distant good. This will give decision, tone, and energy, to the mind, which, thus disciplined, will often reap victory from defeat, and honour from repulse. Having acquired this invaluable habit of rational preference and just appreciation, start for that *prize that endureth for ever*; you will have little left to learn. The advantages you will possess over common minds will be those of the *Lanista* over the *Tyro*, and of the veteran over the recruit.—*Lacon.*

61.

Modesty and humility are the sobriety of the mind: temperance and chastity are the sobriety of the body.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

62.

It is much easier to think right without doing right than to do right without thinking right. Just thoughts may, and woefully do, fail of producing

just deeds ; but just deeds are sure to beget just thoughts. For when the heart is pure and straight, there is hardly anything which can mislead the understanding in matters of immediate personal concernment. But the clearest understanding can do little in purifying an impure heart ; the strongest, little in straightening a crooked one. You cannot reason or talk an Augean stable into cleanliness. A single day's work would make more progress in such a task than a century's words. Thus our Lord's blessing on knowledge is only conditional : *If ye know these things, happy are ye if ye do them* (John xiii. 17). But to action his promise is full and certain : *If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it is of God* (John vii. 17).—*Guesses at Truth.*

## 63.

Nothing is more commonly observed than that whilst a man is teaching another he improves himself. Our memories are frail and treacherous, and we think many excellent things, which for want of making a deep impression we can never recover afterwards ; in vain we hunt for the straggling idea, and rummage all the solitudes and retirements of the soul for a lost thought, which has left no tracks or footsteps behind it. The first offspring of the mind is gone, 'tis dead as soon as born ; nay, often proves abortive in the moment it was conceived. The only way, therefore, to retain our thoughts is to fasten them in words and chain them in writing.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

## 64.

I have often observed that by the mere propounding a difficulty to another, I have presently been able to resolve that which was too hard for me whilst I resolved it only in my own breast.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*



65.

To form the profound philosopher, or the elegant scholar, is not always within our power. But every man will be called upon to discharge some duties to the community, and every man is endowed with talents for the acquisition of some knowledge. It is not necessary for him to feel the beauties of composition, to measure the motions of the planets, to exercise his memory in history, or to invigorate his judgment by logic. But he may become a useful citizen or a skilful artificer; and in order to become so, he must often turn a deaf ear to the syren song of indolence.—*Dr. Parr.*

66.

Men hope, by systems and rules, to shape different minds according to one fixed model; but nature and the accidents of life intervene to thwart the design, and thus keep up the infinite diversity of intellect and attainments, corresponding to the equally varied tempers and fortunes of mankind.—*W. B. Clulow.*

67.

Some people will never learn anything, for this reason—because they understand everything too soon, and that no one can be taught faster than he can learn.—

68.

He is not likely to learn who is not willing to be taught; for the learner has something to do as well as the teacher.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

69.

Nothing is more absurd than the common notion of instruction; as if science were to be poured into the mind like water into a cistern, that passively waits to receive all that comes.—*Harris.*

70.

The framers of preventive laws, no less than private tutors and schoolmasters, should remember

that the readiest way to make either mind or body grow awry, is by lacing it too tight.—*S. T. Coleridge.*

## 71.

No learning ought to be learned with bondage. For bodily labours wrought by compulsions hurt not the body; but any learning learned by compulsions tarrieth not long in the mind.—*Roger Ascham.*

## 72.

It is not less true of the intellect than of the body, that premature exertion occasions mal-conformation or disease.—*W. B. Clulow.*

## 73.

A monitor ought, in the first place, to have a regard to the delicacy and sense of shame of the person admonished. For they who are hardened against a blush are incorrigible.—*Epictetus.*

## 74.

The teachers of youth in a free country should select those books for their chief study—so far, I mean, as the world is concerned—which are best adapted to foster a spirit of manly freedom. The duty of preserving the liberty which our ancestors, through God's blessing, won, established, and handed down to us, is no less imperative than any commandment in the Second Table, if it be not the concentration of the whole.—*Guesses at Truth.*

## 75.

None are so fit to teach others their duty, and none so likely to gain men to it, as those who practise it themselves; because hereby we convince men that we are in earnest, when they see that we persuade them to nothing but what we choose to do ourselves.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

## 76.

The small progress of men under the best religious instruction, need excite the surprise of no one who recollects the ignorance and mistakes of the Apostles under the teaching of our Saviour.—*W. B. Clulow.*

## 77.

Discipline, like the bridle in the hand of a good rider, should exercise its influence without appearing to do so, should ever be active, both as a support and as a restraint, yet seem to lie easily in hand. It must always be ready to check or pull up, as occasion may require; and only when the horse is a runaway should the action of the curb be perceptible.—*Guesses at Truth.*

## 78.

A fault once excused is twice committed.—

## 79.

Humanity is the first of virtues; but humanity should be tempered with judgment; for when the same lenity is shewn to imprudence, or even to the indulgence of vicious habits, that is due to unavoidable misfortune, or to accidental error; instead of doing any real good to the individual we shew it to, we only encourage his faults, and aggravate the distress that we wish to relieve, besides the example and encouragement we give to others; till at last we are forced to use that severity which, if exercised sooner, and perhaps in a smaller degree, would have been the greatest humanity we could shew.—*W. Danby.*

## 80.

All men should rather wish for virtue than wealth, which is dangerous to the foolish; for vice is increased by riches. And in proportion as any one is destitute of understanding, into the more

injurious excess he flies out, by having the means of gratifying the rage of his pleasures.—*Epictetus*.

81.

Learning teacheth more in one year than experience in twenty; and learning teacheth safely, when experience maketh more miserable than wise. He hazardeth sore that waxeth wise by experience. An unhappy master is he that is made cunning by many shipwrecks; a miserable merchant that is neither rich nor wise but after some bankrupts. It is costly wisdom that is bought by experience. We know by experience itself that it is a marvellous pain to find out, but a short way by long wandering. And surely, he that would prove wise by experience, he may be witty indeed, but even like a swift runner that runneth fast out of the way, and upon the night, he knoweth not whither. And verily they be fewest in number that be happy or wise by unlearned experience, and look well upon the former life of those few, whether your example be old or young, who without learning have gathered by long experience a little wisdom and some happiness; and when you consider what mischief they have committed, what dangers they have escaped (and yet twenty for one do perish in the adventure), then think well with yourself whether you would that your own son should come to happiness by the way of such experience or no.—*Roger Ascham*.

82.

“Felix quem faciunt aliena pericula cautum.” This is well translated by some one who observes, that it is far better to *borrow* experience than to *buy* it. He that sympathizes in all the happiness of others perhaps himself enjoys the safest happiness, and he that is warned by all the folly of others has perhaps attained the soundest wisdom. But such is the purblind egotism and the suicidal selfishness

of mankind, that things so desirable are seldom pursued, things so accessible seldom attained. That is indeed a *twofold* knowledge which profits alike by the folly of the foolish and the wisdom of the wise; it is both a shield and a sword; it borrows its security from the darkness and its confidence from the light.—*Lacon*.

## 83.

There are things which are in our power, and which operate on the mind and affect and alter the will and appetite, and, therefore, possess most influence in producing a change of manners. In which department philosophers ought to have laboriously and industriously made enquiries on the power and efficacy of custom, practice, habit, education, example, emulation, company, friendship, praise, reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, studies, and other things of the same sort. For these are the influences which predominate in morals, by the agency of these the mind is affected and disposed; of these, as ingredients, medicines are compounded, which may be useful in preserving and recovering soundness of mind as far as that can be effected by human remedies.—*Bacon*.

## 84.

Patients are displeased with a physician who doth not prescribe to them and think he gives them over. And why are none so affected towards a physician of the mind as to conclude he despairs of their recovery to a right way of thinking, if he tell them nothing which may be for their good?—*Epictetus*.

## 85.

Does not each faculty both of body and of mind grow by exercise and dwindle by disuse?—

## 86.

The unassisted hand, and the understanding left to itself, possess but little power. Effects are

produced by means of instruments and helps, which the understanding requires no less than the hand. And as instruments either promote or regulate the motion of the hand, so those that are applied to the mind prompt or protect the understanding.—*Bacon*.

87.

The way to invigorate and excite the powers of the mind is not so much to urge them with a multitude of motives, as to bring some great subject before the attention.—*W. B. Chulow*.

88.

Invention is one of the great marks of genius, but if we consult experience we shall find that it is by being conversant with the inventions of others that we learn to invent, as by reading the thoughts of others we learn to think. The mind is but a barren soil;—is a soil soon exhausted, and will produce no crop, or only one, unless it be continually fertilized and enriched with foreign matter.—*Sir Joshua Reynolds*.

89.

The manurement of wits is like that of soils: when before either the pains of tilling or the charge of sowing, men use to consider what the mould will bear—heath or grain.—*Sir H. Wotton*.

90.

Professions of universal education are as ludicrous as professions of universal cure, the obliquity and inaptitude of some minds being absolutely incurable.—*W. B. Chulow*.

91.

Mallet, in his “Northern Antiquities,” relates that the Scandinavians had a god, Kvasir, who was suffocated by the multitude of ideas sticking in his throat, because he could not find any one who could question him fast enough to get them out of



him. There are many who are nearly choked by the converse process—the attempt to get one idea into them.—*J. F. Boyes.*

92.

I hate bye-roads in education. Education is as well known, and has long been as well known, as ever it can be. Endeavouring to make children prematurely wise is useless labour.—*Dr. Samuel Johnson.*

93.

When ideas enter a barren brain, they lie inactive and dead, like seed cast into sterile ground. But when they fall on a genial soil, they are almost sure to germinate, and spring forth in some new or beautiful forms.—*W. B. Clulow.*

94.

Some intellects gather strength from slight and imperceptible causes, as trees occasionally flourish almost on the naked rock. In both cases, however, the nutrition actually received is less considerable than might be supposed. Trees, in the circumstances mentioned, derive supplies of air, as of moisture, through the medium of their leaves; the latest researches in vegetable physiology demonstrating that the principal food of plants is drawn from the carbon of the atmosphere; and, with regard to the understanding, its nourishment may appear scanty merely because extracted from objects, or appropriated in ways, little obvious or common.—*W. B. Clulow.*

95.

The different productions of soil, the different temperatures of climate, the different influences of religion and government, the different degrees of national proficiency in arts and sciences, and the different dispositions, or it may be talents of individuals, require us to pursue different methods in

the instruction of youth. But the general principles of education are the same, or nearly the same, in all ages and at all times. They are fixed unalterably in the natural and moral constitution of man.—*Dr. Parr.*

## 96.

Is not this also true, that young men are much less fit hearers of Political than of Moral Science, before they are thoroughly imbued with religious and moral knowledge, but haply, from a perversion and corruption of judgment, they may fall into the opinion that there are no real and solid moral distinctions between things, but that everything is to be measured by its usefulness or success?—*Bacon.*

## 97.

The Chinese, whom it might be well to disparage less and imitate more, seem almost the only people among whom learning and merit have the ascendancy, and wealth is not the standard of estimation.—*W. B. Chulow.*

## 98.

To excel others is a proof of talent; but to know when to conceal that superiority is a greater proof of prudence.—*Lacon.*

## 99.

Emulation is lively and generous, and envy base and malicious: the first is a regret at our small desert, the other a vexation at the merit of others. Emulation would raise us, and envy would abase what is above us.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

## 100.

As I believe that the English Universities are the best places in the world for those who can profit by them, so I think for the idle and self-indulgent they are about the very worst, and I



would far rather send a boy to Van Dieman's Land, where he must work for his bread, than send him to Oxford [or Cambridge] to live in luxury, without any desire in his mind to avail himself of his advantages.—*Dr. Arnold.*

## 101.

He that is able to maintain his life in learning at Cambridge knoweth not what a felicity he hath.—*Roger Ascham.*

## 102.

I left it [Emmanuel College], as must not be dissembled, before the usual time, and, in truth, had been almost compelled to leave it, not by the want of a proper education, for I had arrived in the first place in the first form of Harrow School when I was not quite fourteen; not for the want of useful tutors, for mine were eminently able, and to me had been uniformly kind; not for the want of ambition, for I had begun to look up ardently and anxiously to academical distinctions; not by the want of attachment to the place, for I regarded it then, as I continue to regard it now, with the fondest and most unfeigned affection; but by another want which it were unnecessary to name, and for the supply of which, after some hesitation, I determined to provide by patient toil and resolute self-denial when I had not completed my twentieth year. I ceased, therefore, to reside with an aching heart; I looked back with mingled feelings of regret and humiliation to advantages of which I could no longer partake, and honours to which I could no longer aspire. The unreserved conversation of scholars, the disinterested offices of friendship, the use of valuable books, and the example of good men, are endearments by which Cambridge will keep a strong hold upon my esteem, my respect, and my gratitude, to the last moment of my life.—*Dr. Parr.*

## 103.

University distinctions are a great starting point in life ; they introduce a man well, nay, they even add to his influence afterwards.—*Dr. Arnold.*

## 104.

Consider that a young man has no means of becoming independent of the society about him. If you wish to exercise influence hereafter, begin by distinguishing yourself in the regular way, not by seeming to prefer a separate way of your own. It is not the natural order of things, nor, I think, the sound one.—*Dr. Arnold.*

## 105.

Literary prizes and academical honours are laudable objects of any young man's ambition ; they are proofs of present merit and the pledges of future utility. But when hopes excited within the cloister are not realized beyond it, when academical rewards produce not public advantage, the general voice will not squander away upon the blossom that praise and gratitude which it reserves only for the fruit. Let those, therefore, who have been successful in their academic career, be careful to *maintain their speed*, "*servetur ad imum*," otherwise these petty kings, within the walls of their colleges, will find themselves dethroned monarchs when they mix with the world ; a world through which, like Theodore, they will be doomed to wander, out of humour with themselves and useless to society ; exasperated with all who do not recognise their former royalty and commiserate their present degradation.—*Lacon.*

## 106.

It is impossible to become either an eminently great, or truly pious man, without the courage to remain ignorant of many things.—*S. T. Coleridge.*

## 107.

Make thyself thy great study, and learn to estimate and value thyself justly. He that knoweth not what is fit for one in his circumstances will never be able to maintain a due esteem.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

## 108.

Consider seriously with thyself what figure is the most fit for thee to make in the world, and then find out and fix upon a method and rule in order thereunto, which be sure to observe strictly.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

## 109.

We should be careful not to mistake the possession of talents or their occasional exhibition for the full use of them.—*W. Danby.*

## 110.

It is impossible that any man, though he be of an admirable wit, and hath a natural good judgment, can reach to and thoroughly understand certain particulars; and for this is experience necessary, which, and none other, doth teach them. And he will best understand this maxim who shall have managed many affairs, because experience herself will have taught him how good and precious a thing she is.—*Guicciardini.*

## 111.

If there be one habit of mind which I should especially desire to discourage in men entering into the business of life, it is the habit of substituting a shabby plausibility for sound knowledge.—*Sir James Stephen.*

## 112.

Show not thyself in public till maturity and fitness: first failings may put thee back too far for an after-recovery. For expectations come with an

appetite and would be satisfied ; if thou baulkest them, men may take such an offence as scarce ever to relish thee again.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

113.

Without a profession I scarcely see how a man can live honestly. That is, I use the term “profession” in rather a large sense, not as simply denoting certain callings which a man follows for his maintenance, but rather *a definite field of duty*, which the nobleman has as well as the tailor ; but which that man has not who, having an income large enough to keep him from starving, hangs about upon life, merely following his own caprices and fancies ; quod factu pessimum est.—*Dr. Arnold.*

114.

The choice of our occupations is certainly of importance, but the manner in which we occupy ourselves is, perhaps, of still more ; for by this their effect on the mind is shown and their ultimate result determined. To this all must be subordinate, as being the medium through which the mind is seen. To fortify, expand, and elevate the powers of the mind should be the great business of human life ; to teach the mind to know itself, and to use that knowledge for its real improvement ; to give it at once a consciousness of its own strength and of its dependence ; to raise it above the allurements of sense, to make it feel its destination and look up with humble awe, but with inspiring hope to the Great Being on whom that destination depends ; to make it feel that the source of happiness is in itself and not in the objects that surround it.—*W. Danby.*

115.

Studies serve for delight, for ornament, and for ability. The chief use for delight is in privateness and retiring ; for ornament is in discourse ; and

for ability is in the judgment and disposition of business, for expert men can execute and, perhaps, judge of particulars one by one; but the general counsels and the plots of marshalling of affairs come best from those that are learned. To spend too much time in study is sloth; to use them too much for ornament is affectation; to make judgment wholly by their rules is the humour of a scholar: they perfect nature and are perfected by experience; for natural abilities are like natural plants that need pruning by study, and studies do give forth directions too much at large except they be bounded in by experience. Crafty men condemn studies, simple men admire them, and wise men use them; for they teach not their own use, but that is a wisdom without them, and above them, won by observation.—*Bacon*.

## 116.

Let the course of thy studies be as a journey ought to be. First, propose to thyself whither it is thou wouldest go. Secondly, which is the nearest and best way thither. And thirdly, think of setting about it with unwearied diligence. He that is discouraged with difficulties, or mistakes his way, or goes far about, or loiters, is not likely to arrive very soon; and he that rambles about from one town to another, without any determinate design, is a vagabond and no traveller.—*Dr. T. Fuller*.

## 117.

When thou hast resolved what to study advise what are the best books on that subject, and procure them; as for indifferent ones, I would not have thee throw away any time or pains on them if thou canst get better. A few books well chosen and well made use of will be more profitable to thee than a great confused *Alexandrian* Library.—*Dr. T. Fuller*.

118.

If thou wouldest study to advantage keep a peaceful soul in a temperate body. Fulness of humours and turbulency of spirit distract the thoughts and disable the judgment.

119.

The best way of acquiring most branches of knowledge is to study them, if possible, for some specific object or occasion. This will supply the curiosity with a powerful stimulus, and communicate to the search a practical character essentially beneficial.—*W. B. Chulow.*

120.

Amidst the multiplicity of books and sciences that invite our curiosity, the most compendious and effectual method is to study any particular topic in works where it is *systematically* and *fully* treated. There will afterward be little occasion to consult other performances on the subject, as a slight inspection of those parts only which profess to contain any new discoveries will be amply sufficient.—*W. B. Chulow.*

121:

Lay down such rules to thyself of observing stated hours for study and business as no man shall be able to persuade thee to recede from. For when thy resolutions are once known, as no man of ingenuity will disturb thee, so thou wilt find this method will become not only practicable but of singular benefit in abundance of things.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

122.

Marshall thy notions into a handsome method. One will carry twice more weight trussed and packed up in bundles than when it lies untoward flapping and hanging about his shoulders. Things orderly fardled up under heads are most portable.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*



123.

Judge of thy improvement, not by what thou speakest, or by what thou writest ; but by the firmness of thy mind, and the government of thy passions and affections. It would be well worth thy time thus to consider thyself, and what progress thou hast made.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

124.

Be industrious ; and so difficulties will give place. Use makes practice easy ; and practice begets custom and a habit of things, to facilitate what thou couldst not conceive attainable at the first undertaking.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

125.

He that loseth his morning studies gives an ill precedent to the afternoon, and makes such a hole in the beginning of the day that all the winged hours will be in danger of flying out thereat.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

126.

Think how much work is behind ; how slow thou hast wrought in thy time that is past ; and what a reckoning thou shouldst make if thy Master should call thee this day to thine account.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

127.

There is no man so miserable as he that is at a loss how to spend his time. He is restless in his thoughts, unsteady in his counsels, dissatisfied with the present, solicitous for the future.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

128.

The advice is unsound, as well as impracticable, which recommends that our time be always occupied with some industrious or, at least, specific pursuit. After laborious mental efforts, the attention should be directed to the lightest subjects possible ; and as a general rule, it is best to leave the intellect a

good deal free to its own operations, and to the entrance of casual reflections.—*W. B. Chulow.*

129.

Be always employed; thou wilt never be better pleased than when thou hast something to do. For business, by its motion, brings heat and life to the spirits; but idleness corrupts them like standing water.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

130.

They are idle who do not know the value of time.—*Kalee Krishun.*

131.

A man that is *young in years*, may be *old in hours*, if he have lost no time; but that happeneth rarely.—*Bacon.*

132.

Make use of time if thou valuest eternity. Yesterday cannot be recalled; to-morrow cannot be assured; to-day only is thine, which if thou procrastinatest, thou lovest; which loss is lost for ever.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

133.

Attempt only such things as thou mayest reasonably judge are within thy power; giving over an enterprize is discreditable, for it implieth either folly in the assaying or levity in the prosecuting.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

134.

It is natural, indeed, for common minds to look to those things which are obvious and superficial. It is natural also to avoid labour, and to seek for compendious methods. We may, with very little application, acquire the opinions of those who have gone before us; and if our pursuits are mean, they may serve our purpose. But no high point of excellence was ever attained but by a laborious exercise of the mind. I do not say that abridgments, systems, and common places, with the



other assistances, which modern times have so abundantly furnished, may not have their use. At the same time, it can scarcely be denied that they have contributed very much to languid and inefficient studies.—*Dr. Markham.*

135.

That time and labour are worse than useless that have been occupied in laying up treasures of false knowledge which it will one day be necessary to unlearn, and in storing up mistaken ideas which we must hereafter remember to forget. Timotheus, an ancient teacher of rhetoric, always demanded a double fee from those pupils who had been instructed by others; for in this case, he had not only to plant in, but also to root out.—*Lacon.*

136.

It is almost as difficult to make a man unlearn his errors as his knowledge. Mal-information is more hopeless than non-information; for error is always more busy than ignorance. Ignorance is a blank sheet on which we may write, but error is a scribbled one on which we must first erase. Ignorance is contented to *stand still* with her back to the truth, but error is more presumptuous and *proceeds* in the *same* direction. Ignorance has no light, but error follows a false one. The consequence is, that error, when she retraces her footsteps has further to go before she can arrive at the truth than ignorance.—*Lacon.*

137.

No kind of study or inquiry into fact is a proper object of contempt. It is not unfrequent to possess a passion for particular species of knowledge, but the understanding is scarcely in a proper tone unless information or truth of every description be seized with avidity. What Cicero describes as essential to the finished orator, acquaintance with the whole circle of learning, is

not less desirable for all who aspire to the distinction of combined or comprehensive thought. Variety of studies and speculations, so far from weakening the faculties, is a powerful means of promoting their activity and growth. You seldom meet with persons of eminent capacity whose range of reflection has been chiefly restricted to one department.—*W. B. Chulow.*

138.

All labour and learning that promotes not the great end of happiness is to no purpose, since we are never the better for it; for to be better and to be happier for it are all one.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

139.

I would not have thee study merely for study's sake; No! infinite thinking, that designs no other advantage but thy own private satisfaction, is but a sort of ingenious idleness.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

140.

In common life a remark has become obvious, that the fortune which is bequeathed or acquired at an easy rate is more likely to be dissipated than the fruits of laborious industry. It is so likewise in learning. Ideas collected without any great effort make but a slight impression on the memory or the imagination. The reflection that they may be recalled at pleasure, prevents any solicitude to preserve them. But the remembrance, that the degree of knowledge already acquired has cost us dearly, enhances its value, and excites every precaution to prevent it from being lost. I would compare the learning acquired by the facilitating aids of modern invention to the vegetables raised in a hot-bed, which, whatever size or beauty they may attain in a short time, never acquire that firmness and durable perfection which is gradually collected by the slow process of unassisted nature.—*Dr. Knox.*

## 141.

In thy study and pursuance of a notion, first work it out by thyself as far as thou canst, and make it lie as clear and distinct in thy head as possible; and then (but not before) consult books and discourse with thy associates. For remember thou art not always to live on reliance and go in leading-strings.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

## 142.

When we desire to be informed it is good to contest with men above ourselves; but to confirm and establish our opinions it is best to argue with judgments below our own, that the frequent spoils and victories over their reasons may settle in ourselves an esteem and confirmed opinion of our own.—*Sir T. Browne.*

## 143.

Doubt is the vestibule which *all* must pass before they can enter into the temple of wisdom; therefore, when we are in doubt and puzzle out the truth by our own exertions, we have gained a something that will stay by us and which will serve us again. But if, to avoid the trouble of the search, we avail ourselves of the superior information of a friend, such knowledge will not remain with us; we have not *bought* but *borrowed* it.—*Lacon.*

## 144.

For the object of our pursuit is not barely contemplative enjoyment, but, in truth, the interests and fortunes of mankind and a complete mastery over works. For man, the servant and interpreter of nature, is limited in action and understanding by the observation he has made on the order of nature, either by sense or mentally; further than this he has neither knowledge nor power. Neither can any strength loose or burst the chain of causes, nor is Nature to be overcome otherwise

than by obeying her. These two aims, therefore, namely, human knowledge and human power, really coincide; and the failure of effects chiefly arises from the ignorance of causes. And every thing depends upon this, that, never turning the mind's eye from things themselves, we should receive the images exactly as they exist.—*Bacon*.

145.

Sir Isaac Newton used to say that if there were any difference between him and other men, it consisted in his fixing his eye steadily on the object which he had in view, and waiting patiently for every idea as it presented itself, without wandering or hurrying.—

146.

The proof of a rational and active mind is in its extent of thought and power of expression.—*W. Danby*.

147.

The best proof of a well-disposed mind, is to be capable of still further improvement and elevation.—*W. Danby*.

148.

The power of thought is not so much shewn in conceiving ideas, as in combining them.—*W. Danby*.

149.

It is not enough that the mind can reproduce just what it has received from reading and no more; it must reproduce it digested, altered, improved, and refined. Reading, like food, must shew its effects in promoting growth; since, according to a striking remark of Epictetus:—“Sheep do not shew the shepherd how much they have eaten by producing the grass itself; but after they have inwardly digested the pasture they produce outwardly wool and milk.”—*Dr. Knox*.

## 150.

The care of writing well and fast, is no indifferent matter, though most commonly neglected by the better sort. It is a great acquisition to study, and a good method will facilitate and further its progress; whereas to write slow is a hindrance and delay to thought. Misshaped and confused writing can neither be well read nor understood; whence follows the additional labour of dictating the necessary corrections; so that whoever contracts the habit of a fair and well-proportioned hand, will in several respects find its benefit, but more especially in transacting private business and corresponding with friends and acquaintances.—*Quintilian*.

## 151.

Read not to contradict and confute, nor to believe and take for granted, nor to find talk and discourse, but to weigh and consider. Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested; that is, some books are to be read only in part; others to be read, but not curiously; and some few to be read wholly and with diligence and attention.—*Bacon*.

## 152.

The study of languages has given a character to modern minds by the habits of discrimination and analysis which it requires, and has partly contributed to the present advancement of science and reasoning. To represent it as nothing but a criticism of words, or an exercise of memory, is utterly erroneous. It demands no trifling perspicuity and judgment; admits the operations even of fancy, picturing things of which words are but the symbols; and tends to promote quickness and depth of apprehension. A good linguist is always a man of considerable acuteness, and often of pre-eminent taste.—*W. B. Clulow*.



## 153.

Verbal criticism has been seldom despised sincerely by any man who was capable of cultivating it successfully; and if the comparative dignity of any kind of learning is to be measured by the talents of those who are most distinguished for the acquisition of it, philology will hold no inconsiderable rank in the various and splendid classes of human knowledge.—*Dr. Parr.*

## 154.

Some, while they hasten (*ἀνίπτοις ποσὶν*) with unwet feet, as they say, to learn things, neglect the care of language and words, and, unfortunately, pretending to have found a shorter way, go the longest way about. For as things cannot be known but by *words*—*the marks* of things; he who understands not words, must necessarily be blind, mistaken, and foolish in his judgment of things.—*Erasmus.*

## 155.

The study of Greek and Latin, considered as mere languages, is of importance mainly as it enables us to understand and employ well that language in which we commonly think, and speak, and write. It does this, because Greek and Latin are specimens of language at once highly perfect and incapable of being understood without long and minute attention: the study of them, therefore, naturally involves that of the general principles of Grammar, while their peculiar excellencies illustrate the points which render language clear, and forcible, and beautiful. But our *application* of this general knowledge must naturally be to our own language; to shew us what are its peculiarities, what its beauties, what its defects; to teach us by the patterns or the analogies offered by other languages, how the effect we admire in them may be produced with a somewhat different

instrument. Every lesson in Greek or Latin may and ought to be made a lesson in English; the translation of every sentence in Demosthenes or Tacitus is properly an exercise in extemporaneous English composition; a problem, how to express with equal brevity, clearness, and force, in our own language, the thought which the original author has so admirably expressed in his.—*Dr. Arnold.*

156.

Homer calls words *winged*; and the word is peculiarly appropriate to his, which do indeed seem to fly—so rapid and light is their motion; and which have been flying ever since over the whole of the peopled earth, and still hover and brood over many an awakening soul. Latin marches; Italian floats; French hops; English walks; German rumbles along: the music of Klopstock's hexameters is not unlike the tune with which a broad-wheel waggon tries to solace itself when crawling down a hill. But Greek flies, especially in Homer.—*Guesses at Truth.*

157.

It is easy to translate such authors where there is little but the matter itself to express; but such wherein the ornament of a language and elegance of style is the main endeavour, are dangerous to attempt, especially when a man is to turn them into a weaker idiom.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

158.

The translating select passages out of authors into English, and back again into their own tongue, is most undoubtedly of great use, if we take care to compare our translation with the original accurately, considering the most minute part in which they differ, for this will imprint in us a lively notion both of the idiom and genius of the language, and the author we are upon; we shall discern also how much he exceeds us in elegance



and propriety, and a good step it will be to the attainment of his excellencies, and to be thoroughly acquainted with our own deficiencies.—*Dr. Holmes.*

159.

Queen Elizabeth, by this double translating of Greek, without missing, every forenoon, and of Latin every afternoon, hath attained to such a perfect understanding in both tongues, and to such a ready utterance of the Latin, and that with such a judgment, as there be few in number in both the Universities, or elsewhere in England that be comparable to her Majesty.—*Roger Ascham.*

160.

A literal translation is better than a loose one; just as a cast from a fine statue is better than an imitation of it. For copies, whether of words or things, must be valuable in proportion to their exactness. In idioms alone, the literal rendering cannot be the right one. Hence the difficulty of translations, regarded as works of art, varies in proportion as the books translated are more or less idiomatic, for in rendering idioms one can seldom find an equivalent which preserves all the point and grace of the original.—*Guesses at Truth.*

161.

A verbal translation is not nicely to be affected, because the spirit and grace of two languages is commonly lost by it; and methinks it resembles arras hangings turned the wrong side outwards; all the parts appear misshapen and deformed.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

162.

Of all books the Bible loses least of its force and dignity and beauty from being translated into other languages, wherever the translation is not erroneous. One version may indeed excel another; in that its diction may be more expressive, or simple, or more majestic; but in every version

the Bible contains the sublimest thoughts uttered in plain and fitting words. It was written for the whole world, not for any single nation or age; and though its thoughts are above common thoughts, they are so as coming from the primal Fountain of Truth, not as having been elaborated and piled up by the workings of abstraction and reflection.—*Guesses at Truth.*

## 163.

The Bible is unquestionably the richest repository of thought and imagery, and the best model of pure style, that our language can boast. It would be difficult to discover in its pages a single instance of affected or bombastic phraseology; a circumstance, probably, arising from the subdued and chastened tone of feeling with which the translation was executed, and a remarkable specimen, therefore, of the influence exerted on diction by the moral qualities of the writer. Yet its very simplicity and unostentatious character are attributes which render it distasteful, in a critical point of view, to sophistical and pretending minds.—*W. B. Clulow.*

## 164.

Translation is a province everybody thinketh himself qualified to undertake, but very few are found equal to it: the mechanic rules, the common laws which are to be observed, are very seldom obeyed; and sometimes a translation may prove a very bad one when these are most strictly regarded. Too scrupulous an observation of rules spoileth all sorts of writings: it maketh them stiff and formal; it betrayeth a weak and pedantic genius, and such nice writers are fitter to make *transcribers* than *translators*.

The first qualification of a good translator is an exact understanding, an absolute mastery of the language he translateth *from* and the language he

translateth *to*. We are not only required to understand our own and a foreign tongue, as critics and grammarians; we must not only be perfect masters of each separately, but we must more especially study the relation and comparison between them. In this do lie the great art and difficulty of translating; and not being able to reach the full compass, the differences, the properties, and beauties of one language, is the foundation of all faulty rendering into another.  
—*Felton*.

## 165.

The knowledge of Languages, Sciences, Histories, &c., is not innate to us; it doth not of itself spring up in our minds; it is not any ways incident by chance or infused by grace, (except rarely by miracle); common observation doth not produce it; it cannot be purchased at any rate, except by that for which, it was said of old, the gods sell all things, that is, for pains; without which the best wit and the greatest capacity may not render a man learned, as the best soil will not yield good fruit or grain if they be not planted nor sown therein.—*Dr. Barrow*.

## 166.

Those who have read of everything, are thought to understand everything too; but it is not always so. Reading furnishes the mind only with materials of knowledge; it is thinking that makes what we read ours. We are of the ruminating kind, and it is not enough to cram ourselves with a great load of collections; unless we chew them over again they will not give us strength and nourishment.—*John Locke*.

## 167.

This is to be exactly observed, that not only exceeding great progression may be made in those studies, to which a man is swayed by a natural

proclivity, but also that there may be found, in studies properly selected for that purpose, cases and remedies to promote such kind of knowledge to the impressions whereof a man may, by some imperfection of nature, be most unapt and insufficient. As, for example, if a man be bird-witted, that is, quickly carried away, and hath not patient faculty of attention, the mathematics give a remedy thereunto; wherein, if the wit be caught away but for a moment, the demonstration is new to begin.—*Bacon.*

## 168.

In the matter of reading, I would have thee fix upon some particular authors and make them thine own. If thou art everywhere, thou wilt be nowhere; but like a man that spends his life in travel, he has many hosts, but few friends; which is the condition of him who skips from one book to another; the variety does but disturb his head; and, for want of digesting, it turns to corruption instead of nourishment.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

## 169.

If thou buyest fine books only to set up in thy closet, and never readest them, thou wilt be like a man that getteth in nice provisions and never eats of them.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

## 170.

It seems unadvisable to attempt composition in early life, as the understanding is then almost wholly unfurnished with thought as well as expression; and not possessing the requisite materials for composing would only waste in the effort the time and attention which had better be occupied with surrounding objects or other sources of information. Milton might well censure as a “preposterous exaction” what he calls “forcing the empty wits of children to compose themes, verses, and orations, which,” says he, “are the arts of ripest judgment,

and the final work of a head filled by long reading and observing with elegant maxims and copious invention." The remark, though directed especially against juvenile essays in the learned languages, applies no less to similar attempts in our own tongue.—*W. B. Chulow.*

171.

Use is the best master of language; and as money to be current, requires to be struck from the die of the State, so language to be received requires the consent of the learned.—*Quintilian.*

172.

They who are learning to compose and arrange their sentences with accuracy and order, are learning at the same time to think with accuracy and order.—*Dr. Blair.*

173.

Affect not hard words: a design to be thought learned thereby, shews want of learning; for the more knowing any man is, the plainer he is able to express his mind. But, on the other side, thou art not to descend to low and mean expressions; that will savour of an ungenteel breeding and coarse conversation.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

174.

Expression is the *clothing* of thought; its reception with the world depends as much upon this, as a man's does upon the *coat* he wears.—*W. Danby.*

175.

No learning ought to be learned with bondage; for bodily labours wrought by compulsion hurt not the body, but any learning learned by compulsion tarrieth not long in the mind.—*Roger Ascham.*

176.

When we meet with repetitions of words in a composition, and, on endeavouring to correct them,



we find their removal would impair the effect, we should leave them; to do otherwise shews a blind fastidiousness which is unable to perceive that, in such a case, a repetition is no defect; that is one of those points, however, which admit of no general rule. The meaning of a passage will be changed by the meaning of the words made use of in its expression. Meaning receives from, rather than imparts to, words their force.—*Pascal*.

177.

An epithet is an addition, but an addition may be an incumbrance. Some writers accumulate epithets, which weaken oftener than they strengthen; throwing a haze over the objects instead of bringing out their features more distinctly. As a general maxim no epithet should be used which does not express something not expressed in the context, nor so implied in it as to be immediately deducible.

A great master and critic in style observes that "Thucydides and Demosthenes lay it down as a rule never to say what they have reason to suppose would occur to the auditor and reader in consequence of any thing said before, knowing that every one is more pleased and more easily led by us when we bring forth his thoughts indirectly and imperceptibly than when we elbow them and outstrip them with our own." (*Landor, Imagin. Conv. i. 129.*)—*Guesses at Truth*.

178.

One mark of mental ability is the being able to make a thorough comparison of the different styles in which authors have written, and of their treatment of the subjects they have written upon.—*W. Danby*.

179.

In the pursuit of knowledge follow it wherever it is to be found; like fern it is the produce of all

climates, and like coin its circulation is not restricted to any particular class. We are ignorant in youth from idleness, and we continue so in manhood from pride; for pride is less ashamed of being ignorant than of being instructed, and she looks too high to find that which very often lies beneath her. Therefore condescend to men of low estate, and be for wisdom that which Alcibiades was for power. He that rings only one bell will hear only one sound; and he that lives only with one class will see but one scene of the great drama of life. Mr. Locke was asked how he had contrived to accumulate a mine of knowledge so rich, yet so extensive and so deep; he replied that he attributed what little he knew to the not having been ashamed to ask for information, and to the rule he had laid down of conversing with all descriptions of men on those topics chiefly that formed their own peculiar professions or pursuits. I myself have heard a common blacksmith eloquent when welding of iron has been the theme; for what we know thoroughly we can usually express clearly, since ideas will supply words, but words will not always supply ideas. Therefore when I meet with any that write obscurely, or converse confusedly, I am apt to suspect two things; first, that such persons do not understand themselves; and, secondly, that they are not worthy of being understood by others.—*Lacon*.

180.

There are three kinds of writing—the insipid, the affected, and the decisive: the *insipid* is when the style and expression are weakened and perplexed, with little meaning and less decision; the *affected*, when a conceited arrogance is covered by a pretended modesty, with a pompous diction, and often studied obscurity, and when a fancied



knowledge is substituted for real ignorance ; the *decisive*, when a well-grounded confidence is shewn, not so much in the writer's own power, as in a thorough conviction of the truth of what is asserted, and clearly explained. If he appears to lay down the law, he does it from a certitude of its being founded in justice ; if he advances an opinion, it is with a modest appeal to the unperverted, unsophisticated sense and feelings of mankind, whether he addresses himself to his reader's feelings, reason, or imagination.—*W. Danby.*

181.

The collocation of words is so artificial in Shakespeare and Milton that you may as well think of pushing a brick out of a wall with your forefinger, as attempt to remove a word out of any of their finished passages.—*S. T. Coleridge.*

182.

The great source of a loose style is the injudicious use of synonymous terms.—*Dr. Blair.*

183.

What we can easily comprehend, may appear to us easy to compose, but the one may sometimes be in an inverse ratio with the other, which shews itself in the difficulty of an expressive simplicity. Perhaps this may arise from the manner in which ideas are arranged in the head, and from the difference of the qualities of taste, judgment, imagination, &c., that actuate those ideas.—*W. Danby.*

184.

Written language, though a tolerable medium for the conveyance of fact, is very inadequate in matters of passion, which often depend on something undefinable in looks, tone, or general demeanour. In representations of things addressed to the eye, and especially for the seizure of the momentary effect, painting has, to all minds not

eminently gifted with the imaginative faculty, a decisive advantage over verbal description. But in cases which speak more directly to that faculty, words, being only dead symbols, do not, like painting or sculpture, tend to bound its operations, but rather set it upon the weaving of its own wondrous spells.—*W. B. Clulow.*

185.

One powerful impediment to extemporary public speaking might be obviated, or at least diminished, by the simple reflection that the largest audience is only an assemblage of units; for what man of ordinary abilities finds difficulty or embarrassment in expressing his ideas on any subject with which he is familiar before a single individual?—*W. B. Clulow.*

186.

Study to make it easy for thee to speak upon all occasions and subjects. Consider what expressions would be fit to use when thou wouldest excuse a fault, beg a favour, deny a request, give thanks, reprove, &c. Good forms of words and variety of sayings will be of great service, and may make thee splendid, by letting thee in handsomely to what thou hast to say. But in using these, great care is to be taken not to fall into pedantry; for that would render thee the most nauseous and ridiculous wretch in the world. Avoid therefore frequent repetitions of the same set of phrases, all hard and unusual words, far-fetched conceits, and all sorts of affectedness in look, gesture, or tone of voice. If thou dressest up in something that is unnatural or unfashionable, *Risum teneatis amici?* thou wilt be the laugh of the company.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

187.

Pronunciation standeth partly in fashioning the tongue and partly in framing the gesture. The

tongue or voyce is praiseworthie, if the utter-  
aunce be audible, strong and easie, and apt to  
order as wee list. Therefore, they that minde  
to get praise in telling their minde in open  
audience, must, at the first beginning, speake  
somewhat softlie, use meete pausing, and beeying  
somewhat heated, rise with their voyce, as tyme  
and cause shall best require. They that have no  
good voyces by nature, or cannot well utter their  
wordes, must seek for helpe elsewhere. Some  
there bee that either naturally, or through folly  
have such evill voyces, and suche lacke of utter-  
aunce, and such evill gesture, that it muche de-  
faceth all their doynge. One pipes out his words  
so small, through defaulte of his windepipes, that  
ye would thinke he whistled. An other is hoarse  
in his throte. An other speakes in his throte, as  
though a good ale crumme stucke fast. An other  
rattles his wordes. An other choppes his wordes.  
An other speakes as though his wordes had neede  
to be heaved out with leavers. An other speakes  
as though his wordes should be weighed in a  
balance. An other gapes to fetch winde at every  
thirde worde. This manne barks out his  
Englishe Northern like, with *I saie*, and *thou lad*.  
An other speakes so finely as though he were  
brought up in a ladie's chamber. Some blowe  
out their nostrilles. Some sighes out their  
woordes. Some singes their sentences. Some  
laughes altogether when they speake to any  
bodie. Some gruntes like a hogge. Some cackles  
like a henne or a jackedawe. Some speakes as  
though they should tell in their sleeve. Some  
cries out so loude that they would make a man's  
ears ake to heare them. Some coughes at every  
word. Some hemmes it out. Some spittes fire,  
they talk so hottely. Some make a wrie mouth,  
and so they wrest out their wordes. Some whines

like a pigge. Some suppes their wordes up as a poore man doth his porage. Some noddeth at every sentence. An other winkes with one eye and some with both. This man frouneth alwaies when he speakes. An other lookes ever as though he were madde. Some cannot speake but they must goe up and doune, or at the least be styrring their feete as though they stood in a cokerying boate. An other will plaie with his cappe in his hand, and so tell his tale. Some when they speake in a great companie, will looke all one waie. Some pores upon the ground as though they sought for pinnes. Some swelles in the face and filles their cheekes full of winde, as though they would blow out their wordes. Some settes forthe their lippes two inches good beyonde their teeth. Some talkes as though their tongue went of pattines. Some shew all their teeth. Some speakes in their teeth altogether. Some lettes their wordes fall in their lippes, scant opening them when they speake. There are a thousand suche faultes among men, bothe for their speche, and also for their gesture, the which if in their young yeres they be not remedied, they will hardly bee forgott when they come to man's state.—*Wilson*.

188.

Eloquence is the art of expressing things in such a manner that—first, the persons addressed shall listen not only without uneasiness but with satisfaction; and secondly, they shall feel an interest in the subjects discussed, and shall accompany them with beneficial reflections.

It consists, then, in a correspondence aimed at, on the one hand, between the mind of the writer or speaker and the feelings of those addressed, and, on the other, between the thoughts as they arise in the mind and the language which is made

their vehicle; all which supposes a profound study of the heart of man to acquire a knowledge of its most secret springs, and to draw out the desired emotions by appropriate language. We ought to put ourselves in the place of those whom we address, and to make trial upon our own heart of any touching or forcible turn of discourse, in order to ascertain whether the one is calculated to affect the other; and thus be assured of carrying with us the sympathies of the hearer. We ought, as much as possible, to study simplicity and nature, and to give no undue elevation to what is in itself low, nor to lower what is great. It is not enough that a thought or an illustration be beautiful; it must be appropriate to our subject, in which nothing ought to be excessive and nothing deficient.—*Pascal*.

189.

Philosophy delights in analysis; poetry in combination. The former represents things as they are, for its leading object is instruction; the latter as we would wish them to be, for its principal design is pleasure. Philosophy is concerned chiefly with causes; poetry with effects. The one gives scope to the exercise of judgment; the other, of imagination. Philosophy presents us with an anatomical dissection; poetry exhibits the object clothed with flesh and blood, and animated with passion. The element of philosophy is argument; that of poetry feeling. Between philosophy and poetry there is no essential contrariety; for poetry implies not the rejection but the use of philosophy. It includes, however, something which philosophy alone cannot reach; and the portion of it which it employs, it disguises by art. On this account, poetry is often, but without justice, deemed incompatible with philosophy.—*W. B. Chulow*.



## 190.

To the priviledge of absurdity no living creature is subject but man onely. And of man those are of all most subject to it that professe philosophy. For it is most true that Cicero saith of them somewhere, that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the definitions or explications of the names they are to use ; which is a method they are to use onely in Geometry, whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.—*Hobbes*.

## 191.

Study to acquire such a philosophy as is not barren and babbling, but solid and true ; not such an one as floats upon the surface of endless verbal controversies, but one that enters into the nature of things.—*Abp. Leighton*.

## 192.

There is no man sufficient of himself to establish or perfect any one art or science. Having received from our ancestors the product of all their meditations and researches, we ought daily to add what we can to it, and by that means contribute all in our power to the increase and perfection of knowledge.—*Galen*.

## 193.

The science of the mathematics performs *more* than it promises, but the science of metaphysics promises more than it *performs*. The study of the mathematics, like the Nile, begins in minuteness but ends in magnificence ; but the study of metaphysics begins with a torrent of tropes, and a copious current of words, yet loses itself at last in obscurity and conjecture like the Niger in his barren deserts of sand.—*Lacon*.

## 194.

The ordering of exercises is a matter of great consequence to help or to hint; for, as is well observed by Cicero, men, in exercising their faculties, if they be not well advised, *do exercise their faults and get ill habits* as well as good; so that there is a great judgment to be had in the continuance and intermission of exercises.—*Bacon*.

## 195.

They [the mathematics] effectually exercise the mind, and plainly demonstrate every thing within their reach; they draw certain conclusions, instruct by profitable rules, and unfold pleasant questions. Their discipline inures and corroborates the mind to a constant diligence in study; they wholly deliver us from a credulous simplicity; they effectually restrain us from rash presumption; most easily incline us to a due assent, and perfectly subject us to the government of right reason.—*Dr. Barrow*.

## 196.

Every exercise of the mind upon Theorems of Science, like generous and manly exercise of the body, tends to strengthen and call forth Nature's original vigour. The nerves of reason are braced by the mere employ, and we become abler actors in the drama of life, whether our part be of the busier or sedater kind.—*Harris*.

## 197.

Of Geometry it is not too much to say that it is a necessary part of a good education. There is no other study by which the Reason can be so exactly and so rigorously exercised. In learning Geometry, as I have on a former occasion said [*University Education*, p. 139], the Student is rendered familiar with the most perfect examples



of strict inference ; he is compelled habitually to fix his attention on those conditions on which the cogency of the demonstration depends ; and in the mistakes and imperfect attempts at demonstration made by himself and others, he is presented with examples of the more natural fallacies which he sees exposed and corrected. He is accustomed to a chain of deduction in which each link hangs from the preceding, yet without any insecurity in the whole ; to an ascent, beginning from solid ground, on which each step, as soon as it is made, is a foundation for a further ascent, no less solid than the first self-evident truths. Hence he learns continuity of attention, coherency of thought, and confidence in the power of human reason to arrive at the truth. These great advantages, resulting from the study of Geometry, have justly made it a part of every good system of liberal education from the time of the Greeks to our own.—*Dr. Whewell.*

## 198.

The value of mathematical instruction as a preparation for those more difficult investigations (physiology, society, government, &c.) consists in the applicability not of its doctrines but of its method. Mathematics will ever remain the most perfect type of the deductive method in general ; and the applications of mathematics to the simpler branches of physics furnish the only school in which philosophers can effectually learn the most difficult and important portion of their art, the employment of the laws of simpler phenomena for explaining and predicting those of the more complex. These grounds are quite sufficient for deeming mathematical training an indispensable basis of real scientific education, and regarding, with Plato, one who is *ἀγεωμέτρητος*, as wanting in one of the most essential qualifications for the

successful cultivation of the higher branches of philosophy.—*John Stuart Mill.*

199.

I remember a young man at the University who refused to read Euclid's Elements,—*because he was a man of fortune, and was never likely to become a carpenter.* His understanding was too narrow to conceive the utility of Geometry, &c., in strengthening the reason and advancing science.—*Dr: Knox.*

200.

Would you have a man reason well, you must use him to it betimes, and exercise his mind in observing the connexion of ideas and following them in train. Nothing does this better than Mathematics; which, therefore, I think should be taught all those who have time and opportunity; not so much to make them Mathematicians as to make them reasonable creatures.—*John Locke.*

201.

He that gives a portion of his time and talent to the investigation of Mathematical truth will come to all other questions with a decided advantage over his opponents. He will be in argument what the ancient Romans were in the field; to them the day of battle was a day of comparative recreation, because they were ever accustomed to exercise with arms much heavier than they fought with; and their reviews differed from a real battle in two respects, they encountered more fatigue but the victory was bloodless.—*Lacon.*

202.

The Mathematics are either pure or mixed. To the pure Mathematics are those sciences belonging which handle quantity determinate, merely severed from any axioms of natural philosophy; and these are two, Geometry and Arithmetic; the one handling quantity continued, and the

other dissevered. Mixed hath for subject some axioms or parts of natural philosophy, and considereth quantity determined, as it is auxiliary and incident unto them: For many parts of nature can neither be invented with sufficient subtilty, nor demonstrated with sufficient perspicuity, nor accommodated unto use with sufficient dexterity, without the aid and intervening of the Mathematics; of which sort are perspective, music, astronomy, cosmography, architecture, enginery, and divers others.

In the Mathematics I can report no deficiency, except it be that men do not sufficiently understand the excellent use of the pure Mathematics, in that they do remedy and cure many defects in the wit and faculties intellectual. For, if the wit be dull, they sharpen it; if too wandering, they fix it; if too inherent in the sense, they abstract it. So that as tennis is a game of no use in itself, but of great use in respect that it maketh a quick eye, and a body ready to put itself into all postures; so in the Mathematics, that use which is collateral and intervenient is no less worthy than that which is principal and intended. And as for the mixed Mathematics, I may only make this prediction, that there cannot fail to be more kinds of them, as nature grows further disclosed.—*Bacon*.

203.

The Principles of Natural Philosophy are the Principles of common sense.—*Professor Daniel*.

204.

*Elementary Mechanics* should now form a part of intellectual education, in order that the student may understand the theory of universal gravitation; for our intellectual education should cultivate such ideas as enable the student to understand the most complete and admirable portions

of the knowledge which the human race has attained to.—*Dr. Whewell.*

205:

Some dispositions evince an unbounded admiration for antiquity, others eagerly embrace novelty, and but few can preserve the just medium, so as neither to tear up what the ancients have correctly laid down, nor to despise the just innovations of the moderns. But this is very prejudicial to the sciences and philosophy, and instead of a correct judgment, we have but the factions of the ancients and moderns. Truth is not to be sought in the good fortune of any particular juncture of time which is uncertain, but in the light of nature and experience which is eternal.—*Bacon.*

206.

Men of strong minds and who think for themselves should not be discouraged on finding occasionally that some of their best ideas have been anticipated by former writers; they will neither anathematize others with a "*pereant qui ante nos nostra dixerint*," nor despair themselves. They will rather go on in science, like John Hunter in physics, discovering things before discovered, until, like him, they are rewarded with a *terra* hitherto *incognita* in the sciences, an empire indisputably their own, both by right of conquest and of discovery. They must not, however, be disappointed if their discoveries like his be unappreciated by their day.—*Lacon.*

207.

It would be madness and inconsistency to suppose that things, which have never yet been performed, can be performed without employing some hitherto untried means.—*Bacon.*

208.

Art and science differ. The object of science

is knowledge ; the objects of art are works.—*Dr. Whewell.*

209.

We know the effects of many things, but the causes of few ; experience, therefore, is a surer guide than imagination, and inquiry than conjecture. But those physical difficulties which you cannot account for, be very slow to arraign, for he that would be wiser than nature, would be wiser than God.—*Bacon.*

210.

It is a test of true theories not only to account for, but to predict phænomena.—*Dr. Whewell.*

211.

A really useful induction for the discovery and demonstration of the arts and sciences should separate nature by proper rejections and exclusions, and then conclude for the affirmative after collecting a sufficient number of negatives.—*Bacon.*

212.

That which is most useful in practice is most correct in theory.—*Bacon.*

213.

*The Logic of Induction* consists in stating the facts and the inference in such a manner, that the evidence of the inference is manifest ; just as *the Logic of Deduction* consists in stating the premises and the conclusion in such a manner that the evidence of the conclusion is manifest.—*Dr. Whewell.*

214.

The mathematical postulate, that “ things which are equal to the same are equal to one another,” is similar to the form of the syllogism in logic, which unites things agreeing in the middle term.—*Bacon.*



215.

The art of reasoning which a judicious logic affords is not so much the art of *acquiring* knowledge, as the art of *communicating* it to others, or *recording* it in the manner that may be most profitable for our own future advancement.—*Brown.*

216.

Those grave sciences, logic and rhetoric, the one for judgment the other for ornament, do suppose the learner ripe for both; else it is, as if one should learn to weigh, or measure, or to paint the wind. Those arts are the rules and directions how to set forth and dispose the matter; and if the mind be empty thereof, if it have not gathered that which Cicero calleth *sylva* and *supellex*, *stuff* and *variety*; to begin with those arts, it doth work but this effect, that the wisdom of those arts, which is great and universal, will be made almost contemptible, and degenerate into childish sophistry.—*Bacon.*

217.

To get up by memory a metaphysical theory is as useless as any other acquisition of mere words; but to test a theory by the individual's own experience, and only to accept it as a truth when he finds that it supplies him with a key to the secrets of his own mind, is a scientific method of attaining self-knowledge, which no thoughtful man should despise.—

218.

The science of jurisprudence is certainly the most honourable occupation of the understanding, because it is the most immediately subservient to the general safety and comfort.—*Sir James Mackintosh.*

219.

All history is only the precepts of Moral Phi-



losophy reduced into examples. Moral Philosophy is divided into two parts, ethics and politics; the first instructs us in our private offices of virtue, the second in those which relate to the management of the commonwealth.—*Dryden*.

220.

Observe diligently things past, because they throw great light upon things to come; since it happens that the world will always be of the same nature, and that all which is, and shall be, hath been before; because the same things do return, but under divers names and colours. And yet not every man doth know them again, but only one who is wise and doth consider them diligently.—*Guicciardini*.

221.

The difference between a great mind's and a little mind's use of history is this. The latter would consider, for instance, what Luther did, taught, or sanctioned; the former, what Luther—a Luther—would now do, teach, and sanction.—*S. T. Coleridge*.

222.

A writer who builds his arguments upon facts is not easily to be confuted. He is not to be answered by general assertions or general reproaches. He may want eloquence to amuse or persuade; but, speaking truth, he must always convince.—*Letters of Junius*.

223.

In reading histories, carry an indifferent affection along with thee; and never engage thy inclination so firmly to what thou meetest in one author, as to leave no place for the truth or greater probability thou mayest find in another.—*Dr. T. Fuller*.

224.

I am extremely sceptical as to the real value

of public oral teaching on such a subject as mine [Modern History]. If Abelard were living now, I believe he would address his instructions, not to the ears of thousands crowding round his chair, but to the eyes of myriads reading them in studious seclusion.—*Sir James Stephen.*

225.

People have now-a-days got a strange opinion that everything should be taught by lectures. Now, I cannot see that lectures can do so much good as reading the books from which the lectures are taken. I know nothing that can be best taught by lectures, except where experiments are to be shewn. You may teach chemistry by lectures; you might teach the making of shoes by lectures.—*Dr. Samuel Johnson.*

226.

Men are often more disposed to attend to what they read than to what they hear; their attention is less disturbed, either by personal regards or by personal jealousies. They in a manner lay the world aside to attend to the book they have in hand.—*W. Danby.*

227.

In reading books observe this direction—consider the scope and design of the whole, and judge of the particular passages with reference to that; and if there be any single passage which thou apprehendest not the meaning of, or which at the first reading seems to have another meaning than is agreeable to the author's design, build nothing upon such a passage, but wait awhile to see if the author will not explain himself; and if he does not, and thou canst not at last discern how that passage can, without some straining of words, be reconciled with others, then conclude however, and take for granted that the author, if he appears a man of judgment, is consistent

with himself, and consequently that in that passage (however the words may sound) he did not mean to thwart and contradict all the rest of his book.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

228.

*Natural History* ought to form a part of intellectual Education, in order to correct certain prejudices which arise from cultivating the intellect by means of Mathematics alone; and in order to lead the student to see that the division of things into kinds, and the attribution and use of names, are processes susceptible of great precision.—*Dr. Whewell.*

229.

Since every interpretation of nature sets out from the senses, and leads, by a regular fixed and well-established road, from the perceptions of the senses to those of the understanding, (which are true notions and axioms) it necessarily follows that, in proportion as the representatives or ministerings of the senses are more abundant and accurate, everything else must be more easy and successful.—*Bacon.*

230.

The ornamental accomplishments, so far as there is room for them without breaking in upon others, deserve not to be neglected, for they have their uses too. They furnish engagement for the time; filling up the spaces which would be otherwise worse employed; they find matter for the judgment to work upon, exercise the faculties, and keep them steady to one regular pursuit; they procure credit to the possessor, make men sociable by being able to give mutual entertainment, and thereby introduce opportunities of doing one another more important services, by bringing them into better confidence and knowledge of their reciprocal wants. Though they

terminate only in pleasure, yet the amusements of life, when to be had without an after-reckoning, are an object well worth the striving for.—*Search's Light of Nature.*

## 231.

Music used moderately, like sleep, is an excellent recreation.—

## 232.

As to cards and dice, I think the safest and best way is, never to learn to play upon them, and so to be incapacitated for those dangerous temptations and incroaching wasters of time.—*John Locke.*

## 233.

The association of ideas may have a greater influence on our minds than we are aware of; a modest mind will shrink (like the sensitive plant) from an idea, on account of its natural association with others, that it will have a still greater horror of.—*W. Danby.*

## 234.

If a man by modesty shrinks from uttering an indecent phrase before a wife or a sister in a private room, what must be the effect when a repetition of such treasons (for all gross and libidinous allusions are emphatically treasons against the very foundations of human society, against all its endearing charities, and all the mother virtues) is hazarded before a mixed multitude in a public theatre?—*S. T. Coleridge.*

## 235.

He that would have the perfection of pleasure must be moderate in the use of it.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

## 236.

Mental pleasures never cloy; unlike those of the body, they are increased by repetition, approved of by reflection, and strengthened by enjoyment.—*Lacon.*

237.

Take heed to avoid all those games and sports that are apt to take up much of thy time, or engage thy affections. He that spends all his life in sports, is like one who wears nothing but fringes, and eats nothing but sauces.—*Dr. T. Fuller*:

238.

An inclination to find defects in any thing may often arise from a want of power to perceive beauties; we should, however, have an eye open to both.—*W. Danby*.

239.

Two men shall say the very same things, yet the one shall please and the other offend. So useful is a graceful, and so hurtful an unseemly manner.—

240.

But among all the accomplishments of youth there is none preferable to a decent and agreeable behaviour among men, a modest freedom of speech, a soft and elegant manner of address, a graceful and lively deportment, a cheerful gravity and good humour, with a mind appearing even serene under the ruffling accidents of human life. Add to this, a pleasing solemnity of reverence when the discourse turns upon anything sacred or divine, a becoming neglect of injuries, a hatred of calumny and slander, a habit of speaking well of others, a pleasing benevolence and readiness to do good to mankind, and special compassion to the miserable, with an air and countenance, in a natural and unaffected manner, expressive of all these excellent qualifications.—*Dr. Watts*.

241.

People are rendered totally incapable of elegance by the want of good-nature and the gentle affections; by the want of modesty and sensibility; and by the want of that nobleness

of spirit which arises from a consciousness of lofty and generous sentiments. The absence of these native charms is generally supplied by a brisk stupidity, an impudence unconscious of defeat, a cast of malice, and an uncommon tendency to ridicule; as if nature had given these her step-children an instinctive intelligence, that they can rise out of contempt only by the depression of others.—*Clio, or a Discourse on Taste.*

242.

Natural grace seems to consist in putting a figure precisely in the attitude that the action, or the intent of that attitude requires; and all beyond that is affectation, all below it is awkwardness.—*W. Danby.*

243.

Elegance of taste procures to a man so much enjoyment at home, or easily within reach, that, in order to be occupied, he is, in youth, under no temptation to precipitate into hunting, gaming, drinking; nor, in middle age, to deliver himself over to ambition; nor, in old age, to avarice. A just relish of what is beautiful, proper, elegant, and ornamental, in writing or painting, in architecture or gardening, is a fine preparation for discerning what is beautiful, just, elegant, or magnanimous in character or behaviour. But after all that is said in praise of taste, we must place it in a subordinate rank to good sense, and a power and habit of just reasoning.—*Lord Kaimes.*

244.

May not taste be compared to that exquisite sense of the bee, which instantly discovers and extracts the quintessence of every flower, and disregards all the rest of it?—



245.

As the ear may be a nice discerner of sounds, yet the voice be not sufficiently flexible to preserve a correct modulation; so in literary and other affairs, the judgment and taste may be pre-eminent, while the powers of execution are of an inferior description.—*W. B. Clulow.*

246.

Travel not early, before thy judgment be risen; lest thou observest shows rather than substance.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

247.

A great degree of mental maturity, and of acquired knowledge, is necessary to enable the mind to derive advantage, and avoid inconvenience from visiting a foreign nation. To expect that boys (*either in body or mind*) should make observations on men or manners, should weigh and compare the laws, institutions, customs, and characteristics of various people, is to expect an impossibility. It is no less absurd to suppose that boys will not be struck and captivated with vanity and trifles.—*Dr. Knox.*

248.

There is another opportunity of gaining experience, to be won from pleasure itself abroad. In those vernal seasons of the year, when the air is calm and pleasant, it were an injury and sullenness against nature not to go out and see her riches, and partake in her rejoicing with heaven and earth. I should not, therefore, be a persuader to them of studying much then, after two or three years that they have laid their grounds, but to ride out in companies with prudent and staid guides, to all the quarters of the land; learning and observing places of strength, all commodities of building and of soil, for towns and tillage, harbours, and ports for trade; sometimes taking sea, as far as to

our navy, to learn there also what they can on the practical knowledge of sailing and of sea-fight. These ways would try all their peculiar gifts of nature; and if there were any secret excellence among them, would fetch it out, and give it fair opportunities to advance itself by, which could not but mightily redound to the good of this nation, and bring into fashion again those old admired virtues and excellencies, with far more advantage now, in this purity of Christian knowledge....But if they desire to see other countries at three or four and twenty years of age, *not to learn principles, but to enlarge experience, and make wise observations*, they will by that time be such as shall deserve the regard and honour of all men where they pass, and the society and friendship of those in all places who are best and most eminent; and perhaps then other nations will be glad to visit us for their breeding, or else to imitate us in their own country.—*John Milton.*

249.

If men praise your efforts, suspect their judgment; if they censure them, your own.—*Lacon.*

250.

Undeserved praise is the severest censure; therefore, sit down and consider, when you are praised, whether you deserve it or not; if not, depend upon it you are only laughed at and abused.—*Lord Chesterfield.*

251.

The excellence of veneration consists purely in its being fixed upon a worthy object; when felt indiscriminately, it is idolatry or insanity. To tax any one, therefore, with want of reverence, because he pays no respect to what *we venerate*, is either irrelevant or is a mere confusion.—*Dr. Arnold.*

252.

It is an immense blessing to be perfectly callous to ridicule; or, which comes to the same thing, to be conscious thoroughly that what we have in us of noble and delicate, is not ridiculous to any but fools, and that, if fools will laugh, wise men will do well to let them.—*Dr. Arnold.*

253.

Satire cannot be too strong, when it has a proper object, but the object ceases to be so, when satirized beyond its deserts. Such satire defeats its own end, and is only fit to gratify ill-nature.—*W. Danby.*

254.

As for jest, there are certain things which ought to be privileged from it; namely, religion, matters of state, great persons, any man's present business of importance, and any case that deserveth pity.—*Bacon.*

255.

The infirmities of age are not a fit subject for laughter, since they must at last be the portion of us all. When the day that is passing over us is gone, our lives are proportionably contracted;—what reason, then, have the fish to be merry, when the water in which they swim is ebbing away?—*Chinese Maxim.*

256.

A wise man moves with one foot, stands fast with the other, and does not quit the station he occupies without well considering that to which he intends to go.—*Chanakya.*

257.

The action of strong character seems to demand something firm in its corporeal basis, as massive engines require, for their weight and for their working, to be fixed on a solid foundation.—*John Foster.*

258.

Neutrality seems to me a natural state for men of fair honesty, moderate wit, and much indolence; they cannot get strong impressions of what is true and right, and the weak impression, which is all they can take, cannot overcome indolence and fear.—*Dr. Arnold.*

259.

Every thing is dangerous to him that is afraid of it.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

260.

To be exquisitely alive to gentle impressions, and yet be able to preserve, when the prosecution of a design requires it, an immoveable heart amidst the most imperious causes of subduing emotion, is perhaps not an impossible constitution of mind, but it must be the rarest endowment of humanity.—*John Foster.*

261.

The body has its rights; and it will have them. They cannot be trampled upon or slighted without peril. The body ought to be the soul's best friend, and cordial, dutiful helpmate. Many of the studious, however, have neglected to make it so; whence the large part of the miseries of authorship. Some good men have treated it as an enemy; and then it has become a fiend, and plagued them.—*Guesses at Truth.*

262.

The vices operate like age, bring on disease before its time, and in the prime of youth leave the character broken and exhausted.—*Letters of Junius.*

263.

In eating and drinking let a man do nothing contrary to the health of the body, nothing to indispose it, as a mansion and instrument of the

soul; nothing to the dishonour of himself as a rational being, the image of God.—*Dr. Whichcote.*  
264.

Let thy sleep be necessary and healthful, not idle and expensive of time, beyond the needs and conveniences of nature. Sometimes be curious to see the preparation the sun makes, when he is coming forth from his chambers in the east.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

265.

Use thyself to rise and go to bed early. This may seem a frivolous precept, because it respects such common matters; but if it be well observed, it will contribute very much toward the rendering of life long, useful, and happy.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

266.

Life is to be measured by action, not by time; a man may die old at thirty, and young at eighty; nay, the one lives after death, and the other perished before he died.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

267.

There is found a sort of relation and correspondence between the good of the mind and the good of the body. For, as we said, that the good of the body consists of health, beauty, strength, and pleasure, so we shall find that the good of the mind, if we view it according to the doctrines of moral science, has this object in view, to render the mind sound and free from perturbations, beautiful and decked with the embellishments of true grace, vigorous and active in discharging all the duties of life,—lastly, not dull, but retaining a strong feeling of pleasure and of virtuous enjoyment.—*Bacon.*

268.

The government of man should be the monarchy of reason; it is too often a democracy of passions, or anarchy of humours.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

269.

The passions have one advantage (if it is one) over reason; they go straight forward to their object, while reason is continually erring in pursuit of hers.—*W. Danby.*

270.

If men's object be to discharge their duty to society, that kind of health is most desirable which can bear and overcome any changes and assaults. Just so, that mind is to be considered truly and properly sound and healthy which is able to overcome the most numerous and most trying temptations and disorders.—*Bacon.*

271.

As it is in the body, so it is in the mind; practice makes it what it is; and most even of those excellencies which are looked on as natural endowments will be found, when examined into more narrowly, to be the product of exercise, and to be raised to that pitch only by repeated actions.—*John Locke.*

272.

A physician can only assist nature; if she wants that assistance, the less the patient gives her to do the more chance she will have of recovering her own powers.—*W. Danby.*

273.

The mind is a spiritual being enclosed in a material and living organization; and for the education of the mind in this state of being, the impressions on the senses are as necessary as food, air, and exercise are for the development of the bodily organization. The senses feed the mind and excite the action of its own innate natural powers, but they do not produce those powers.—

274.

If the mind be without innate knowledge, is it



also to be considered as without innate feelings and capacities—a piece of blank paper, the mere passive recipient of impressions from without? The whole history of man shews this hypothesis to be an outrage on his moral nature. Naked he comes from his mother's womb; endowed with limbs and senses indeed, well fitted to the material world, yet powerless from want of use; and as for knowledge, his soul is one unvaried blank; yet has this blank been already touched by a celestial hand, and when plunged in the colours which surround it, it takes not its tinge from accident, but design, and comes forth covered with a glorious pattern.—*Professor Sedgwick.*

275.

Nature seems to treat man as a painter would his disciple, to whom he commits the outlines of a figure lightly sketched, which the scholar for himself is to colour and complete. Thus from nature we derive senses and passions, and an intellect which each of us for himself has to model into a character.—*Harris.*

276.

There are two descriptions of minds:—the one that which is capable of penetrating deeply and with acuteness the consequences of principles, and this is a sound quality of understanding; the other, that which can comprehend a large number of principles without confounding them, and this is the spirit of geometry. The one of these qualities shews force and accuracy of mind; the other comprehensiveness and amplitude. The one quality may exist without the other; the understanding may be strong and yet narrow, it may be comprehensive but weak.—*Pascal.*

277.

Little minds are in a hurry when the object proves (as it commonly does) too big for them;

they run, they puzzle, confound, and perplex themselves; they want to do everything at once, and never do it all. But a man of sense takes the time necessary for doing the thing he is about, well; and his haste to despatch a business only appears by the continuity of his application to it; he pursues it with cool steadiness, and finishes it before he begins any other.—*Lord Chesterfield*.

278.

Train the understanding. Take care that the mind has a stout and straight stem. Leave the flowers of wit and fancy to come to themselves. Sticking them on will not make them grow. You can only engraft them by grafting that which will produce them.—*Guesses at Truth*.

279.

An inferior understanding is bewildered amid the details and appendages of a subject, attaching as much importance to these as to the leading and most decisive principles. A vigorous intellect discriminates the essence of a question, and by its rapid operations compresses the necessary particulars into a very minute compass.—*W. B. Clulow*.

280.

The very appropriation of what is valuable, and the rejection of what is worthless or indifferent, in things relating to the mind, argues no slight intellectual superiority.—*W. B. Clulow*.

281.

It is one thing to know the *intrinsic* value of a thing; another to know the *current* estimation of it.—

282.

The logical part of men's minds is often good, but the mathematical part nothing worth; that is, they can judge well of the *mode* of attaining any end, but cannot estimate the *value* of the end itself.—*Bacon*.

283.

Every path of mind is so gratifying to those who love the activity of thought, that none will be without its visitors, and it is displeasing to dispraise any. But yet we may be allowed to suggest, that of all the subjects of our studies, artificial logic is the least likely to give us any useful fruit. It may form a ready debater, and assist the attainment of a loquacious fluency; but it also leads the mind to a love of unnecessary, unimportant, and unserviceable distinctions. It creates the habit of verbal argumentation, without adequate researches into facts, and encourages its pupil, not only to dispense with extensive acquisitions of knowledge in himself, but to undervalue them in others. We may appeal to the decision of those who have fairly made the experiment; whether it does not too often and most commonly end in a superficial self-complacency of mind, indolently substituting words for things; phrase for experience; cramping definitions for large inquiry; objection for discrimination; censure for judgment; and controversy for truth. Its aim is for better things, but the intelligent discernment, mental wisdom, the richly-stored memory, and the sound and penetrating judgment, must be sought for with a very different taste, and from superior materials.—*Sharon Turner.*

284.

That understanding is in a perfect state for the acquirement of knowledge which is capable, at any time, to acquire any sort of knowledge. The defects, therefore, are either—first, an inability at particular times to acquire knowledge; and secondly, an inability to acquire particular sorts of knowledge.—*Basil Montagu.*

289.

I believe there are few natures but are capable,

if not of eminent accomplishments, yet of such improvement as may render them considerable and useful enough, if they would apply themselves to the study of knowledge with any tolerable vigour, or exert their vigour with any regularity and uniformity.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

290.

We shall then use our understanding aright, when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion that they are suited to our faculties, and upon those grounds they are capable of being proposed to us; and not peremptorily or intemperately require demonstration, or demand certainty, where probability only is to be had, and which is sufficient to govern all our concernments.—*John Locke.*

291.

I am quite sure that it is a most solemn duty to cultivate our understandings to the uttermost, for I have seen the evil moral consequences of fanaticism to a greater degree than I ever expected to see them realized; and I am satisfied that a neglected intellect is far oftener the cause of mischief to a man than a perverted or over-valued one. Men retain their natural quickness and cleverness, while their reason and judgment are allowed to go to ruin, and thus they do work their minds and gain influence, and are pleased at gaining it; but it is the undisciplined mind which they are exercising, instead of one wisely disciplined.—*Dr. Arnold.*

292.

If you would fertilize the mind, the plough must be driven over and through it. The gliding of wheels is easier and rapider, but only makes it harder and more barren. Above all, in the present age of light reading, that is, of reading hastily, thoughtlessly, indiscriminately, unfruitfully, when most books are forgotten as soon as they are

finished, and very many sooner, it is well if something heavier is cast now and then into the midst of the literary public. This may scare and repel the weak, it will arouse and attract the stronger, and increase their strength by making them exert it. In the sweat of the brow is the mind as well as the body to eat its bread.—*Guesses at Truth.*

293.

If a particular branch of a tree grows out so luxuriantly as to rob the other parts of their nourishment, we call it a deformity in the tree; and we do the same when the like accident happens to the human body; ought we not also, in the same case, to hold the same opinion of the mind, notwithstanding the contrary has generally prevailed?—

294.

Childishness in boys [and in young men too], even of good abilities, seem to me to be a growing fault, and I do not know to what to ascribe it, except to the great number of exciting books of amusement, like *Pickwick*, and *Nickleby*, *Bentley's Magazine*, &c., &c. These completely satisfy all the intellectual appetite of a boy, which is rarely very voracious, and leave him totally palled, not only for his regular work, which I could well excuse in comparison, but for good literature of all sorts, even for *History* and for *Poetry*.—*Dr. Arnold.*

295.

Desultory reading is indeed most mischievous, by fostering habits of loose discontinuous thought, by turning the memory into a common sewer for rubbish of all sorts to float through, and by relaxing the power of attention, which of all our faculties most needs care, and is most improved by it. But a well-regulated course of study will no more weaken the mind than hard exercise will



weaken the body; nor will a strong mind be weighed down by its knowledge any more than an oak is by its leaves.—*Guesses at Truth.*

296.

A powerful barrier to intellectual advancement is a profusion of miscellaneous objects inviting the attention, amusing the fancy, and frittering away the feelings and thoughts. This is one reason why the wealthy, who are occupied with elegant trifles, or the industrious classes, who are seeking to be wealthy, or busied with the means of obtaining a subsistence, so rarely excel in the departments of mind.—*W. B. Clulow.*

297.

In general, experience will shew, that as want of natural appetite to food supposes and proceeds from some bodily disease, so the apathy the Stoics talk of, as much supposes, or is accompanied with, somewhat amiss in the moral character—in that which is the health of the mind—*Bp. Butler.*

298.

I do not think it at all incredible that a long course of indulgence in the pleasures of taste and imagination, without any corresponding exercise of the reason, may have emasculated the intellects of the rising generation, so that they prove feeble in comparison with their fathers, when they are called to any task requiring continuous and systematic thought.—*Dr. Whewell.*

299.

Quick wits commonly be apt to take, unapt to keep; soon hot, and desirous of this and that; as cold, and soon weary of the same again; more quick to enter speedily than able to pierce far, even like our sharp tools, whose edges be very soon turned. Such wits delight themselves in easy and pleasant studies, and never pass far forward in high and hard sciences. And therefore the



quickest wits commonly may prove the best poets, but not the wisest orators; ready of tongue to speak boldly, not deep of judgment, either for good counsel or wise writing. Also for manners and life, quick wits commonly be, in desire, new-fangled; in purpose, inconstant; light to promise anything, ready to forget everything, both benefit and injury; and thereby neither fast to friend nor fearful to foe; inquisitive of every trifle, not secret in the greatest affairs; bold with any person; busy in every matter; soothing such as be present, nipping any that is absent; of nature also, always flattering their betters, envying their equals, despising their inferiors; and by quickness of wit, very quick and ready to like none so well as themselves.—*Roger Ascham.*

300.

An obstinate ungovernable self-sufficiency plainly points out to us that state of imperfect maturity at which the graceful levity of youth is lost, and the solidity of experience not yet acquired—*Letters of Junius.*

301.

The necessity of contemplating objects in an abstract and systematic manner betrays the narrowness of our mental faculties, which are unable to apprehend what is complex without separation or analysis. Yet nothing in nature is presented to us in an abstract form; and provided we have a generally correct view of elementary qualities, the more we can combine subjects and ideas, the more rapid will be our intellectual progress.—*W: B. Chulow.*

302.

The influence of language, as the direct medium of thought, perpetuates, by habitual use, the prejudices involved in the original meaning of certain words, or by accidental association

conveys peculiar differences of meaning to the minds of different individuals, and thus strengthens and fixes in each many separate prejudices, in addition to the general prejudices of mankind.—

*Brown.*

303.

The uncertainty of human knowledge, the consequent imperfection of language, and the obscurity and intricacy of many of the subjects on which men's understandings are exercised, afford room for sophistry, for scepticism, for variety of opinion; and at the same time excite us to that deeper and closer investigation, and that thorough exertion of all our faculties, which, accompanied with a *due* distrust of ourselves and of our first impressions, will lead our reason and our feelings to the acknowledgment of truths that are beyond our comprehension; and to a reference to and reliance on that Power in whom the perfect comprehension of these truths must reside. They will lead us to the exertion of our reason as far as its sphere extends, assisted and stimulated by those feelings which our reason avows, (and for what but this co-operation were those feelings given us?) and they will teach us to confine our conclusions within that sphere; to form them in due consistency with the faculties that are given to us, and to leave all beyond that, to the Power who has given us those faculties for purposes they are fully sufficient to answer, when exercised in the manner that our reason and our consciences approve.—*W. Danby.*

304.

Objects escape the senses either from their distance, or the intervention of other bodies; or because they are not in sufficient quantity to strike the senses; or because there is not sufficient time for their acting upon the senses; or because the

impression is too violent; or because the senses are previously filled and possessed by the object, so as to leave no room for any new notion. These remarks apply principally to sight, and next to touch; which two senses act extensively in giving information, and that too upon general objects, whilst the remaining three inform us only, as it were, by their immediate action, and as to specific objects.—

305.

How differently do things appear to us, when we pay attention to them, and when we do not! And how much do our opinions depend upon the disposition of our minds!—*W. Danby.*

306.

Every thing is mixed, and so mixed, that it is often out of our power to analyze the mixture. We are therefore struck, partial judges as we are, with the most prominent parts of it, which we mistake for the characteristic qualities of the whole. It may, perhaps, like other analogies have one with the chemical mixtures, which have their affinities and opposites, and are rendered more or less simple or compound, salutary or mischievous, by them; and are capable of being neutralized or made useful, by the addition of some other ingredient, which is often within the reach of human contrivance, and shews that there are few evils for which a remedy may not be administered.—*W. Danby.*

307.

It is hard to get rid of an error, therefore take heed of admitting it.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

308.

These reasonings are unconnected: “I am richer than you; therefore, I am better”: “I am more eloquent than you; therefore, I am wiser.” The connection is rather this—“I am richer than

you; therefore, my property is greater than yours": "I am more eloquent than you; therefore, my style is better than yours. But you, after all, are neither property, nor style.—*Epictetus*.

## 309.

Stupidity generally proceeds from laziness or unwillingness. Want of ability is more shewn in not doing a thing well, than in not doing it at all.—*W. Danby*.

## 310.

How chained down, with most of us, is the mind to the sphere of action it has been accustomed to, and almost to that in which the body moves!—*W. Danby*.

## 311.

Of prejudice it has been truly said, that it has the singular ability of accommodating itself to all the possible varieties of the human mind. Some passions and vices are but thinly scattered among mankind, and find only here and there a fitness of reception. But prejudice, like the spider, makes everywhere its home. It has neither taste nor choice of place, and all that it requires is room. There is scarcely a situation, except fire and water, in which a spider will not live. So let the mind be as naked as the walls of an empty and forsaken tenement, gloomy as a dungeon, or ornamented with the richest abilities of thinking; let it be hot, cold, dark or light, lonely or inhabited, still prejudice, if undisturbed, will fill it with cobwebs, and live like the spider, where there seems nothing to live on.—

## 312.

The stronger a man's mind is, the more likely he is to be governed by his own prejudices. Strength of mind, as the term is com-

monly used, does not always mean or imply strength of judgment.—*W. Danby.*

313.

Dogmatism is a bad supporter of truth. Many certainties are contradicted: many falsehoods pass without contradiction. Contradiction is no mark of falsehood, neither is the absence of contradiction a mark of truth.—*Pascal.*

314.

We have a knowledge of truth, not only by reasoning, but by intuition, and by a clear and vivid intelligence; and it is in this way that we attain our knowledge of first principles. It is therefore in vain for reason, which has no share in producing them, to attempt to attack them. The sceptics, who make this their object, are labouring totally in vain. We know when we are awake, however unable we may be to demonstrate it by reasoning. This inability shews nothing more than the feebleness of our rational powers, but not the uncertainty of all our knowledge, as they pretend. For the knowledge of first principles, as for instance, that there are such things as space, time, motion, number, matter, is as certain as any with which our reasonings furnish us. Nay, it is upon this knowledge, by perception and intuition, that reason must rest, and found all its procedures. I perceive that there are three dimensions in space, and that number is infinite; and my reason afterwards demonstrates, that there are no two square numbers assignable, one of which is exactly double the other: We perceive principles, and we conclude propositions: and both with equal certainty, though by different ways. And it is as ridiculous for reason to demand of perception and intelligence a demonstration of these first principles before it consents to them, as it



would be for the intellect to demand of reason a clear intuition of the propositions it demonstrates.—

## 315.

The plain evidence of facts is superior to all declarations.—*Letters of Junius.*

## 316.

We can only judge of things comparatively: to do this justly, we should compare them, not with *what might be*, but with *what is*.—*W. Danby.*

## 317.

The scales of some minds are too fine, too nicely adjusted for common purposes;—diamond scales will not do for weighing wool. Very refined, very ingenious, very philosophical minds are all too scrupulous weighers: their scales turn with the millionth of a grain, and are all, from some cause, subject to the defect of indecision. They see too well how much can be said on both sides of a question. There is a sort of philosophical doubt arising from enlargement of the understanding, quite different from the irresolution of character, which is caused by infirmity of will; and when once some of these over scrupulous weighers come to a balance, that instant they become most wilful. After excessive indecision they perhaps start suddenly to a rash action.—*Edgeworth.*

## 318.

Those accustomed to judge by feeling, understand little of reasoning; they decide by a glance, and are not able to search into principles. Others, on the contrary, who are in the habit of reasoning from principles, cannot enter into matters of feeling; principles are all they look for, and they can do nothing by mere sight.—*Pascal.*



## 319.

Independence of judgment is one of the rarest things in the world; and the prevailing defect in education is the neglect of the reasoning or discursive faculties. The consequence is, that among those who are regarded as well-educated, few are capable of comprehending or discussing an extensive or complicated question. It is observed by the elegant author of Fitzosborne's Letters, that *thinking is one of the last exerted privileges of cultivated humanity.*—*W. B. Clulow.*

## 320.

The best way to acquire a well-balanced and healthy tone of the faculties, is to exercise them all more or less, and accustom them to alternate tension and relaxation.—*W. B. Clulow.*

## 321.

It seems at first sight extraordinary, that many who reason correctly on some topics, should fail to do so on others. The explanation, however, appears to coincide with that which applies to diversities of sentiment among different persons. In all cases of error, only part of the subject is perceived. Let the particulars which go to make up truth on any question, be brought equally before ten thousand separate minds, and they will all adopt the like accurate conclusion.—*W. B. Clulow.*

## 322.

Perhaps the leading distinction of superior intellect is a power of compression, a faculty which pre-supposes that of generalization. A subordinate understanding never perceives more than certain fragments or mutilated portions of a subject,—surveying the field of thought as a landscape through a tube.—*W. B. Clulow.*

## 323.

The discovery of new ideas is not essential

to the character of mental originality. A certain juxtaposition or combination of well-known truths, will often supply unquestionable proof of decided originality and invention. It is with the operation of thought somewhat as with that of the kaleidoscope, which out of a few simple materials, freshly arranged, and submitted to the action of light, produces the most surprising forms of novelty and beauty. Perhaps, I may add, that what are called creations, and in a certain sense with accuracy, are rather but new forms or combinations elaborated out of the mind's pre-existing stores, by the chemistry of genius.—*W. B. Chulow.*  
324.

Four species of idols [*εἰδωλα*] beset the human mind; to which (for distinction's sake) we have assigned names: calling the first, *Idols of the tribe*; the second, *Idols of the den*; the third, *Idols of the market*; the fourth, *Idols of the theatre*.

The formation of notions and axioms on the foundation of true induction, is the only fitting remedy, by which we can ward off and expel these idols. It is, however, of great service to point them out. For the doctrine of idols bears the same relation to the interpretation of nature, as that of the confutation of sophisms does to common logic.

The idols of the tribe are inherent in human nature, the very tribe or race of man. For man's sense is falsely asserted to be the standard of things. On the contrary, all the perceptions both of the senses and the mind, bear reference to man, and not to the universe, and the human mind resembles those uneven mirrors, which impart their own properties to different objects, from which rays are emitted which distort and disfigure them

The idols of the den are those of each individual. For every body (in addition to the errors common to the race of man) has his own individual den or cavern, which intercepts and corrupts the light of nature: either from his own peculiar and singular disposition; or from his education and intercourse with others, or from his reading, and the authority acquired by those whom he reverences and admires, or from the different impressions produced on the mind, as it happens to be pre-occupied and pre-disposed, or equable and tranquil, and the like: so that the spirit of man (according to its several dispositions) is variable, confused, and, as it were, actuated by chance; and Heraclitus said well, that men search for knowledge in lesser worlds and not in the greater or common world.

There are also idols formed by the reciprocal intercourse and society of man with man, which we call idols of the market, from the commerce and association of men with each other. For men converse by means of language; but words are formed at the will of the generality; and there arises from a bad and unapt formation of words a wonderful obstruction to the mind. Nor can the definitions and explanations with which learned men are wont to guard and protect themselves in some instances, afford a complete remedy words still manifestly force the understanding, throw everything into confusion, and lead mankind into vain and innumerable controversies and fallacies.

Lastly, there are idols which have crept into men's minds from the various dogmas of peculiar systems of philosophy, and also from the perverted rules of demonstration, and these we denominate idols of the theatre. For we regard all the systems of philosophy hitherto received or imagined, as so

many plays brought out and performed, creating fictitious and theatrical worlds. Nor do we speak only of the present systems, or of the philosophy and sects of the ancients, since numerous other plays of a similar nature can still be composed and made to agree with each other, the causes of the most opposite errors being generally the same. Nor again, do we allude merely to general systems, but also to many elements and axioms of sciences which have become inveterate by tradition, implicit credence, and neglect.—*Bacon.*

325.

Of some minds the first decisions are commonly the best, subsequent meditation serving only to bewilder or weaken their conceptions. This is chiefly the case with imaginative minds, and for the most part perhaps with those of women, who seem to arrive at results more by a species of intuition, than by a process of reasoning. On the contrary, certain persons, and those often of the deepest intellect, appear incapable of forming accurate conclusions with promptitude. Their thoughts must hover for a while over the generalities of a subject; but the conclusions which they ultimately adopt, are almost sure to be of the genuine stamp.—*W. B. Clulow.*

326.

I consider there is a certain quantity of distempered brain in the world, which, though sure to manifest itself in some way, is often checked and diverted, or prevented from attaining its ultimate effects, by the variety of absurd opinions that, in one department or another, are always to be met with or invented. The mad humour which used to be absorbed by the dreams of alchemy, witchcraft, astrology, and other exploded chimeras of the dark ages, is as rife as

ever, only expended on newer and less imaginative follies.—*W. B. Clulow.*

327.

It is more from carelessness about truth than from intentional lying, that there is so much falsehood in the world.—*Dr. Samuel Johnson.*

328.

He involves himself in a labyrinth of nonsense, who endeavours to maintain falsehood by argument.—*Letters of Junius.*

329.

Self-delusion is ever averse from enquiry, though by enquiry alone can the charm be dissolved.—*Dr. Parr.*

330.

The indiscriminate defence of right and wrong contracts the understanding while it corrupts the heart.—*Letters of Junius.*

331.

To give a reason for fancy were to weigh the fire and measure the wind.—

332.

The faculty of imagination is the great spring of human activity, and the principal source of human improvement. As it delights in presenting to the mind scenes and characters more perfect than those which we are acquainted with, it prevents us from ever being completely satisfied with our present condition or with our past attainments, and engages us continually in the pursuit of some untried enjoyment, or of some ideal excellence. Hence the ardour of the selfish to better their fortunes, and to add to their personal accomplishments; and hence the zeal of the patriot and philosopher to advance the virtue and happiness of the human race. Destroy this faculty, and the condition of man



will become as stationary as that of the brutes.—  
*Dugald Stewart.*—

333.

Imagination is the deceptive province of man's mind, the fruitful source of error and falsehood; and it is the more treacherous, inasmuch as it is not uniformly, and consistently so; imagination would serve as an infallible rule of faith if it were infallibly false. But being for the most (although not always) fallacious, it gives no indication of its proper quality, but throws the same colouring over truth and falsehood. I am not referring here to the weak and foolish; I speak of the wisest of men; and it is among them that the imagination exercises its most powerful influences over the mind. Reason may well complain that she knows not how to put a just estimate on the objects presented to her consideration. This mighty power—the perpetual antagonist of reason—which delights to shew its ascendancy by bringing it under its control and dominion, has a second nature in man. It has its joys and its sorrows, its health, its sickness, its wealth, its poverty; it compels reason, in spite of herself, to believe, to doubt, to deny; it suspends the exercise of the senses, and imparts to them again an artificial acuteness; it has its follies and its wisdom; and the most perverse thing of all is, that it fills its votaries with a complacency more full and complete even than that which reason can supply. The imaginative have pleasures peculiar to themselves, and into which those of more phlegmatic dispositions cannot enter. They aspire to mastery over the minds of others; they argue with confidence and hardihood, while others are cautious and timid; their self-complacent temperament gives them often an advantage over their hearers;



and their imaginary wisdom finds ready favour with judges as visionary as themselves. It is not in their power, indeed, to impart wisdom to fools; but they can make them happy in spite of reason, when only able to make her followers dissatisfied with themselves. The one, in fact, crowns men with glory; the other lays them low in humiliation.—*Pascal*.

334.

The sound and proper exercise of imagination may be made to contribute to the cultivation of all that is virtuous and estimable in the human character. It leads us in particular, to place ourselves in the situation of others, to enter into their feelings and wants, to participate in their distresses. It thus tends to the cultivation of sympathy, and the benevolent affections: and promotes all those feelings which exert so extensive an influence in the duties of civil and religious intercourse.—*Abercrombie*.

335.

A person of an active imagination, who is too much in the habit of exercising it, may be apt to see things in too favourable or too unfavourable a light; and may be equally liable to suffer by it, either from present anxiety, or future disappointment.—*W. Danby*.

336.

Imagination exaggerates petty objects, till they fill the mind in an extravagant degree; and in the same way, with a rash presumption, she diminishes great objects, and brings them down to her own standard.—*Pascal*.

337.

The furthest stretch of reason is, to know that there is an infinite number of things which utterly surpass it; and it must be very feeble indeed, if it reach not so far as to know this.

It is fit we should know how to doubt where we ought; to be confident where we ought; and to submit where we ought. He who is deficient in these respects, does not yet understand the powers of reason. Yet there are men who err against each of these principles: either, considering everything as demonstrated, because they are unacquainted with the nature of demonstration; or, doubting of every thing, because they know not where to submit; or, submitting to every thing, because they know not where they ought to judge.—*Pascal.*

## 338.

One great object of our endeavours should be, to know the limits of our mental powers, to know why they are so limited, and why certain things are hidden from us: this we may do, and this knowledge is perhaps the highest, and certainly, is the most useful and satisfactory that we can attain. It will teach us the value of those communications, which supply any defect they may have in informing our reason, by the impression they are calculated to make upon our feelings.—*W. Danby.*

## 339.

Is it not a proof of the limited power of the human mind, that it can state a difficulty which it cannot solve? Does not this imply a sort of imperfect comprehension?—*W. Danby.*

## 340.

There are three forms of speaking, which are as it were, the style and phrase of imposture.

The first kind is of them who, as soon as they have gotten any subject or matter, do straight cast it into an art, reducing all into divisions and distinctions; thence drawing assertions or positions, and so framing oppositions by questions

and answers. Hence issueth the cobwebs and clatterings of the Schoolmen.

The second kind is of them who, out of the vanity of their wit, (as church poets) do make and devise all variety of tales, stories, and examples, whereby they may lead men's minds to a belief; from whence did grow the legends and infinite fabulous inventions and dreams of the ancient heretics.

The third kind is of them who fill men's ears with mysteries, high parables, allegories, and illusions, which mystical and profound form, many of the heretics also made choice of.

By the first kind of these, the capacity and wit of man is fettered and entangled; by the second, it is trained on and inveigled; by the third, it is astonished and enchanted; but by every one of them the while it is seduced and abused.—*Bacon.*

## 341.

If we demand not good security for truth, we give advantage to impostors and cheats.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

## 342.

Impressions independent of the will, whether produced directly through the senses, or by trains of association within the mind, gradually lose their power by repetition; but habits, whether of mind or body depending on a previous determination of the will, gain strength by their very exercise, so as at length to become a part of ourselves, and an element of our happiness.—*Professor Sedgwick.*

## 343.

Habits are lost by forbearing those acts which are connatural to them, and conservative of them.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

344.

Habit, if wisely and skilfully formed, becomes truly a second nature (as the common saying is); but unskilfully and unmethodically directed, it will be, as it were, the ape of nature, which imitates nothing to the life, but only clumsily and awkwardly.—*Bacon*.

345.

We examine not how long one has been doing a work, but if it be well done, that only makes it valuable. *Fast* and *slow* are accidents which are unknown and forgotten, whereas *well* is permanent.—*Dr. T. Fuller*.

346.

In our conduct, we are, for the most part, determined at once, and by an impulse, which is the effect and energy of *pre-established habits*.—*Paley*.

347.

We ought to know, that it is not easy for a man to form a principle of action, unless he daily speaks and hears the same things; and, at the same time, accommodates them to the use of life.—*Epictetus*.

348.

*Then* you have heard a thing often enough, *when* what you have heard, is passed into a principle, and makes a constitution of mind, and is seen in practice.—*Dr. Whichcote*.

349.

It always gives perfection to have the exercise harder than the ordinary use.—*Bacon*.

350.

Amidst the great diversities of temper, and probably of capacities, which are to be found in individuals, the most cautious and discerning enquirer must acknowledge it extremely difficult to form any general estimate at once convincing

by its clearness, and applicable from its precision. We do, indeed, know, that from the very moment any human creature begins to act, he shews both wrong propensities which may be controlled, and right ones which may be confirmed, by the aid of instruction. We also know that children are incapable of long foresight, or nice discrimination; that they consider what is agreeable, rather than what is useful; that habits of every kind are contracted insensibly; that vicious habits are not subdued without great difficulty, and that virtuous habits require frequent assistance and encouragement.

The same laws seem to pervade the vegetable, the animal, and the moral world. Nurture is experimentally found in all of them to ward off exterior danger, and to strengthen every internal capacity of improvement, to prevent untimely blasts, and to secure a lasting and vigorous maturity. We observe, too, that every good quality is alike destroyed by excessive care, or by total neglect; and that the same causes give a quicker growth and a more incurable malignity to such qualities as are bad. To habit, indeed, may be applied the well-known description of fame:—Timorous at first, and puny in its size, it shrinks from the slightest breath of opposition; but disregarded or cherished, it rears aloft its head, it spreads its bulk, it quickens its pace, and in every stage of its progression acquires new strength and new boldness.

The first operation of all our faculties is owing to some inconsiderable impulse. They are called into action by incidents which we sometimes cannot control, and sometimes do not observe. They produce effects which were at the beginning, minute and transient; and when these effects from their permanence or



magnitude, attract our attention, the causes which give rise to them, either elude our efforts to discover them, or when discovered, they are counteracted only by repeated trials and after many mortifying disappointments.—*Dr. Parr.*

351.

In every thing which refers to practice we must make up our accounts as to what is in our power, and what not. For, in the former, alteration is allowed, but in the latter, application merely. The husbandman hath no power over either the nature of the soil or the weather; nor the physician over the natural frame and constitution of the patient, or the variety of accidents. But in the cultivation of the mind, and the healing of its disorders, three things come under consideration,—the different characters of dispositions, the ailments, and remedies; as also in the treatment of bodily diseases, these three things are brought under our notice,—the habit or constitution of the patient, the disease, and the cure. But of those three, the last only is in our power, not so the two first. But we must make no less careful enquiry into those matters which are beyond our power, than into those which are within it. For a distinct and accurate knowledge of them must form the basis of a doctrine respecting the remedies, in order that these may be applied more skilfully and successfully.—*Bacon.*

352.

Talk to a blind man—he knows he wants the sense of sight, and willingly makes the proper allowances. But there are certain internal senses, which a man may want, and yet be wholly ignorant that he wants them. It is most unpleasant to converse with such persons on subjects of taste, philosophy, or religion. Of course



there is no reasoning with them: for they do not possess the facts on which the reasoning must be grounded. Nothing is possible, but a naked dissent, which implies a sort of unsocial contempt; or what a man of kind dispositions is very likely to fall into, a heartless tacit acquiescence, which borders too nearly on duplicity.—*S. T. Coleridge.*

## 353.

Diseases of the discerning power are many, but danger is only to be apprehended in these: *perplexity, ignorance simple, and ignorance compound*; the first belongs to the class of excess, the second to the class of deficiency, and the third to the class of the perverted state.

For the cure of *perplexity*, as it arises from the conflict of evidence on obscure subjects, so that the judgment is unable to determine upon either side, we are in the first place to call to mind this self-evident proposition,—*that there is no reconciling or removing of contraries*; so that we may take it for granted universally, be the proposition what it may, that one of the two sides is in its own nature necessarily true, and the other false. Next let us investigate the premises applicable to the question, with reference to the rules of logic and the precision of scrutiny, till the true becomes distinguishable from the false, and we determine upon one side or other.

Cure of *simple ignorance*,—which is want of knowledge without supposing ourselves possessed of it. In the outset this is not culpable; nay, it is a condition of acquiring knowledge; for if we know, or if we suppose we know, it is impossible we should learn. But to remain in this situation is culpable, and condemned alike by the followers of faith and philosophy. Its

cure is this:—let the patient reflect on the state of men and of other animals, till he is convinced that man's superiority to them lies in his knowledge and discernment; and that the really ignorant man, who is graced by no such symbol, belongs to the class of irrational brutes; nay, a viler even than they.

Cure of *compound ignorance*. Of this the essence is opinion not agreeable to fact; and it necessarily involves another opinion, namely, that we are already possessed of knowledge. So that besides not knowing, we know not that we know not; and hence its designation of compound ignorance. In like manner, as of many chronic complaints and established maladies, no cure can be effected by physicians of the body; of this, no cure can be effected by physicians of the mind: for with a presupposal of knowledge in our own regard, the pursuit and acquirement of further knowledge is not to be looked for. The approximate cure, and one from which in the main much benefit may be anticipated, is to engage the patient in the study of measures (Geometry, Computation, &c.), for in such pursuits the true and the false are separated by the clearest interval, and no room is left for the intrusion of the fancy. From these the mind may discover the delight of certainty; and when, on returning to its own opinions, it finds in them no such sort of repose and gratification, it may discover their erroneous character, its ignorance may become simple, and a capacity for acquiring knowledge be obtained.—*Akhlak-i-Jalaly*.

· 354.

What is conscience? If there is such a power, what is its office? It would seem to be simply this,—to approve our conduct when we do

what *we believe* to be right; and to censure us when we commit whatever *we judge* to be wrong. When reason, or religion, or education, has marked the distinction between virtue and vice, we are conscious of a pleasurable feeling when we practise the one, and of a painful sentiment when we are guilty of the other. The office of the conscience is not legislative, but judiciary: its voice is either laudative or objurgatory, rather than directive or imperative.—*Dr. Crombie.*

355.

Men get embarrassed by the common cases of a misguided conscience; but a compass may be out of order as well as a conscience, and the needle may point due south if you hold a powerful magnet in that direction. Still the compass, generally speaking, is a true and sure guide, and so is the conscience; and you can trace the deranging influence on the latter quite as surely as on the former.—*Dr. Arnold.*

356.

Our perceptions of moral duty vary with the moral and physical circumstances in which we are placed. All men acknowledge a difference between right and wrong; but all are not agreed in assigning the same moral character to one and the same action. They have not in every instance an intuitive perception of virtue and vice. Their moral discrimination is generally resolvable into *the authority of reason, the influence of education, professional habits, social intercourse, and religious feeling*; and from the diversity, or similarity, which obtains in their principles of judgment, originates the contrariety or identity of moral sentiment and moral conduct, which we find exhibited in different nations, and in different individuals of the same country.—*Dr. Crombie.*

## 357.

When we are children, our parents deliver us to the care of a tutor, who is continually to watch over us, that we get no hurt. When we are become men, God delivers us to the guardianship of an implanted conscience. We ought by no means then to despise this guardian; for it will both displease God, and we shall be enemies to our own conscious principle.—*Epictetus.*

## 358.

Our responsibility must be in proportion to our free agency; we can no more know the limits of the one than we can those of the other. But reason and conscience are guides sufficient for all the purposes which both require.—*W. Danby.*

## 359.

Our knowledge of ourselves must at the best be very imperfect; we can only judge of ourselves from the trials we have been exposed to, and the inclinations we have either indulged, or have only felt without giving way to them. What effects new temptations, or any change of circumstances, might produce in us, we can have little or no idea of; and as to those virtues or vices which we know ourselves to be more or less addicted to, we are full as much at a loss in attempting to trace them to the primary sources. If we attribute them to early impressions, or to the accidental (as we may call them) circumstances in which we have been placed, it is because our recollections will carry us no further back, nor our reflections enable us to go deeper in investigation; if to innate propensities, it is probably for want of a better solution of the question. Perhaps physical causes may present a greater appearance of probability; but

we cannot well ascertain how far any of those may be peculiar to each of us, as part of our nature, or common to us, with the rest of mankind, and brought into action by external causes. One thing, however, appears to be certain, amidst all this uncertainty; that we have a consciousness which indicates our power of choice in our actions, by reproaching when we have made a bad one. It may be stifled, or not attended to, but it does not the less exist in us, though we even have it in our power to pervert its judgments and dictates. It has besides the faculty of impressing us with a general sense of the defects of our nature, in making us sensible we can be secure under certain circumstances, against the commission of the worst actions that we hear of in others; and this by so greatly widening the sphere of the operations of conscience, seems to afford additional means, under the protection of the Divine Providence, of providing for our security. The imperfection then of self-knowledge must often expose us to the danger of self-delusion, the only remedy for which is self-distrust; this will evince the necessity of self-denial; and our general security (with Divine assistance) must be in self-command.—*W. Danby.*

## 360.

Learning, almost beyond that of man—a happy power of tracing out the proofs of Natural religion—a critical knowledge of the Word of God—a grasp of the sharpest weapons of polemical theology, may co-exist in a mind manifesting hardly one single Christian grace.—*Professor Sedgwick.*

## 361.

Knowledge of external things will not compensate my moral knowledge in a time of affliction; but moral proficiency will always afford me conso-



lation under the absence of external knowledge.—*Pascal.*

362.

It was a saying with the Physician Hippocrates —“*An unsound body, the more you nourish it the more it increases in ailment;*” which may be significative of a similar predicament in the mind; which, when not purified from vicious dispositions, experiences an augmentation of depravity by acquiring the truths of science; for it finds itself therein supplied with the material of pride and haughtiness, and empowered to carp at the good, and to call the highest authorities in question.—*Akhlak-i-Jalaly.*

363.

An ill principle in the mind is worse than the matter of disease in the body.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

364.

There is no stand or impediment in the wit but may be wrought out by fit studies; like as diseases of the body may have appropriate exercises. Every defect of the mind may have a special receipt. Histories make men wise; poets, witty; the mathematics, subtle; natural philosophy, deep; moral, grave; logic and rhetoric, able to contend.—*Bacon.*

365.

One of the saddest things about human nature is, that a man may guide others in the path of life without walking in it himself; that he may be a pilot, and yet a castaway.—*Guesses at Truth.*

366.

Many that are well learned are ill-taught; have a good head and a bad heart. Learning and virtue are excellent company, but they do not always meet.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

367.

• We should, if we were wise and careful of our



soul's health and safety, grasp and comprehend in thought, so far as we can, the several dimensions of time past, present, and to come, and raise a judgment upon the view and resolution of the whole, what is our interest, what the establishment, whereon immortal spirits may fix and settle; and thereto, by invincible courage, subdue all things unto obedience and true subserviency.  
—*Dr. Whichcote.*

368.

The simplicity which pervades Nature results from the exquisite nicety with which all its parts fit into one another. Its multiplicity of wheels and springs merely adds to its power; and so perfect is their mutual adaptation and agreement, the effect seems inconceivable, except as the operation of a single law, and of one supreme Author of that law.—*Guesses at Truth.*

369.

To expect that we should see the immediate operations of Providence in the hand that conducts them, or that we should foresee the end of them, would be absurd in the extreme. That we cannot do this, therefore, so far from being an obstacle to our belief of the existence and agency of that Providence, is rather a negative proof in favour of it, our knowledge of it (imperfect as it is) being exactly suited to our state and condition; and, the abstract reasoning on the necessity of a first Intelligent Cause, which all the chain of causes and effects (the general connection of which is in some measure apparent to the senses) is subordinate to, and dependent upon, subsists in its full force. To suppose an infinite chain of causes and effects self-derived, with an inherent power of action, but without intelligence, would be the highest absurdity; or to suppose the continuance of the

general action (or whatever else we may choose to call it) in consequence of an original fiat, while the Supreme Cause remains in a state of inactivity, would be nearly as absurd...The first Great Cause must act, if at all (and what is power without agency?) in some mode or other. The mode in which He acts (and which we, I may say, necessarily, see in its effects) we call a chain of natural causes.—*W. Danby.*

## 370.

God does not expect us to submit our faith to Him without reason, -or to subdue us to Himself by tyranny. But He does not intend to give us a reason for everything. And to reconcile these contrarieties, He is pleased clearly to shew us those divine characters of Himself which may convince us of what He is, and to establish His authority by miracles and evidences that we shall be unable to resist,—in order that we might, afterwards, believe without hesitation whatever He teaches us, when we find no other reason to reject it, but because we are unable to know of ourselves whether it be true or not.—*Pascal.*

## 371.

We are not to submit our understandings to the belief of those things that are contrary to our understanding. We must have a reason for that which we believe above our reason.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

## 372.

He that useth his reason doth acknowledge God.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

## 373.

What has not reason in it or for it, if held out for religion, is man's superstition: it is not religion of God's making.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

374.

If a man has wrong suppositions in his mind concerning God, he will be wrong through all the parts of his religion.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

375.

Sincerity of heart is a great advance towards orthodoxy of judgment.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

376.

There is nothing in religion necessary which is uncertain.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

377.

Let all uncertainties be by themselves, in the catalogue of disputables, matters of further inquiry; let the certainties of religion settle with the constitution and issue in life and practice.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

378.

Where the doctrine is necessary and important, the Scripture is clear and full; but where the Scripture is not clear and full, the doctrine is not necessary nor important.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

379.

Religion is not a system of doctrines, an observance of modes, a heat of affections, a form of words, a spirit of censoriousness.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

380.

Religion is unity and love; therefore it is not religion that makes separation and disaffection.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

381.

The *first* act of religion is to know what is true of God, the *second* act is to express it in our lives.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

382.

A man hath his religion to little purpose, if he doth not mend his nature and refine his spirit by it.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

383.

The best way to find out what is religion in us, is to inquire, what is true concerning God: for religion in us is our resemblance of God, who is ever best pleased with those things in His creatures which are most eminent in Himself.  
*Dr. Whichcote.*

384.

He that believes what God saith without evidence that God says it, doth not believe *God*, while he believes the *thing* which comes from God.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

385.

The sophistry is very superficial which represents mankind as not responsible for their belief, because that, it is alleged, is dependent on reason, not on the will; just as if the degree of attention, and other circumstances that influence the operation of the reason, were not affected by the moral qualities of the mind.—*W. B. Clulow.*

386.

To believe there is a God, is to believe the existence of all possible good and perfection in the universe.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

387.

The greatest and truest nobility is, to be a servant of the great God. He is nobly descended who is born from above.—*Dyer.*

388.

Sin is an attempt to control the immutable and unalterable laws of everlasting righteousness, goodness, and truth upon which the universe depends.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

389.

From the Existence of God, to His Providential agency over the affairs of men, there is a

chain of reasoning, the links of which are inseparable.—*W. Danby.*

390.

In one sense, the idea of a Supreme Being must be an abstract one to us; for we can only see Him through His works, assured as we are of His existence by our reason, our feelings, and by the authorities which are given to us.—*W. Danby.*

391.

Wisdom may be unfathomable, as Divine wisdom undoubtedly is; and if so, its results may be equally beyond our comprehension, or (consequently) reception; that is, as truths that may be comprehended, but not as such as may not be attested by comprehensible evidence.—*W. Danby.*

392.

If Providence works always by human means, men are only its instruments as far as is consistent with their free agency, and with the extent (little indeed as it is) of their reasoning powers.—*W. Danby.*

393.

If in the examination of mysterious subjects, we adopt ideas that common sense cannot authorise, we run great risk, to say the least, of falling into error; for neither imagination nor our feelings are to be trusted, unless they are sanctioned by our reason.—*W. Danby.*

394.

Want of comprehension would be a strange reason for disbelieving a thing, as that very want deprives us of the power of choosing between reception and rejection, unless there are other substitutes for the comprehension wanted. A negative proof may be as valid as a positive one, where we can examine either side of a

question, which we must be able to do, to give us the power of judging between them. If one side is highly objectionable, can we hesitate in our choice, supposing it necessary that we should make it, and supposing also that our reason and feelings are both of the right kind?—*W. Danby.*

## 395.

If there be an analogy or likeness between that system of things and dispensation of Providence, which revelation informs us of, and that system of things and dispensation of Providence, which experience, together with reason, informs us of, that is the known course of nature; this is a presumption that they have both the same author and cause; at least, so far as to answer objections against the former's being from God, drawn from anything which is analogical, or similar to what is in the latter, which is acknowledged to be from Him.—*Bp. Butler.*

## 396.

Now I think that the Christian doctrine of the resurrection meets the Materialists so far as this; that it does imply that a body, or an organization of some sort, is necessary to the full development of man's nature. Beyond this we cannot go; for, granting that the brain is essential to thought,—still no man can say that the whole pulp which you can see, and touch, and anatomize, can itself *think*, and by whatever names we endeavour to avoid acknowledging the existence of mind, whether we talk of a subtle fluid, or a wonderful arrangement of nerves, or any thing else—still we do but disguise our ignorance; for the act of thinking is one *sui generis*, and the thinking power must in like manner be different from all that we commonly mean by matter.—*Dr. Arnold.*



397.

The Atheist, arguing about the doubts only himself can see, is like the sick man combating with the phantoms which are produced only by his disordered mind.—*E. W.*

398.

I believe that any man can make himself an Atheist speedily, by breaking off his own personal communion with God in Christ; but, if he keeps this unimpaired, I believe that no intellectual study, whether of nature or of man, will force him into Atheism; but, on the contrary, the new creations of our knowledge, so to speak, gather themselves into a fair and harmonious system, ever revolving in their brightness around their proper centre, the Throne of God.—*Dr. Arnold.*

399.

It seems to be the character and object of Scepticism to leave in doubt its own opinions, as well as those which it professes to doubt of.—*W. Danby.*

400.

Among the extravagancies of faith which have characterised many infidel writers, who would swallow a whale to avoid believing that a whale swallowed Jonah, a high rank should be given to Dupuis, who, at the commencement of the French Revolution, published a work in twelve volumes, octavo, in order to prove that Jesus Christ was the Sun, and all Christians worshippers of Mithra.—*S. T. Coleridge.*

401.

I hold that Atheism and pure Scepticism are both systems of absurdity, which involves the condemnation of hypotheses leading to either of them as conclusions. For Atheism separates truth from goodness, and Scepticism destroys truth

altogether; both of which are monstrosities, from which we should revolt as from a real madness.—*Dr. Arnold.*

402.

There are some of whom it may be said, that if they had learnt more they would not have known so much, or at least, not so usefully; for what they have learnt, may have confounded their minds, or, if they have not “too much knowledge for the sceptic side,” they may have learnt just enough to incline them to it; not the scepticism of ignorance, but of presumptuous confidence and self-conceit.—*W. Danby.*

403.

I did not observe anything amounting to a sneering spirit, but there seemed to me a coldness on religious matters, which made me fear lest it should change to sneering, as the understanding became more vigorous; for this is the natural fault of the undue predominance of the mere intellect, unaccompanied by a corresponding growth and liveliness of the moral affections, particularly that of admiration and love of moral excellence; just as superstition arises, where it is honest, from the undue predominance of the affections, without the strengthening power of the intellect advancing in proportion.—*Dr. Arnold.*

404.

Men work themselves into an atheistical judgment by atheistical practices.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

405.

Men of holy hearts and lives best understand holy doctrines and things. Those who have not the temper of religion, are not competent judges of the things of religion.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

406.

The ancient saying is very true, that “*nemo*

*but the worthy can discern the worthy.*"—*Chinese Maxim.*

407.

When the doctrine of the Gospel becomes the reason of our mind, it will be the principle of our life.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

408.

In worship there is: 1. Apprehension of the object, and acknowledgment of its perfection; 2. Union with the object, and affection to it; 3. Sense of infirmity and dependence on the object. These are things in worship of which nothing can be done but by the spirit.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

409.

True wisdom consists in seeing how all the faculties of the mind and all parts of knowledge bear upon each other, so as to work together to a common end; ministering at once to the happiness of man and his Maker's glory.—*Professor Sedgwick.*

410.

In no age has there existed any philosophy, or sect, or religion, or law, or system, which so much exalted the good of the community, and depressed that of the individual, as the holy Christian Faith: the clear conclusion from which is, that it was one and the same God who gave to inanimate creation those laws of nature, and to men the law of Christ.—*Bacon.*

411.

The precepts of Christianity have a marked superiority over the tedious and intricate rules of modern theories. They teach what is intelligible, they enjoin what is practicable, they do not make the moral worth of the sufferer the sole or, in all cases, even the chief measure of his right to succour. They do not strain or relax the springs

of our particular affections, but direct them in their proper tone towards their proper objects. They do not bewilder and annoy our minds by throwing compassion, or gratitude, or clemency into our hypothetical state of variance with justice. They admit the principle of loving those by whom we are loved, and they enforce the distinct, and certainly not inferior, principle of extending a portion of that love to those by whom we are despitefully “vexed and persecuted.”—*Dr. Parr.*

412.

Christianity is a system of wonders. It enjoins upon man to acknowledge himself vile,—yea, abominable; yet commands him to aspire to a likeness to God! Without such a counterpoise, his elevation would render him fearfully vain, or his abasement hopelessly abject.—*Pascal.*

413.

Any one understanding the real nature of man, must perceive that a true religion ought to be versed in our nature; ought to know its greatness and its degradation; and the causes of both the one and the other. What religion but Christianity exhibits such a knowledge as this?—*Pascal.*

414.

For my part, I confess, that as soon as I found the Christian religion laying down this principle—that the nature of man is corrupt, and fallen away from his Maker—my eyes were open to the truth of the entire system.—*Pascal.*

415.

One striking proof of human depravity is, that the most erroneous and pernicious forms of religion have attained more success, and exercised a wider control over mankind, than the religion whose origin is divine.—*W. B. Clulow.*

416.

The assertion that human nature is totally cor-

rupt, requires some qualification or explanation. If nothing more be meant than that man is so depraved that he will never of himself repent, believe, entertain genuine love to God, or from right motives practise His commands, the proposition is correct. But if it express that no kind or portion of moral excellence resides naturally in man, it is unsupported by Scripture, and decisively confuted by fact. Are not benevolence, filial and parental affection, pity, gratitude, generosity of disposition, the love of justice, in themselves morally good, and parts of the nature which God has communicated to mankind? Or are they peculiar to the renovated and religious character? Though man's nature is in ruins, it exhibits many traces and fragments of its original beauty and magnificence.—*W. B. Chulow.*

## 417.

The opening flower blooms alike in all places: the moon sheds an equal radiance on every mountain and every river. Evil exists only in the heart of man; all other things tend to shew the benevolence of Heaven towards the human race.—*Chinese maxim.*

## 418.

The supposition that mankind acquire depravity from example, education, or circumstances, not from what is termed original sin, only removes the difficulty a single step, if we admit, what cannot be controverted, that they are actually depraved. The same objection might be urged against their introduction to circumstances which invariably occasion depravity, as against their inheritance of a corrupt nature from Adam. The whole difficulty, in fact, lies in the permission of moral evil, or its entrance into our world; for that once obviated, the perplexities attending the

problem would be of comparatively easy solution; as, that one class should be involved in the consequences of behaviour not their own, since otherwise no system of general laws could be established, or if established, could not be continued without the frequent intervention of miracle.—*W. B. Chulow.*

## 419.

What framer of an utopia could dream of more, than, in a state of things requiring the hard toil of the many as a condition of existence, yet still a devotion of one whole day in seven to the sole culture of mental philosophy, from a text-book which contains the purest and loftiest principles of ethics, set forth imaginatively, metaphysically, practically, affectionately—in poetry, maxims, philosophical reasoning—illustrated in parables, anecdotes, biographies—in the history of the oldest nations, and, finally, in the example of a pure and perfect life, and besides all this, that the Word itself, rightly, and under certain conditions, which all may fulfil, should be the means of giving the power of acting up to this knowledge, and thus producing a nation of working men with pure, unselfish, unsensual hearts and refined minds, bent on approaching a glorious ideal standard?—

## 420.

It is the design of the Gospel to reduce men to the obedience of those eternal laws of righteousness under which we were made.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

## 421.

It is necessary to know what God hath revealed concerning the way of pardon by Christ: it is impossible to know more than He has revealed. If men would forbear to explicate further, there would be more Christianity and less controversy.—*Dr. Whichcote.*



422.

All reasoning on divine subjects will be found to fall short of its mark, if it is not founded on the authority of the Scriptures.—*W. Danby.*

423.

If we attend to the expression of opinions that are at variance with the Scriptures, we shall generally find that they are asserted without any reference to, or comparison with, the latter—a proof that the comparison is shrunk from.—*W. Danby.*

424.

It is a part of the perfection of the Gospel that it is attractive to all those who love truth and goodness, as soon as it is known in its true nature, whilst it tends to clear away those erroneous views and evil passions with which philanthropy and philosophy, so long as they stand aloof from it, are ever in some degree corrupted.—*Dr. Arnold.*

425.

There is no solid satisfaction but in a mental reconciliation with the nature of God and the law of righteousness.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

426.

In doctrines of supernatural revelation, we shall do well to direct our apprehensions and to regulate our expressions by words of Scripture.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

427.

It does not follow, that because God doth not enforce, therefore He doth not enable. That God should force agrees neither with the nature of God nor with the nature of man; but that God should enable agrees with both, as He is the Creator and we creatures.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

428.

The true and grand idea of a Church is—

a society for the purpose of making men like Christ,—earth like heaven,—the kingdoms of the world the Kingdoms of Christ.—*Dr. Arnold.*

429.

That common metaphor about our “Mother the Church” is unscriptural and mischievous, because the feelings of entire filial reverence and love which we owe to a parent we do not owe to our fellow Christians; we owe them brotherly love, meekness, readiness to bear, &c.; but not filial reverence, “to them I gave place by subjection, no not for an hour.”—*Dr. Arnold.*

430.

The sense of the Church is not a *rule*, but a thing *ruled*. The Church is bound unto reason and Scripture, and governed by them as much as any particular person.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

431.

When human institutions enjoin anything as a necessary and essential part of religion, which God has not made so; or when they impose such rites, as through their number, or nature of them, cherish superstition, obscure the gospel, weaken its force, or prove burdensome to us, they are to be rejected and not complied with.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

432.

Religious ceremonies should be pure glass, not dyed in the gorgeous crimsons and purple, blues and greens, of the drapery of saints and saintesses.—*S. T. Coleridge.*

433.

No man is to make religion for himself, but to receive it from God; and the teachers of the Church are not to make religion for their hearers, but to shew it only as received from God.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

434.

I am very deeply persuaded that the main cause of the prevalent departures from sound doctrine is, that men take their sentiments from each other, instead of deriving them from the Bible.  
—*Bp. Shirley.*

435.

Some are so possessed with their own fancies that they take them for oracles, and think they see visions, and are arrived to some extraordinary revelations of truth; when indeed they do but dream dreams, and amuse themselves with the fantastic ideas of a busy imagination.—

436.

If there were in one steeple two bells in unison, would not the striking of the one move the other more than if it were of another note?—

437.

Whatever is not against the Word of God is for it,—thought the founders of the Church of England. Whatever is not in the Word of God is a word of man, a will-worship, presumptuous and usurping,—thought the founders of the Church of Scotland and Geneva. The one proposed to themselves to be reformers of the Latin Church, that is, to bring it back to the form which it had during the first four centuries; the latter, to be the renovators of the Christian religion as it was preached and instituted by the Apostles and immediate followers of Christ thereunto specially inspired. Where the premises are so different, who can wonder at the difference in the conclusions.—*S. T. Coleridge.*

438.

Knowledge of the Scriptures seems to consist in two things, so essentially united however, that I scarcely like to separate them even in thought;

the one I will call the knowledge of the contents of the Scriptures in themselves; the other the knowledge of their application to us, and our own times and circumstances.—*Dr. Arnold.*

439.

A clergyman's profession is the knowledge and practice of Christianity, with no more particular profession to distract his attention from it. While all men, therefore, should study the Scriptures, he should study them thoroughly; because from them only is the knowledge of Christianity to be obtained.—*Dr. Arnold.*

440.

One mistake in principles of action is of worse consequence than several false opinions which end in speculation.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

441.

To interpret the literal parts of Scripture allegorically, and the prophetic or figurative parts literally, betrays the same qualities of mind, namely, dissatisfaction with simple truth, and a predilection for the marvellous or imaginary.—*W. B. Clul w.*

442.

The written Word of God is not the first or only discovery of the duty of man (Rom. ii. 15, 29). It doth gather together, and repeat, and reinforce, and charge upon us, the scattered and neglected principles of God's creation, that have suffered prejudice and diminution, by the defection and apostacy of man, who has abused his nature and has passed into a contrary spirit.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

443.

It is not scriptural, but fanatical, to oppose faith to reason. Faith is properly opposed to sense, and is the listening to the dictates of the higher part of our mind, to which alone God

speaks, rather than to the lower part of us, to which the world speaks.—*Dr. Arnold.*

444.

Jest not with the two-edged sword of God's Word.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

445.

There are things in the Sacred writings which are above the reach of our comprehension; but there are none which are above the reach of our feelings; and if our reason is unable to judge of the things (mysterious as they are) themselves, it is very well to ascertain the justness of those feelings which are excited by them.—*W. Danby.*

446.

In the adaptation of the Word of God to intellects of all dimensions, it resembles the natural light, which is equally suited to the eye of the minutest insect, and to the extended vision of man.  
*W. B. Clulow.*

447.

In matters of weight, wherein the honour of God and the safety of men's souls are concerned, Scripture is punctual, clear, full, and particular; that our faith may be better directed, and we ourselves preserved against cheats and imposture. But as to other matters, they are left to Christian prudence, discretion, and fidelity.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

448.

It would be no slight service to the cause of Christianity to trace the influence of experimental religion on intellectual character and happiness. It would also be curious, and not uninteresting, to reverse the process, by considering the operation of intellectual peculiarities, especially of the imaginative faculty, on religious character and experience.  
—*W. B. Clulow.*

449.

Were a plain, unlettered man, but endowed with common sense, and a certain *quantum* of observation and of reflection, to read over attentively the four Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles, without any *note* or *comment*, I hugely doubt whether it would enter into his ears to hear, his eyes to see, or his heart to conceive, the purport of many ideas signified by many words ending in *ism*, which nevertheless have cost Christendom rivers of ink and oceans of blood.—*Bacon*.

450.

The apotheosis of error is the greatest evil of all, and when folly is worshipped, it is, as it were, a plague-spot upon the understanding. Yet some of the moderns have indulged this folly with such consummate inconsiderateness, that they have endeavoured to build a system of natural philosophy on the first chapter of Genesis, the book of Job, and other parts of Scripture; seeking thus the dead amongst the living.—*Bacon*.

451.

Many expositions of Scripture have been constructed on a false principle, namely, that the whole of the Bible requires elucidation; whereas the greater part is perfectly simple and easy of comprehension. The only effect of these attempts to explain what needs no explanation, is that you get the same sentiment in different words, but generally so impaired by amplification, that it has lost half its majesty and beauty: Akin to this mode of dealing with Holy Writ are endeavours to clear up what is impenetrable. Many seem reluctant to admit that any phrase or proposition in Scripture can defy interpretation; while of passages which have baffled the keenest wits, they will tender a solution, or rather a number of



contradictory solutions, which every unsophisticated judgment would reject with contempt. If scepticism is an evidence of impiety, facility in adopting the glosses of critics and expositors would in many instances involve an abandonment of reason. The crudities that have been hazarded on that mysterious and sublime composition, the Apocalypse, are a scandal to the human intellect.—*W. B. Chulow.*

452.

Credulity, or an easiness to believe without reason or Scripture, is a stranger to wisdom, and the very nurse of superstition.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

453.

Zeal for God will justify no action unless there be discretion to justify our zeal. Even when zeal is a virtue, it is a nice and dangerous one; for the wisest men are apt to mingle their own passions and interests with their zeal for God and religion.—

454.

It is not to be imagined, when men are once under the power of superstition, how ridiculous they may be, and yet think themselves religious: how prodigiously they may play the fool, and yet believe they please God: what cruel and barbarous things they may do to themselves and others; and yet be verily persuaded that they do God service.  
*Dr. T. Fuller.*

455.

There are some people who would not only destroy all wickedness in the world, but almost all goodness, when it does not make its appearance under the form, or with the sanction of their own particular opinions.—*J. F. Boyes.*

456.

When misfortunes happen to such as dissent

from us in matters of religion, we call them judgments; when to those of our own sect, we call them trials; when to persons neither way distinguished, we are content to attribute them to the settled course of things.—*Shenstone.*

457.

I suspect whether that be of any moment in religion which admits of dispute; for methinks it it is not agreeable to the goodness of God, to suffer anything of that universal concern to all men, to remain very obscure and controversial.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

458:

Ignorance and credulity have ever been companions, and have misled and enslaved mankind; philosophy has in all ages endeavoured to oppose their progress and to loosen the shackles they had imposed; philosophers have on this account been called unbelievers; unbelievers of what?—of the fictions of fancy, of witchcraft, hobgoblins, apparitions, vampires, fairies; of the influence of the stars on human actions, miracles wrought by the bones of saints, the flights of ominous birds, the predictions from the bowels of dying animals, expounders of dreams, fortune-tellers, conjurors, modern prophets, necromancy, chieromancy, with endless variety of folly? These they have disbelieved and despised, but have ever bowed their heads to truth and nature.—*Dr Darwin.*

459.

I have seen a harmless dove made dark with an artificial night, and her eyes sealed and locked up with a little quill, soaring upward and flying with amazement, fear, and an undiscerning wing; she made towards heaven, but knew not that she was made a train and an instrument to teach her enemy to prevail upon her, and all her defenceless

kindred. So is a superstitious man, jealous and blind, forward and mistaken; he runs towards heaven as he thinks, but he chooses foolish paths, and out of fear takes any thing that he is told, or fancies and guesses concerning God, by measures taken from his own diseases and imperfections.—*Bp. Jeremy Taylor.*

460.

Any one who properly considers the subject, will find natural philosophy to be, after the Word of God, the surest remedy against superstition, and the most approved support of faith. She is therefore rightly bestowed upon religion as a most faithful attendant, for the one exhibits the will and the other the power of God. Nor was He wrong who observed, "Ye err, not knowing the Scriptures and the power of God;" thus uniting in one bond the revelation of His will and the contemplation of His power.—*Bacon.*

461.

Superstition has many direct sorrows, but atheism has no direct joys. Superstition admits fear mingled with hope; but atheism, while it excludes hope, affords a very imperfect security against fear. Superstition is ever exposed to the dreary vacuities in the soul, over which atheism is wont to mood in solitude and silence; but atheism is sometimes haunted with forebodings scarcely less confused, or less unquiet, than those by which superstition is annoyed. Superstition stands aghast at the punishment reserved for wicked men in another state; but atheism cannot disprove the *possibility* of such a state to all men, accompanied by consciousness, and fraught with evils, equally dreadful in degree, and even in duration, with those punishments. Superstition has often preserved men from crimes; but atheism tends to protect them from weaknesses only.

Superstition imposes fresh restraints upon the sensual appetites, though it may often let loose the malignant passions ; but atheism takes away many restraints from those appetites, without throwing checks upon those passions, under many circumstances which may incite them in the minds of its votaries. Superstition is eager from a vicious excess of credulity ; but atheism is often obstinate from an excess of incredulity, equally vicious. Superstition is sometimes docile from conscious weakness ; but atheism is always haughty from real or supposed strength. Superstition errs, and perverts only in consequence of error ; but atheism rejects, and for the most part disdains to examine after rejection. Superstition catches at appearances ; but atheism starts back from realities. Superstition may, in some favorable moment, be awakened to the call of truth ; but atheism is generally deaf to the voice of that “charmer, charm she never so wisely.”—*Dr. Parr.*

462.

If all proceeds from God, so must the qualities of our minds as well as the forms of our bodies ; and the gifts must be directed by His will, which shews itself in the variety of His works, as well in the moral as the natural world.

That will must also shew itself in the mode of giving, which in man is modified by a due proportion of free agency, to constitute and temper his responsibility, and the retributions which his use of it shall call for. This, I believe, is the limit of God’s predestination, distinct as that must be from His prescience : leaving to Him the full exercise of His attributes, and to man the exercise destined for him of his free agency.—*W. Danby.*

463.

This is the security of us creatures who live

under an irresistible and uncontrollable power, that all the ways and proceedings of that power are in loving-kindness, righteousness, and judgment.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

464.

Reason cannot be perfectly satisfied with what it does not comprehend; but there are matters in which this want of satisfaction may be supplied by the feelings; so it is in religion, which addresses itself to both. If reason were perfectly satisfied, there would be no operation on the feelings, or, at least, not of that sort and degree that would not interfere with our free agency, or with that trial of our feelings, which depends upon our having the power over them that free agency supposes. Without that free agency, or, at least, a sufficient degree of it (for every thing in human nature is limited), there can be no responsibility.—*W. Danby.*

465.

I think we cannot repeat that passage in Scripture, "Surely there is a God who governs the earth," without being sensible that the assurance is derived from a mixture of reason and feeling, which would not have been made to concur, if the action of each had not been necessary, as an aid to the other.—*W. Danby.*

466.

In matters of sentiment, the grounds of assent or rejection must, I should suppose, differ from those of mere matter of fact; and the manner and degree of assent obtained must probably depend a good deal upon the moral inclination of the person addressed. Now religion is chiefly a matter of sentiment: not merely the judgment, but all the passions are concerned, one way or another, in its reception or rejection.—*W. Danby.*



467.

Our wills are more to be blamed than our natures : perverse wills do more harm in the world than weak heads.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

468.

It grieves me more than I can say, to find so much intolerance ; by which I mean over-estimating our points, of difference and under-estimating our points of agreement. I am by no means indifferent to truth and error, and hold my own opinions as decidedly as any man ; which of course implies a conviction that the opposite opinions are erroneous. In many cases I think them not only erroneous but mischievous ; still they exist in men, whom I know to be thoroughly in earnest, fearing God and loving Christ, and it seems to me to be a waste of time, which we can ill afford, and a sort of quarrel “by the way,” which our christian vow of enmity against moral evil makes utterly unseasonable, when christians suspend their great business and loosen the bond of their union with each other by venting fruitless regrets and complaints against one another’s errors, instead of labouring to lessen one another’s sins. For coldness of spirit, and negligence of our duty, and growing worldiness, are things which we should thank our friends for warning us against ; but when they quarrel with our opinions, which we conscientiously hold, it merely provokes us to justify ourselves, and to insist that we are right and they wrong.—*Dr. Arnold.*

469.

We may maintain the unity of verity in point of faith, and unity of charity in point of communion, notwithstanding all differences in point of apprehension.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

470.

The essential idea of opinion seems to be, that



it is a matter about which doubt can reasonably exist, as to which two persons can without absurdity think differently. The existence of an object before the eyes of two persons would not be a matter of opinion, nor would it be a matter of opinion that twice two are four. But when testimony is divided, or uncertain, the existence of a fact may become doubtful, and, therefore, a matter of opinion.—*Lewis.*

471.

It seems possible, and even not very difficult, for two truly candid and intelligent persons to understand each other upon any subject.—*Hartley.*

472.

Things may be viewed in such different lights, that it is possible we may be thought to contradict ourselves when we really do not.—*W. Danby.*

473.

True unanimity is that which proceeds from a free judgment arriving at the same conclusion after an investigation of the fact.—*Bacon.*

474.

Men's apprehensions are often nearer than their expressions; they may mean the same thing when they seem not to say the same thing.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

475.

I remember it was with extreme difficulty that I could bring my master to understand the meaning of the word *opinion*, or how a point could be disputable; because reason taught us to affirm or deny only when we are certain, and beyond our knowledge we cannot do either. So that controversies, disputes, and positiveness in false and dubious propositions are evils unknown among the Houyhnhnms.—*Dean Swift.*

## 476.

Those who have no opinion of their own, are perhaps the most likely to adopt a wrong one, or at least it is an even chance whether they do or not; for being incapable of forming an opinion of their own, they are equally so of distinguishing between the good and bad which they meet with in others; and this incapacity leaves them no resource but in an obstinate adhesion to the opinion they may happen to have adopted.—*W. Danby.*

## 477.

There are many who take up their opinions without having been incited by any previous doubt to the examination of the subject on which they have formed them. They have no idea that conviction can be the result of such a process. These can hardly be ranked among the *thinkers*. But what is curious is, that those who so take up their opinions, are often the most obstinate in adhering to them, without very well knowing why. These then can hardly be ranked among the *reasonable*. Instead of having “proved all things,” they have not even proved what they have adopted. Neither the one nor the other of these *rational* beings seems to understand what doubt is: they jump at once from perfect ignorance to perfect certitude, or what they take for such. They can hardly say, “My heart became the convert of my head.”—*W. Danby.*

## 478.

Principles taken upon trust have seldom an equal influence upon us with those which we take upon strict examination and mature deliberation. And men will be easily tempted to desert those for which they have no better authority than the vote of a multitude.—

479.

Most commonly the weakest are most wilful; and they that have the least reason have the most self-conceit.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

480.

A man has as much right to use his own understanding in judging of truth as he has a right to use his own eyes to see his way; therefore it is no offence to another, that any man uses his own right.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

481.

Every man has a right to give his opinion, and no man has a right to dictate to others; if the first was not done, there could be no discussion; if the second was done, all discussion would be precluded, or something worse would be substituted in its stead.—*W. Danby.*

482.

The freest possible scope should be given to all the opinions, discussions, and investigations of the learned; if frail they will fall, if right they will remain; like steam they are dangerous only when pent in, restricted, and confined. These discordancies in the moral world, like the *apparent* war of the elements in the natural, are the very means by which wisdom and truth are ultimately established in the one, and peace and harmony in the other.—*Lacon.*

483.

I persuade myself that the life and faculties of man, at the best but short and limited, cannot be employed more rationally or laudably than in the search of knowledge; and especially of that sort which relates to our duty and conduces to our happiness. In these enquiries, therefore, wherever I perceive any glimmering of truth before me, I readily pursue and endeavour to trace it to its source, without any reserve or caution of pushing

the discovery too far, or opening too great a glare of it to the public. I look upon the discovery of any thing which is true as a valuable acquisition of society, which cannot possibly hurt or obstruct the good effect of any other truth whatsoever, for they all partake of one common essence, and necessarily coincide with each other, and, like the drops of rain which fall separately into the river, mix themselves at once with the stream and strengthen the general current.—*Dr. Middleton.*

484.

Though men's reasons and opinions vary, as do their faces, yet truth is homogeneous, uniform, and ever of the same complexion, in all ages and nations.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

485.

With regard to authority, it is the greatest weakness to attribute infinite credit to particular authors, and to refuse his own prerogative to Time, the Author of all authors, and therefore of all authority.—*Bacon.*

486.

Disregard for the mere authority of great names has occasioned most of our best things, yet is commonly viewed with the utmost suspicion and ill-will. Thus it was with Copernicus on reviving the Pythagorean doctrine respecting the Solar system; with Harvey in reference to the circulation of the blood; not to mention the contempt attached to Lord Bacon by so many writings of his time, Sir Edward Coke among the number, for disabusing the world of the speculative absurdities which had led it astray. The Reformation itself was nothing but an insurrection of individual judgment against the most extensive, potent, and, in some respects, most venerable authority ever exercised by man.—*W. B. Clulow.*

487.

Let no man, upon a weak conceit of sobriety or an ill-applied moderation, think or maintain that a man can search too far, or be too well studied in the book of God's word, or in the book of God's works—divinity or philosophy; but rather let men endeavour an endless progress or proficience in both: only let men beware that they apply both to charity and not to swelling, to use and not to ostentation; and again, that they do not unwisely mingle or confound these learnings together.—*Bacon.*

488.

No opinion can be heretical but that which is not true. Conflicting falsehoods we can comprehend; but truths can never war against each other. I affirm, therefore, that we have nothing to fear from the results of our enquiries, provided they be followed in the laborious but secure road of honest induction. In this way we may rest assured that we shall never arrive at conclusions opposed to any truth, either physical or moral, from whatsoever source that truth may be derived; nay rather (as in all truth there is a common essence) that new discoveries will ever lend support and illustration to things which are already known, by giving us a larger insight into the universal harmonies of nature.—*Professor Sedgwick.*

489.

A proper estimation and acknowledgment of the difficulties of an abstruse question are perhaps the best means of producing an agreement between persons who entertain opposite opinions upon it. It is an appeal from their prejudices, or their biasses, to the standard of reason and common sense.—*W. Danby.*



490.

The more men *really know*, the more they will agree together ; it is ignorance that breeds disputes and discord. But this real knowledge must first be attained ; and perhaps the giving and receiving it may both be difficult. Without it they never can understand one another ; and misunderstanding is quarrelling.—*W. Danby.*

491.

As long as there are different degrees of understanding among men, and as those understandings are influenced by their passions, so long will it be impossible to make them agree upon any subject that requires a right understanding and feeling to judge of it.—*W. Danby.*

492.

A variety of opinions seems to have been meant to be allowed to men, and to be in a certain degree disconnected with their responsibility. If this is the case, can we wonder that these different opinions (and on the most important subjects) should admit of that defence which precludes both the power of absolute refutation, and the right of determining the merit or demerit of those who hold them?—*W. Danby.*

493.

As the understanding may be injured, so may the opinions. We form both by social intercourse, and thus Society, whether good or bad, tends either to form or to impair them. It is, then, above all things important to choose such Society whereby they may be formed and not impaired ; and the choice cannot be properly made if they have not been already formed and not impaired. In this manner the whole forms a circle ; happy those who can deviate from it without danger !—*Pascal.*



494.

Live not on opinions, but think for thyself and act with reason; and shun carefully the contagion of minds which communicates itself by the ways and manners of those we converse with.  
—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

495.

What we think has often to be corrected by what we ought to think. I do not mean by this that we should make a sacrifice of our reason, but that our reason should examine whatever is before it with a due sense of our own limited powers, and that the examination should not be a partial one. By observing this rule, if we are not always sure of making a right decision, we may at least be pretty sure of not making a wrong one; and many are the cases in which it is better to suspend our judgment than to run the risk of making an improper use of it. Suspending our judgment is not suspending our opinion; for I believe the human mind is so constituted, that it cannot help forming an opinion on whatever it adverts to.—*W. Danby.*

496.

He that shortens the road to knowledge, lengthens life; and we are all of us more indebted, than we believe we are, to that class of writers whom Johnson termed “the pioneers of literature, doomed to clear away the dirt and the rubbish for those heroes who press on to honour and to victory, without deigning to bestow a single smile on the humble drudge that facilitates their progress.”—*Lacon.*

497.

Some writers write nonsense in a clear style, and others sense in an obscure one; some can reason without being able to persuade, others can persuade without being able to reason; some dive

so deep that they descend into darkness, and others soar so high that they give us no light; and some in a vain attempt to be cutting and dry, give us only that which is cut and dried. We should labour, therefore, to treat with ease, of things that are difficult; with familiarity, of things that are novel; and with perspicuity, of things that are profound.—*Lacon*.

498.

Condensation results from the mastery of a subject. It is imperfection of view or imbecility that occasions diffuseness; and it is to such a cause, rather than to amplitude of resources or invention, that we owe the generality of bulky tomes; for great books, like large skulls, have often the least brains.—*W. B. Clulow*.

499.

Books are not absolutely dead things, but do contain a progeny of life in them, to be as active as that soul was whose progeny they are; nay, they do preserve, as in a vial, the purest efficacy and extraction of that living intellect that bred them. I know they are as lively and as vigorously productive as those fabulous dragon's teeth; and being sown up and down, may chance to bring up armed men. And yet, on the other hand, unless wariness be used, as good almost kill a man as kill a book. Who kills a man, kills a reasonable creature—God's image, but he who destroys a good book destroys reason itself, kills the image of God, as it were, in the eye. Many a man lives a burden to the earth; but a good book is the precious life-blood of a master spirit, embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life.—*John Milton*.

500.

Many books require no thought from those who read them, and for a very simple reason;—

they made no such demand on those who wrote them. Those works, therefore, are the most valuable that set our thinking faculties in the fullest operation. For as the solar light calls forth all the latent powers and dormant principles of vegetation contained in the kernel, but which, without such a stimulus, would neither have struck root downwards nor borne fruit upwards, so it is with the light that is intellectual; it calls forth and awakens into energy those latent principles of thought in the minds of others which, without this stimulus, reflection would not have matured, nor examination improved, nor action embodied.—*Lacon.*

## 501.

Were all books reduced to their quintessence, many a bulky author would make his appearance in a penny paper. There would be scarcely any such thing in nature as a folio: the works of an age would be contained on a few shelves; not to mention millions of volumes that would be utterly annihilated.—*Addison.*

## 502.

We shall generally find that the most excellent books in any art or science have been still the smallest and most compendious; and this is not without ground; for it is an argument that the author was a master of what he wrote, and had a clear notion, and a full comprehension of the subject before him. For the reason of things lies in a little compass, if the mind could at any time be so happy as to light upon it: most of the writings and discourses in the world are but illustration and rhetoric, which signifies as much as nothing to a mind eager in pursuit after the causes and philosophical truth of things.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

503.

By only seeking and perusing what is truly excellent, and by contemplating always this, and this alone, the mind insensibly becomes accustomed to it, and finds that in this alone it can acquiesce with content.—*Harris.*

504.

The best books are those which every reader thinks *he himself could have written*. Nature, which is the highest excellence, seems familiar and level to all.—*Pascal.*

505.

It has long been deemed the glory of Socrates, that he brought Philosophy from the schools of the learned to the habitations of men—by stripping it of its technicalities, and exhibiting it in the ordinary language of life. There is no one, in modern times, who has possessed the talent and disposition, for achievements of this kind, to an equal extent with Paley; and we can scarcely conceive any one to have employed such qualities with greater success. The transmutation of metals into gold was the supreme object of the alchemist's aspirations. But Paley had acquired a more enviable power. Knowledge, however abstruse, by passing through his mind, became plain, common sense—stamped with the characters which insured its currency in the world.—*Bp. Turton.*

506.

It may perhaps be worth while to remark, that if we except the poets, a few orators, and a few historians, the far greater part of the other eminent men of letters, both of Greece and Rome, appear to have been either public or private teachers—generally either of Philosophy or Rhetoric.—*Adam Smith.*

507.

A total seclusion from the world must of

course give a wrong bias to our opinions, and too much mixing with it will leave us no opinions but what we borrow from others. A judicious observer will not be carried away by the tide of popular opinion, nor will he be bound by the long-worn chains of prejudice. Sometimes the *chief proof* that we give of the *independence* of our opinions is by a constant opposition to those of others. We may fancy this is independence, without feeling that it is, in fact, a dependence on our own humour.—*W. Danby.*

508.

The studious men, while they continue heaping up in their memories the customs of past ages, fall insensibly to imitate them, without any manner of consideration how suitable they are to times and things. In the ancient authors they find descriptions of virtues more perfect than indeed they were. The governments are represented better; and the ways of life pleasanter than they really deserved. Upon this, these bookish men straight compare what they read with what they see; and there beholding nothing so heroically transcendent, because they are able to mark all the spots as well as beauties of everything that is so close to their sight, they presently begin to despise their own times, to exalt the past, to condemn the virtues, and aggravate the vices of their country, not endeavouring to amend them, but by such examples as are now impracticable, by reason of the alteration of men and manners.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

509.

Many monkish writers, who being much retired from the world, having much leisure, and few books, did spin out every subject into wandering mazes and airy speculations.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

510.

Wholesome meats to a vitiated stomach differ



little or nothing from unwholesome; and the best books to a naughty mind are not inapplicable to occasions of evil. Bad meats will scarce breed good nourishment in the healthiest concoction; but herein the difference is of bad books, that they to a discreet and judicious reader serve in many respects to discover, to confute, to forewarn, and to illustrate.—*John Milton.*

## 511.

There is a debt due to those who come after us, and it is the historian's office to punish, though he cannot correct. Where he cannot give patterns to imitate, he must give examples to deter.—*Letters of Junius.*

## 512.

The historian commands attention, and rewards it, by selecting the more brilliant circumstances of great events, by unfolding the characteristic qualities of eminent personages, and by tracing well-known effects through all the obliquities and all the recesses of their secret causes.—*Dr. Parr.*

## 513.

From the early occurrences of life, as they influence the conduct of extraordinary men, the biographer collects such scattered rays as may be concentrated into one bright assemblage of truth upon the character which he has undertaken to delineate.—*Dr. Parr.*

## 514.

If an editor unites a large share of accuracy, even with a moderate portion of erudition; if he collects materials with industry, and uses them with judgment; if he distinguishes between ingenuity and refinement, and separates useful information from ostentatious pedantry, he will have a claim to public favor, though he should not possess the exquisite taste of a Heyne, the



profound erudition of a Hemsterhuis, or the keen penetration of a Porson.—*Dr. Parr.*

515.

Compilation is a task of far greater difficulty than the production of what is original; though there is no comparison between their intellectual merit or their praise, whatever may be the case as to their respective utility. It is in literature as in life; the most laborious departments are the most necessary, yet often the least appreciated or lucrative.—*W. B. Chulow.*

516.

It is a doubt whether mankind are most indebted to those who, like Bacon and Butler, dig the gold from the mine of literature, or to those who, like Paley, purify it, stamp it, fix its real value, and give it currency and utility. For all the practical purposes of life, truth might as well be in a prison as in the folio of a schoolman, and those who release her from her cobwebbed shelf, and teach her to live with men, have the merit of *liberating*, if not of *discovering* her.—*Lacon.*

517.

The extremes of human knowledge may be considered as founded, on the one hand, purely upon reasons, and on the other, purely on sense. Now, a very large portion of our knowledge, and what, in fact, may be considered as the most important part of it, lies between these two extremes, and results from a union or mixture of them, that is to say, consists of the application of rational principles to the phænomena presented by the objects of nature.—*Dr. Prout.*

518.

Perfect proof requires perfect comprehension; what we can only partially comprehend we can only have partial proof of; because the full proof must be

adequate to the thing which is to be proved, so that both will be incomprehensible by us; but if the proof of a thing in itself, incomprehensible by us, rises as high as our comprehension can reach, we ought to attribute the deficiency of proof that may be necessary for our perfect conviction, not to the defect of probability (capability of being proved) in the thing itself, but to our own incompetency to receive the full proof of it. To defective intelligence, then proof proportionately defective will be sufficient to make a thing probable; that is, such as may be proved.—*W. Danby.*

## 519.

The strongest arguments on any subject will be of no avail, unless there is some disposition in the mind to receive them; so much are our feelings concerned in our opinions.—*W. Danby.*

## 520.

Conclusions from partial reasoning often, perhaps always, make more difficulties than they remove.—*W. Danby.*

## 521.

The evidence of others is not comparable to personal experience; nor is, "I heard," so good as "I saw."—*Chinese Maxim.*

## 522.

We are often inclined to ascribe an effect to one cause when it may be owing to a combination of many. In reasoning thus we may often lose ground instead of gaining it.—*W. Danby.*

## 523.

*Testimony* is like an arrow shot from a long bow, the force of it depends on the strength of the hand that draws it; *argument* is like an arrow from a cross-bow, which has great force though shot by a child.—*Bacon.*

524.

He that gives reason for what he saith has done what is fit to be done, and the most that can be done; he that gives not reason, speaks nothing though he saith never so much.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

525.

I can hardly believe that a person who is unfair in argumentation will be honest in practical affairs, under circumstances of temptation. If it were not that ignorance, like age, has its privileges, and can play strange tricks, and that man, instead of being defined a thinking animal, might more properly be termed an unthinking one, it would be difficult to avoid the suspicion that the way in which some argue implies, as it assuredly tends to produce an utter corruption of moral principle. There is nothing in a course of dissipation, or religious negligence, that so blunts all perception of right and wrong as the bigotry which will not open its eyes to evidence, and the sophistry that defends what reason has pronounced untenable.—*W. B. Clulow.*

526.

He that makes a question where there is no doubt must take an answer where there is no reason.—

527.

Be always so precisely true in whatsoever thou relates of thy own knowledge that thou mayest get an undoubted and settled reputation of veracity; and thou wilt have this advantage, that every body will believe (without further proof) whatsoever thou affirmest be it never so strange.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

528.

Let us be assured of the matter of fact before we trouble ourselves with enquiring into the cause. It is true, that this method is too slow and dull

for the greatest part of mankind who run naturally to the cause and pass over the truth of the matter of fact; but for my part, I will not be so ridiculous as to find out a cause for what is not.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

529.

One plain positive proof is a better reason to believe anything than a hundred objections against it are not to believe it; because since it is confessed on all hands, that our knowledge is very imperfect, it is no reason to disbelieve what we do know, and what we are as certain of as we can be of anything, because there are some things relating to the same subject which we do not know; and, therefore, unless the objection be as positive and evident as the proof is, we may very reasonably acknowledge that there are some difficulties which we do not understand, and yet may very reasonably believe on as we did.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

530.

Oceans of ink, and reams of paper, and disputes infinite, might have been spared, if wranglers had avoided lighting the torch of strife at the wrong end; since a tenth part of the pains expended in attempting to prove *the why, the where, and the when*, certain events have happened, would have been more than sufficient to prove that they never *happened at all*.—*Lacon.*

531.

He who leaves a certainty for an uncertainty, undoes the former, and renders the latter useless.—*Chanakya.*

532.

Those who support startling paradoxes in society must expect severe treatment. By the articles of war, the conquerors never spare those who maintain indefensible positions.—

533.

A wrong principle of judgment multiplies absurdities or mistakes in proportion to the period of its exercise.—*W. B. Clulow.*

534.

The sense of our ignorance, or at least of our limited knowledge, may be itself a preservative against scepticism; for it should teach us to confine our conclusions within the limits of that knowledge, and to make the evidence that we can comprehend, the ground of our belief of what we cannot.—*W. Danby.*

535.

There are some conclusions that solve every thing without explaining any thing. Such is our reference to supreme wisdom and power, to supply our want of efficient causes, and our inability to reconcile apparent contrarieties.—*W. Danby.*

536.

A false conclusion is an error in argument, not a breach of veracity.—*Letters of Junius.*

537.

General conclusions should never be formed without some attention at least to the details which must necessarily be connected with them.—*W. Danby.*

538.

Nothing is so difficult as tracing effects up to their causes, nothing so easy as the invention of causes for effects.—

539.

It is not uncommon for effects to react with double force upon their causes; and when this happens, all of them conspire to the increase of those evils which they respectively produce.—*Dr. Parr.*

540.

We are apt to imagine that we have a full



knowledge of what is familiar to our observation, not considering how superficial that observation is; and consequently how imperfect is all our knowledge.—*W. Danby.*

541.

The first intellectual fault is,—“The taking up of things upon trust, and flattering ourselves that we know more than effectively we do.—*Cicero.*

542.

None can judge well of things of importance who doth not thoroughly know all the particulars: because often one circumstance, and that the least, doth alter the whole case. Yet I tell thee that one doth often judge well who is only acquainted with the generals; and the same man shall judge worse when he hath heard the particulars; because, if a man's head be not very sound and free from passions, he is readily confused, and doth vary, hearing many particulars.—*Guicciardini.*

543.

What is sophistry? It is in using arguments that are in opposition to reason; but those who do not think deeply or fairly enough to see how far arguments are reconcileable to reason, will be apt to call those sophistical that are in fact so reconcileable to, and even those that perfectly accord with reason.—*W. Danby.*

544.

It is a dangerous and pernicious thing to disguise or pervert truth in any case; but to avoid this, all the circumstances of the case, and all that is connected with it, should be fairly and judiciously considered.—*W. Danby.*

545.

The noblest spirits are most sensible of the possibility of error, and the weakest do most hardly lay down an error.—*Dr. Whichcote.*



546.

Dogmatism and obstinacy are the natural consequences of partial decisions, or rather the causes of them; for when one side or part of a question only is examined, there can be no comparative, and consequently no satisfactory judgment formed. — *W. Danby.*

547.

We all love to be in the right. Granted. We like exceedingly to have right on our side, but are not always particularly anxious about being on the side of right. We like to be in the right when we are so; but we do not like it when we are in the wrong. At least it seldom happens that anybody, after emerging from childhood, is very thankful to those who are kind enough to take trouble for the sake of guiding him from the wrong to the right. Few in any age have been able to join heartily in the magnanimous declaration uttered by Socrates in the *Gorgias*: *I am one who would gladly be refuted, if I should say anything not true,—and would gladly refute another should he say anything not true,—but would no less gladly be refuted than refute. For I deem it a greater advantage; inasmuch as it is a greater advantage to be freed from the greatest of evils than to free another; and nothing, I conceive, is so great an evil as a false opinion of matters of moral concernment.*—*Guesses at Truth.*

548.

False reasoners are often best confuted by giving them the full swing of their own absurdities. Some arguments may be compared to wheels, where half a turn will put every thing upside down that is attached to their peripheries; but if we complete the circle, all things will be just where we found them. Hence it is common to say that arguments that prove too much, prove

nothing. I once heard a gentleman affirm, that all mankind were governed by a strong and over-ruling influence, which determined all their actions, and over which they had no control; and the inference deducible from such a position was, that there was no distinction between virtue and vice. Now, let us give this mode of reasoning full play. A murderer is brought before a judge, and sets up this strong and over-ruling propensity in justification of his crime. Now the judge, even if he admitted the plea, must, on the criminal's own showing, condemn him to death. He would thus address the prisoner: You had a strong propensity to commit a murder, and this, you say, must do away the guilt of your crime; but *I* have a strong propensity to hang you for it, and this *I* say, must also do away with the guilt of your punishment.—*Lacon*.

## 549.

What are called parallel cases are dangerous things in argumentation, especially when pushed to excess as they are liable to be. Few methods of illustration or proof are more futile, or more open to the attacks of a subtile polemic. The remark of Lord Chesterfield in censure of those who in ordinary conversation resort to supposed parallels from antiquity, is applicable to most similar expedients to set off truth, error, or personal consequence. “*There never were, since the creation of the world, two cases exactly parallel.*” He adds, however, with much sense, “*Take into your consideration, if you please, cases seemingly analogous; but take them as helps only, not as guides.*” Even if the outward circumstances of any given events were strictly alike, the state of the agents and of society at the time will always be found different, from the perpetual

flux and peculiarity of all minds, individual or collective.—*W. B. Clulow.*

550.

It would be one of the nicest of problems, requiring for its solution consummate skill both in physiology and in ethics, to determine, in certain cases, the lines which separate mental aberration from idiosyncrasy on the one hand, and from moral delinquency on the other.—*W. B. Clulow.*

551.

All truth consists in the relation of our ideas to each other, or in the conformity of those ideas to external objects; and wheresoever that relation or that conformity exists, the ideas belonging to either are unalterably just, and the proposition expressing those ideas must for ever be true.—*Dr. Parr.*

552.

Truth and understanding are not such wares as to be monopolized and traded in by tickets, and statutes, and standards.—*John Milton.*

553.

The mass of diversified truths which lie beneath the outward appearances of things never enters into the imagination of the generality; as when the eye gazes on the wide and uniform surface of the ocean, it little dreams perhaps of the rocks and valleys, the beds of coral, or the forests which sleep below, or of the living prodigies that people and replenish its interior recesses.—*W. B. Clulow.*

554.

Truth of whatever kind is only fact or reality. But in a multitude of instances, mankind are much fonder of fiction than of reality; all false sentiments being so many fictions or fancies in place of facts. One reason may be that there is often considerable difficulty in arriving at facts,

but little or none in taking up with some vague or apparent resemblances.—*W. B. Clulow.*

555.

Error is sometimes so nearly allied to truth, that it blends with it as imperceptibly as the colours of the rainbow fade into each other.—*W. B. Clulow.*

556.

Truth itself has not sufficient charms to captivate the vulgar, but must be vested in mystery, or invested with adventitious ornaments or attractions to strike the popular taste. An unsophisticated mind loves truth for its very simplicity.—*W. B. Clulow.*

557.

Physicians tell us that there is a great deal of difference between taking a medicine and the medicine getting into the constitution. A difference, not unlike which obtains with respect to those great moral propositions, which ought to form the directing principles of human conduct. It is one thing to assent to a proposition of this sort, another, and a very different thing, to have properly imbibed its influence.—*Paley.*

558.

There are things which, if we do not see, we ought to feel; and such feeling, when sanctioned by reason, the proverb rightly describes as being "the truth." If we have not that feeling, we can have no perception of them; truth itself will be lost upon us.—*W. Danby.*

559.

Many talk of the truth which never sounded the depth from whence it springeth; and, therefore, when they are led thereunto they are soon weary, as men drawn from those beaten paths wherewith they have been inured.—*Hooker.*

560.

Truth enters into the heart of man when it is empty, and clean, and still; but when the mind is shaken with passion as with a storm, you can never hear the *voice of the charmer though he charm never so wisely.*—*Bp. Jeremy Taylor.*

561.

It is only by comparison that we can judge of any thing. Absolute knowledge is not given us to possess. The knowledge of truth, especially of the highest truths, must be progressive. Let us then not quarrel with the slowness of our progress, or with the imperfection of our convictions; but doing what we can to improve them, let us wait with patience for their final accomplishment.—*W. Danby.*

562.

Truth conquers by itself; opinion, by foreign aids.—*Epictetus.*

563.

If you seek truth, you will not seek to conquer by all possible means; and when you have found truth, you will have a security against being conquered.—*Epictetus.*

564.

Truth is simple and uniform; the suggestions which it offers to the mind must in some respects, and those the most material, be so too.—*W. Danby.*

565.

The grand and, indeed, only character of truth is its capability of enduring the test of universal experience, and coming unchanged out of every possible form of fair discussion.—*Sir W. J. Herschel.*

566.

Each truth is convictive of some error; and each truth helps on the discovery of another.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

567.

If the mind of man is continually in search of truth, every suggestion of his reason and feelings united must have a tendency towards the perception of it.—*W. Danby.*

568.

The greatest truths are the simplest, and so are the greatest men.—*Guesses at Truth.*

569.

Those truths which are most useful and excellent are also most obvious and intelligible. I set little value on those curiosities and subtleties which are too fine for common apprehensions.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

570.

I give thoughts words, and words truth, and truth boldness. He whose honest freedom makes it his virtue to speak what he thinks, makes it his necessity to speak what is good.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

571.

A person is not to estimate his influence by the degree of external deference which he obtains. A better proof of influence is undesigned imitation, or the adoption of a line of conduct in unison with his maxims or practice.—*W. B. Chulow.*

572.

He in whom talents, genius, and principle are united, will have a firm mind in whatever embarrassment he may be placed; will look steadily at the most undefined shapes of difficulty and danger, of possible mistake or mischance; nor will they appear to him more formidable than they really are. For his attention is not distracted—he has but one business, and that is with the object before him. Neither in general conduct nor in particular emergencies are his plans subservient to considerations of reward, estate, or



title; these are not to have precedence in his thoughts, to govern his actions, but to follow in the train of duty.—*William Wordsworth.*

573.

A man of principle looks at two sides of a thing, to see which is wrong and which is right; a man of the world turns it on every side, to see which he can make the most of.—*W. Danby.*

574.

Harmony may be resolved into simplicity, from which all emanates; unless, indeed, we are to call it the highest possible degree of concentration. Do not men's characters become more estimable as they are more simple? For what is simplicity but truth?—*W. Danby.*

575.

The truly great consider first how they may gain the approbation of God; and secondly, that of their own conscience. Having done this, they would then willingly conciliate the good opinion of their fellow-men. But the truly little reverse the thing; the primary object with them is to secure the applause of their fellow-men, and having effected this, the approbation of God, and their own conscience may follow on as they can.—*Lacon.*

576.

Wherever I find a man despising the false estimates of the vulgar and daring to aspire, in sentiment, in language, and in conduct, to what the highest wisdom through all ages has sanctioned as most excellent, to him I unite myself by a sort of necessary attachment; and, if I am so favoured by nature or destiny, that, by no exertion or labour of my own, I can attain this summit of worth and honour, yet no power of heaven or earth shall hinder me from looking with affection

and reverence upon those who have thoroughly attained this glory, or appear engaged in the successful pursuit of it.—*John Milton.*

577.

From my youth upward to the present moment, I never deserted a private friend nor violated a public principle. I have been the slave of no patron, and the drudge of no party. I formed my political opinions without the smallest regard, and have acted upon them with an utter disregard to personal emolument and professional honors; for many and the best years of my existence I endured very irksome toil, and “suffered” very galling “need,” measuring my resources by my wants, I now so “abound” as to unite a competent income with an independent spirit; and, above all, looking back to this life, and onward to another, I possess that inward “peace of mind which the world can neither give nor take away.”—*Dr. Parr.*

578.

There are many who cultivate appearances while they neglect the heart. There are others who cultivate the heart but somewhat neglect appearances. Both are in the wrong, though the former are incalculably more so. I will endeavour to regard what is internal, so as to secure the approbation of God; I will so far pay attention to what is exterior, as not justly to incur the disapprobation of man.—*W. B. Clulow.*

579.

Reading maketh a full man; conference a ready man; and writing an exact man; and, therefore, if a man write little he had need have a great memory; if he confer little, he had need have a present wit; and if he read little, he had need of much cunning to seem to know what he doth not.—*Bacon.*

580.

Thou mayst make thyself more learned by reading, but wiser only by acting. Spend not all thy vigour in discipline, in the dressing-room of the soul; but step out into the world, and live as well as think.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

581.

All error, as well as vice, is the offspring of imperfect views. It does not hence follow, as some may insinuate, that there would be as much virtue in the world as knowledge, but that, in any particular case, virtue would be insured by a clear and comprehensive discernment of the truth relating to the subject. "Certain it is," says Lord Bacon, "that *veritas* and *bonitas* differ but as the seal and the print; for truth prints goodness; and they be the clouds of error which descend in the storms of passions and perturbations."—*W. B. Clulow.*

582.

A man in whose manners there is no simplicity, and whose every word seems to have been studied, is more to be shunned than a viper.—*Theophrastus.*

583.

If the habit of falsehood be once contracted, the whole moral system is immediately endangered.—*Dr. Parr.*

584.

Men, in general, are pleased in finding out excuses for their own faults.—*Epictetus.*

585.

He that is good will infallibly become better, and he that is bad will as certainly become worse; for vice, virtue, and time, are three things that never stand still.—*Lacon.*

586.

None can tell what that man will do who dares

to vary from right; for by the same authority; that he varies from it in one instance, he may in all.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

587.

The discipline of the mind, by a right conduct in ordinary cases, is the best security against error and defect in those which are extraordinary.—*Dr. Parr.*

588.

Do not consider any vice as trivial, and therefore practice it; do not consider any virtue as unimportant, and therefore neglect it.—*Chinese Maxim.*

589.

A propensity to scandal may partly proceed from an inability to distinguish the proper objects of censure; the many occasions there are for this might very well save us the trouble of seeking for objects of scandal. Judicious censure is no more than just discrimination; scandal confounds all distinctions, in disabling us from making them; and it destroys all the value both of our praise and our blame.—*W. Danby.*

590.

Does not detraction originate in the common observation, that "the censure of others is a tacit approbation of ourselves?" Is not the spirit of detraction peculiar to narrow minds—to wisdom in its own conceit?—*Basil Montagu.*

591.

Caprice is a vice of the temper which increases faster than any other by indulgence; it often spoils the best qualities of the heart; and, in particular situations, degenerates into the most insufferable tyranny.—

592.

Men may, by constantly treating their equals and inferiors in a gross way, so much debauch

their own manners as to forget that any decency is to be observed even to the greatest of mankind.—*Dr. Colbatch.*

593.

There is a troublesome humour some men have, that if they may not lead they will not follow; but had rather a thing were never done than not done their own way, though otherwise very desirable. This comes of an overfulness of ourselves, and shews we are more concerned for praise than the success of what we think a good thing.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

594.

Impatience of contradiction is both weak and wicked. Instead of facilitating decision, it perpetuates contention; it darkens the evidences and obstructs the efficacy of truth itself. It originates in a radical defect of judgment, and too often terminates in a most incorrigible intolerance of temper.—*Dr. Parr.*

595.

Our interest is wonderfully instrumental in warping our views to our inclinations. The most equitably disposed man in the world ought not to be a judge in his own cause. I have known some who, in order not to fall into this temptation of self-love, have committed acts of the greatest injustice in the contrary direction. The surest way with them to ruin a cause, however just, has been to give it the recommendation of some near relative. Justice and truth are so subtle in their nature, that our instruments are too blunt exactly to touch them. If they succeed in reaching the points, they crush them; and find their resting-place rather on falsehood than on reality.—*Pascal.*

596.

Our fallibility and the shortness of our know-

ledge should make us peaceable and gentle; because I *may be* mistaken, I *must not be* dogmatical and confident, peremptory and imperious. I *will not* break the certain laws of charity for a doubtful doctrine, nor for an uncertain truth.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

597.

In conversation speak reason rather than authors, rather sense than a syllogism, rather thy own thoughts than another's. If thou continually quotest others, it will argue a poverty in thyself, which forces thee to be ever a borrowing; it will be a greater commendation to say—thou art wise, than that thou art well read.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

598.

How delicious that conversation is which is accompanied with mutual confidence, freedom, courtesy, and complaisance; how calm the mind, how composed the affections, how serene the countenance, how melodious the voice, how sweet the sleep, how contented the whole life is of him that neither deviseth mischief against others nor suspects any to be contrived against himself; and, contrariwise, how ungrateful and loathsome a thing it is to abide in a state of enmity, wrath, dissension; having the thoughts distracted with solicitous care, anxious suspicion, envious regret; the heart boiling with choler, the face overclouded with discontent, the tongue jarring and out of tune, the ears filled with discordant noises of contradiction, clamour and reproach; the whole frame of body and soul distempered and disturbed with the worst of passions.—*Dr. Barrow.*

599.

The more we know of ourselves the more easy we shall be in our intercourse with others, and they with us; for mutual allowances will be made, and mutual credit given.—*W. Danby.*



600.

Always endeavour to learn something from the information of those thou conversest with, and to put thy company upon those subjects they are best able to speak of.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

601.

Frequent the company of excellent men more than of excellent books. Thou mayest learn more of them than all thy study can teach thee; for conversation lets things into the mind more particularly than reading can.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

602.

Some in their discourse desire rather commendation of wit, in being able to hold all arguments, than of judgment, in discerning what is true; as if it were a praise to know *what might be said*, and not *what should be thought*. Some have certain common places and themes, wherein they are good and want variety; which kind of poverty is for the most part tedious, and, when it is once perceived, ridiculous.—*Bacon.*

603.

Topics of conversation among the multitude are generally *persons*—sometimes *things*—scarcely ever *principles*.—*W. B. Clulow.*

604.

He that useth himself only to books is fit for nothing but a book; and he that converses with nobody is fit to converse with nobody.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

605.

Some persons are insensible to flattering words; but who can resist the flattery of modest imitation?—

606.

Every man thinks *that man* sensible who agrees with him; the only looking-glass we admire is the one which reflects *us*.—*E. W.*

607.

The man will be variable and fickle who lives entirely upon the approbation of men.—*E. W.*

608.

We should judge of men by the manifest tendency of their actions, and by the notorious character of their minds.—*Letters of Junius.*

609.

Our opinion of our fellow-creatures should be a mixed sentiment, neither too severe nor too lenient; and our conduct towards them should be the result of it; and all our observation of others should have for its end the correction of ourselves.—*W. Danby.*

610.

The foundation of domestic happiness is faith in the virtue of woman. The foundation of political happiness is faith in the integrity of man. The foundation of all happiness, temporal and eternal, is faith in the goodness, the righteousness, the mercy, and the love of God.—*Guesses at Truth.*

611.

The *intuitive* powers of Woman are certainly greater than those of Man. Her perceptions are more acute, her apprehension quicker; and she has a remarkable power of interpreting the feelings of others which gives to her not only a much more ready sympathy with these, but that power of guiding her actions so as to be in accordance with them, which we call *tact*. This *tact* bears a close correspondence with the *adaptiveness* to particular ends, which we see in Instinctive actions. In regard to the inferior development of her Intellectual powers, therefore, and in the predominance of the instinctive, Woman must be considered as ranking below man; but in the superior purity and elevation of her Feelings she

is as highly raised above him. Her whole character, *Psychical* as well as *Corporeal*, is beautifully adapted to supply what is deficient in man, and to elevate and refine those powers which might otherwise be directed to low and selfish objects.—*Dr. Carpenter.*

612.

There is perhaps more of *instinct* in our feelings than we are aware of, even in our esteem of each other.—*W. Danby.*

613.

Either be a *true friend*, or a *mere stranger*. A true friend will delight to do good; a mere stranger will do no harm.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

614.

It is said that when desirous of selecting an object for our friendship, our first enquiry concerning him should be into his behaviour towards his parents during his youthful state; and if noted for contravention of their claims, he is not to be trusted or taken for a friend; for good can never come of him who requites the claims of his parents with disobedience. Next to that, the manner of his intercourse and behaviour with his intimates should be ascertained. Next to that, we must inform ourselves how he is affected towards his benefactors; if disposed to ingratitude, no advance should be desired in his acquaintance. For of all vile qualities, none is more culpable than ingratitude; as, among good ones, there is no virtue more laudable than thankfulness.—*Akhlak-i-Jalaly.*

615.

These three chief points are necessarily belonging to a counsellor—to be bold, plain and faithful.—

616.

Four things belong to a judge: to hear cour-

teously, to answer wisely, to consider soberly, and to give judgment without partiality.—

617.

When you have nothing to say, say nothing ; a weak defence strengthens your opponent, and silence is less injurious than a bad reply.—*Lacon*.

618.

If you would give a just sentence, mind neither parties nor pleaders, but the cause itself.—*Epictetus*.

619.

Consult nothing so much, upon every occasion, as safety. Now it is safer to be silent than to speak ; and omit speaking whatever is not accompanied with sense and reason.—*Epictetus*.

620.

There is a large fund of power in the world unappropriated and inactive, but a still larger portion misapplied and perverted. Were the mere waste talent and energy of mankind to be used aright, three-fourths of the ills that affect the species might be overcome.—*W. B. Clulow*.

621.

It is the character of the most mean-spirited and foolish men to suppose they shall be despised by others ; unless, by every method, they hurt those who are first their enemies.—*Epictetus*.

622.

To do evil is more within the reach of every man, in public as well as in private life, than to do good.—*Dr. Parr*.

623.

If all would abstain from what they evidently can avoid, namely, injuring others in their persons, property, reputation, or feelings, nine-tenths of the unhappiness of life would vanish.—*W. B. Clulow*.

624.

Nothing awakens our sleeping virtues like the

noble acts of our predecessors. They are standing beacons that fame and time have set on hills, to call us to a defence of virtue, whensoever vice invades the commonwealth of man.—*Feltham.*

625.

Every man, however humble his station or feeble his powers, exercises some influence on those who are about him for good or for evil; and those influences emanating again as from a fresh centre, are propagated onwards, and though diluted by new motives, and modified by new circumstances at each transmission, so as in common cases to be lost to the eye of man, they may still go on producing a silent effect to the remotest generations; and thus become, under Providence, a part of the appointed means by which a nation's glory is continued and its strength upheld.—*Professor Sedgwick.*

626.

Great examples to virtue, or to vice, are not so productive of imitation as might at first sight be supposed. The fact is, there are hundreds that want energy for one that wants ambition, and sloth has prevented as many vices in some minds as virtues in others. Idleness is the grand *pacific* ocean of life, and in that stagnant abyss the most salutary things produce no good, the most noxious no evil. Vice, indeed, abstractedly considered, may be, and often is, engendered in idleness, but the moment it becomes efficiently vice, it must quit its cradle, and cease to be idle.—*Lacon.*

627.

As the sun does not wait for prayers and incantations to be prevailed upon to rise, but immediately shines forth, and is received with universal salutations; so, neither do you wait for applauses, and shouts, and praises, in order to do good; but

be a voluntary benefactor, and you will be beloved like the sun.—*Epictetus*.

628.

Nothing makes societies so fair and lasting as the mutual endearment of each other by good offices; and never any man did a good turn to his brother, but one time or another himself did eat the fruit of it.—*Bp. Jeremy Taylor*.

629.

Were we to consider the goods of life as temporary loans, which they are, rather than appropriate or permanent possessions, which they are not, we should be more likely to employ them in a manner profitable to ourselves and others.—*W. B. Clulow*.

630.

He that receiveth a benefit should not only remember but requite the same liberally and fruitfully, according to the nature of the earth, which rendereth more fruit than it receiveth seed.—*Quintilian*.

631.

Gratitude is a virtue which, according to the general apprehensions of mankind, approaches more nearly than almost any other social virtue to justice.—*Dr. Parr*.

632.

Amidst all the imperfections of human language, the principles of gratitude have fixed and intelligible terms.—*Dr. Parr*.

633.

You may rest upon this as a proposition of an eternal unfailing truth, that there neither is, nor ever was, any person remarkably ungrateful, who was not also insufferably proud; nor, convertibly, any one proud, who was not equally ungrateful.—*Dr. South*.



634.

Afflictions cannot be esteemed with wise and godly men any argument of sin in an innocent person, more than the impunity of wicked men is amongst good men any sure token of their innocence.—*Charles I.*

635.

In the hour of adversity be not without hope; for crystal rain falls from black clouds.—*Nez-zoumee.*

636.

Praise to the dead cannot be withheld without ingratitude; and surely it is paid with a greater propriety when it conveys most delicate exhortation, and the most powerful encouragement to those among the living, who are animated by the strong and generous impulses of virtuous emulation.—*Dr. Parr.*

637.

The maxim of “*de mortuis nil nisi verum*” is far preferable to “*nil nisi bonum*,” as it is more the *example* than the *person* which is to be followed or avoided, and the influence of that example subsists after death, when those who have made themselves conspicuous in the world will be remembered; and it is but doing justice to the memory of the good, to distinguish them from the bad. If nothing but good were to be spoken of the dead, the living would want an inducement to deserve well of posterity. It is the example we leave behind us that is of most importance to future generations; for what is there else to record?  
*W. Danby.*

638.

I am convinced, from long observation, that unity in religious opinions is unattainable—that the attempt to produce it by artifice or force recoils upon its employers—that every truth, really

interesting to mankind, is discovered more fully and more clearly by the investigation of enquirers whose ability and perhaps motives to enquire are various—that the spirit of proselytism, even in honest men, is often accompanied by excess of zeal, impatience of contradiction, and a secret propensity towards intolerance—that public measures ought to be guided by the views of the public good, at once precise and large—and that the public good itself is most effectually promoted and secured by a temper of general moderation among the different members and different classes of society.—*Dr. Parr.*

639.

Nothing should alienate us from one another but that which alienates us from God.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

640.

In contentions be always passive, ever active upon the defensive, not the assaulting part; and then also give a gentle answer, receiving the furies and indiscretions of the other like a stone into a bed of moss and soft compliance; and you shall find it sit down quietly; whereas anger and violence make the contention loud and long, and injurious to both parties.—*Bp. Jeremy Taylor.*

641.

The great art of social life, is to assert what is due to ourselves without trespassing on what is due to others; and in both to act a defensive part; not being too rigorous in one nor too complaisant in the other observance; if we exact too much, we cannot expect it will be paid; if we concede too much, we cannot expect it will be received in a manner that will be satisfactory to us. If we respect others, we shall respect ourselves; we shall respect others (for it is a common interest) and be sure of their respect; if we command ourselves, we shall command others.—*W. Danby.*

642.

As it is impossible to please men in all things, our only care should be to satisfy our own consciences.—*Chinese maxim.*

643.

If you would live with tranquility and content, endeavour to have all who live with you good. And you will have them good by instructing the willing and dismissing the unwilling.—*Epictetus.*

644.

If you would be well spoken of, learn to speak well of others. And when you have learned to speak well of them, endeavour likewise to do well to them; and thus you will reap the fruit of being well spoken of by them.—*Epictetus.*

645.

Two of the greatest difficulties in life, I believe, are to be perfectly just in our opinion of men and things; and to distinguish those things which are of real consequence, and to be solicitous only about them. The nearer we approach to these points, the more we shall probably be satisfied with ourselves.—*W. Danby.*

646.

In our actions, we should accord with the will of heaven; in our words, we should consult the feelings of men.—*Chinese maxim.*

647.

He that never changed any of his opinions, never corrected any of his mistakes, and he who was never wise enough to find out any mistake in himself will not be charitable enough to excuse what he reckons mistakes in others.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

648.

You will commit the fewest faults in judging, if you are faultless in your own life.—*Epictetus.*

649.

If every body did confine himself to that which

is right, just and fit, we should all be the better for one another.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

650.

Fair construction and courteous behaviour are the greatest charity.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

651.

Those who are evil themselves are hard to believe the good that is spoken of others ; because they are challenged by the good of others which is wanting in themselves.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

652.

Ill-nature doth not credit the effects of good-nature. We shall hardly think truly of God, if we be not like God ; and they must needs misrepresent God who think Him such as themselves, before they have made themselves such as He is.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

653.

He does me the first good office who makes me right in my notion where I was mistaken ; he does me the next good office who awakens and reminds me where I had forgotten.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

654.

If we would reprove another with success, and convince him that he is in the wrong, we must observe in what point of view he looks on the affair ; because, in that way it generally is as he imagines, and acknowledge that he is so far in the right. He will be pleased with this, because it intimates not that he was mistaken, but only that he had not considered the thing on all sides. For we do not feel it any disgrace not to see everything ; but we do not like to acknowledge that we have been deceived ; and perhaps the reason of this may be that the understanding is not deceived in that point of view in which it actually considers the subject, just as the simple perceptions of the senses are always true.—*Pascal.*

655.

Every man that would have peace must be content to let the world go on in its folly. Yet he who would not have his better nature mastered by selfishness must often make a sacrifice of peace, and do good to others in spite of themselves.—*W. B. Clulow.*

656.

“Charity seeketh not its own.” It will sometimes relinquish the greater good to itself, that it may procure the less for another man; and sometimes it will incur the greater evils, in order to avert from another the less.—*Dr. Parr.*

657.

The benevolent affections owe much of their vigour to the frequency with which they are exercised, and to the pleasure by which they are attended.—*Dr. Parr.*

658.

Wisdom, and Virtue, and Benevolence, and Rectitude, without Good-breeding, are imperfect.—*Chinese maxim.*

659.

Confucius perhaps displayed as much sagacity as benevolence, in making politeness one of his five cardinal virtues.—*W. B. Clulow.*

660.

There is a law of opinion which no good man will presume to treat with irreverence; because every good man is anxious to avoid the contempt, and to deserve the regard of his fellow-creatures.—*Dr. Parr.*

661.

There is nothing that people bear more impatiently, or forgive less, than contempt; an injury is much sooner forgotten than an insult.—*Lord Chesterfield.*

662.

Be very cautious of believing little tales and ill reports of others; and far more cautious of reporting them; lest, upon strict enquiry, they should prove false; and then shame will not only attend thee for thy folly, but thy conscience will accuse thee of an act of injustice.—

663.

We are the less able to judge of others, and still less of the world in general, as we are apt to be more struck with, and even to generalize, what is bad in it.—*W. Danby.*

664.

Some of our law maxims are admirable rules of conduct. If, in spite of the censorious calumny of the world, we considered “a man innocent until he were proved guilty;” or if in our daily thoughts, words, and actions, we did but “give the prisoner the benefit of the doubt;” how much better Christians we should become!—

665.

Let not any one use that severity in the case of another which his own case will not bear; for a man may condemn himself in the person of another.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

666.

Though a man be utterly stupid, he is very perspicacious while reprehending the bad actions of others; though he may be very intelligent, he is dull enough while excusing his own faults. Do you only correct yourself on the same principle that you correct others, and excuse others on the same principle that you excuse yourself.—*Chinese maxim.*

667.

Upon the points in which we dissent from each other, argument will always secure the attention of the wise and good; whereas, invective must dis-



grace the cause which we may respectively wish to support.—*Dr. Parr.*

668.

If thou contendest or discourshest in argument, let it be only with wise and sober men; of whom thou mayst learn by reasoning; not with ignorant, conceited, and angry persons, who may affront and vex thee.—

669.

When you do any thing from a clear judgment that it ought to be done, never shun the being seen to do it, even though the world should make a wrong supposition about it; for if you do not act right, shun the action itself; but if you do, why are you afraid of those who censure wrongly? —*Epictetus.*

670.

Where the reason of the thing doth not require or determine; where the necessity of the end doth not claim and enforce; where there is no positive prohibition, or injunction to the contrary, from God; there, under God, we have liberty.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

671.

A leading distinction between men of enlarged and philosophic genius, and the uninformed multitude, appears to be, that the former perceive, at least in part, the *reasons* or *causes of things*, while the latter perceive only the *things themselves*.—*W. B. Clulow.*

672.

Hesiod, in his celebrated distribution of mankind, divides them into three orders of intellects. "The first place," says he, "belongs to him that can by his own powers discern what is right and fit, and penetrate to the remoter motives of action. The second is claimed by him that is willing to hear instruction, and can perceive right and wrong

when they are shewn him by another; but he that has neither acuteness nor docility, who can neither find the way by himself, nor will be led by others, is a wretch without use or value.”—

## 673.

They who would exclude the poor from all knowledge are frequently persons who have experienced the advantages of education, and are placed in very respectable situations. Their reasoning, however, reminds one of the illiterate and brutal Cade’s interview with the Clerk of Chatham.

“*Cade.* Let me alone.—Dost thou use to write thy name? or hast thou a mark to thyself like an honest plain-dealing man?

“*Clerk.* Sir, I thank God, that I have been so well brought up that I can write my name.

“*All.* He hath confessed; away with him! he’s a villain and a traitor.

“*Cade.* Away with him, I say! hang him with his pen and ink-horn about his neck!”—*Dr. Parr.*

## 674.

Propagate good instruction to correct men’s vices; part with your wealth to effect men’s happiness.—*Chinese maxim.*

## 675.

Those that are teaching the people to read, are doing all that in them lies to increase the power, and to extend the influence of those that can write; for the child will read to please his master, but the man to please himself.—*Lacon.*

## 676.

Morality is the congruity and proportion that is between the actions of rational beings and the objects of those actions.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

677.

Inattention to minute actions will ultimately be prejudicial to a man's virtue.—*Chinese maxim.*

678.

It is good for a man to abstain from anger, if not for wisdom's sake, yet for his own bodily health's sake.—

679.

The best cure for drunkenness is, while sober, to observe a drunken man.—*Chinese maxim.*

680.

If the stream be not confined it will soon flow away and become dry; if wealth be not economized, there will be no limits to its expenditure, and it will soon be wasted.—*Chinese maxim.*

681.

Do not accustom yourself to consider debt only as an *inconvenience*; you will find it a *calamity*.—

682.

Keep exact accounts. It is seldom observed that he who keeps an account of his income and expenses, and thereby has constantly under his view the course of his domestic affairs, lets them run to ruin. When any one breaks in *Holland*, their expression for it is, such a man kept not his accounts well.—

683.

He that can look with rapture upon the agonies of an unoffending and unresisting animal will soon learn to view the sufferings of a fellow-creature with indifference; and in time he will acquire the power of viewing them with triumph, if that fellow-creature should become the victim of his resentment, be it just or unjust. But the minds of children are open to impressions of every sort; and, indeed, wonderful is the facility with

which a judicious instructor may habituate them to tender emotions. I have, therefore, always considered mercy to beings of an inferior species as a virtue which children are very capable of learning, but which is most difficult to be taught if the heart has been once familiarized to spectacles of distress, and has been permitted either to behold the pangs of any living creature with cold insensibility, or to inflict them with wanton barbarity.—*Dr. Parr.*

684.

From the beginning of the world, to this day, there was never any great villainy acted by men, but it was in the strength of some great fallacy put upon their minds by a false representation of evil for good, or good for evil.—*Dr. South.*

685.

The responsibility of nations seems to be separated from that of individuals; the one to be judged of in this world, the other in the next.—*W. Danby.*

686.

The great object of government should be to make the general interest, the interest also of each individual.—*W. Danby.*

687.

If good principles be made general (universal I fear they cannot be), the violation of them will be attended with more danger, the observance with more security; which is probably all that can be attained in human society.—*W. Danby.*

688.

The word liberty has been falsely used by persons who, being degenerately profligate in private life, and mischievous in public, had no hopes left but in fomenting discord.—*Tacitus.*

689.

The right of the case is the law of heaven,

and should be the law of the world.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

690.

Are there not many things amongst the institutions of society which have been the subjects of violent and obstinate controversy, and of which a little unprejudiced common sense may be able at once to form both the censure and the apology? —*W. Danby.*

691.

That is the most excellent state of society in which the patriotism of the citizen ennobles, but does not merge, the individual energy of the man. —*S. T. Coleridge.*

692.

Pay in, before you are called upon, what is due to the public, and you will never be asked for what is not due.—*Epictetus.*

693.

You will confer the greatest benefits on your city, not by raising the roofs but by exalting the souls of your fellow-citizens. For it is better that great souls should live in small habitations than that abject slaves should burrow in great houses.—*Epictetus.*

694.

He who would live for future generations must have his thoughts occupied, but his hands and his time free. He must be content to remain ignorant of many things which fill the ideas and conversation of the generality; to be neglected perhaps, or misrepresented by his contemporaries; and to behold the superficial or flippant reap the distinctions which are the appropriate rewards of merit.—*W. B. Clulow.*

695.

The introduction of great inventions appears one of the most distinguished of human actions;

and the ancients so considered it. For they assigned divine honours to the authors of inventions, but only heroic honours to those who displayed civil merit, such as the founders of cities and empires, legislators, the deliverers of their country from lasting misfortunes, the quellers of tyrants, and the like. And if any one rightly compare them, he will find the judgment of antiquity to be correct. For the benefits derived from inventions may extend to mankind in general, but civil benefits to particular spots alone; the latter, moreover, last but for a time, the former for ever. Civil reformation seldom is carried on without violence and confusion, whilst inventions are a blessing and a benefit without injuring or afflicting any.—*Bacon*.

696.

Laws are intended to guard against what men *may do*, not to trust to what they *will do*.—*Letters of Junius*.

697.

The submission of a free people to the executive authority of government is no more than a compliance with laws which they themselves have enacted.—*Letters of Junius*.

698.

The necessity of external government to man is in an inverse ratio to the vigour of his self-government. Where the last is most complete, the first is least wanted. Hence the more virtue, the more liberty.—*S. T. Coleridge*.

699.

From original temperament, from early education, from experience of personal inconvenience, and from various other causes scarcely known to ourselves, we all of us feel a stronger aversion from some offences than from others. One man is alarmed at public robbery, another takes fright at private



stealing, a third startles at heresy as bordering upon infidelity, a fourth kindles at republicanism as teeming with treason; and each, if it were in his power, would wreak the utmost of his vengeance upon the offender. But can it be right that the life, or the liberty, or the fortune of any human being should be dependent upon the greater or less degree of these moral idiosyncrasies? —*Dr. Parr.*

700.

The oppression of an obscure individual gave birth to the famous *Habeas Corpus* Act of 31 Car. II., which is frequently considered as another *Magna Charta* of this kingdom.—*Blackstone.*

701.

Men are governed by their habits, their prejudices, their hopes, or their fears. The two first are the most powerful, as being the earliest planted and deepest rooted; the two latter are purely speculative, and in a great measure dependent on the constitution, whether it is sanguine and bold, or cautious and timid. Much also will depend on their powers of reasoning and of observation, for which there is a very wide field, in observing all the bearings and dependencies, all the connexion between theory and practice, and how far they are compatible with each other, which is only to a certain degree; though all practice, to be good, must be founded on good theoretical principles, otherwise it cannot last long in a sound state, however it may accord with men's passions and interests, mutable as they are, in common with the events of the world.—*W. Danby.*

702.

Necessity includes the idea of inevitable. Wherever it is so, it creates a law to which all positive laws, and all positive rights, must give way.—*Letters of Junius.*

703.

No institutions of man, however solid in their fundamental principles, and however beneficial in their general tendencies, can be fenced against the incursions of contingent evil.—*Dr. Parr.*

704.

The laws of England provide, as effectually as any human laws can do, for the protection of the subject, in his reputation as well as in his person and property.—*Letters of Junius.*

705.

The general principles of law are, indeed, wholly independent of the changes, which, however great, are from time to time effected in the machinery and working of the law of the land. They are unaltered, because they are unalterable—pervading equally all sound systems of jurisprudence, in all ages and countries—being based upon truth and justice, and deduced from the universal experience of mankind.—*Chitty.*

706.

It is of the greatest consequence to the Law of England, and also to the subject, that the powers of the judge and jury be kept distinct; that the judge determine the law, and the jury the fact; and if ever they come to be confounded, it will prove the confusion and destruction of the Law of England.—*Lord Hardwicke.*

707.

The advantages of wise institutions can be sought for only in an inflexible observance of them.—*Chinese maxim.*

708.

Impunity and remissness for certain are the bane of a commonwealth; but here the great art lies, to discern in what the law is to bid restraint and punishment, and in what things persuasion only is to work.—*John Milton.*

709.

One of the firmest supports of princes and statesmen is the general distribution of moderate wealth, and the multiplication of domestic comforts among the members of the community.—*W. B. Clulow.*

710.

The pure and impartial administration of justice is, perhaps, the firmest bond to secure a cheerful submission of the people, and to engage their affections to government.—*Letters of Junius.*

711.

Through idleness, negligence, and too much trust in fortune, not only men, but cities and kingdoms, have been utterly lost and destroyed.—

712.

Liberty and property are precarious, unless the possessors have sense and spirit enough to defend them.—*Letters of Junius.*

713.

Good sense is common sense well applied. The possession of it is shewn in the use.—*W. Danby.*

714.

Sound policy is never at variance with substantial justice.—*Dr. Parr.*

715.

I question whether affairs were not conducted as wisely, at least as successfully, in times of antiquity, when auguries and oracles, events of an accidental nature, or the decisions of individual opinion, formed the rules of procedure, as in the present epoch, when political skill and deliberative counsel are the ostensible directors of government. Under any species of administration it is seldom that both intellect and integrity have a predominating sway; and in the transactions of empires, success is often attained not so much by well-

adjusted schemes as by a happy concurrence of fortuitous incidents. With regard, however, to the ancient practice of divination, it is but fair to mention that those to whom it was chiefly intrusted, as among the Romans, the college of augurs, the haruspices, and the interpreters of the Sibylline prophecies, were usually persons more or less connected with the government or magistracy, and whose explanations, therefore, were in great measure determined by reasons of state. The oracles in particular, it is well known, were often bribed by those who consulted them; so that both auguries and oracular responses were less influenced by chance than might at first be supposed.—*W. B. Chulow.*

## 716.

There are three great maxims to be observed by those who hold public situations; viz. to be upright, to be circumspect, to be diligent. Those who know these three rules, know that by which they will ensure their own safety in office.—*Chinese maxim.*

## 717.

Ignorance, indeed, so far as it may be resolved into natural inability, is, as to men at least, inculpable, and consequently not the object of scorn, but pity; but in a governor it cannot be without the conjunction of the highest impudence; for who bid such an one aspire to teach and to govern? A blind man sitting in the chimney-corner is pardonable enough, but sitting at the helm he is intolerable. If men will be ignorant and illiterate, let them be so in private, and to themselves, and not set their defects in a high place, to make them visible and conspicuous. If owls will not be hooted at, let them keep close within the tree, and not perch upon the upper boughs.—*Dr. South.*

## 718.

If governors were actuated by the same benevolent spirit which Christianity was meant to infuse into the minds of those whom they are appointed to govern,—if justice and mercy, which are recommended to all the followers of our Blessed Redeemer, without regard to the infinitely varied and continually changing distinctions of climate, custom, laws, rank, and fortune, and the obligations to which are modified, but not suspended, by such distinctions, really pervaded the whole of a community, every corruption would be purified; every abuse would be corrected; every violence would be averted; and the blessings of public as well as private life would be more widely diffused, and more permanently secured. The honest magistrate, the wise legislator, the brave warrior, and the upright patriot, might, each in his own province, claim to himself the appellation of a good Christian.—*Dr. Parr.*

## 719.

There is a gradual and silent extension of power which, in its effects, is scarcely less pernicious than usurpation; when under specious pretexts of necessity it has been permitted to answer other purposes than those for which it was primarily conferred; and when, having imperceptibly obtained the force of immemorial usage, it represses all investigation into its comparative merits and demerits in the actual business of life.—*Dr. Parr.*

## 720.

The violation of the law should not be measured by the magnitude of the instance, but by the important consequences which flow from the principle.—*Letters of Junius.*

721.

It is equally criminal in the governor and the governed to violate the laws.—*Chinese maxim.*

722.

Power will intoxicate the best hearts, as wine the strongest heads. No man is wise enough, nor good enough, to be trusted with unlimited power; for, whatever qualifications he may have evinced to entitle him to the possession of so dangerous a privilege, yet, when possessed, others can no longer answer for him, because he can no longer answer for himself.—*Lacon.*

723.

Wisdom and power are perfections only as they are in conjunction with justice and goodness.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

724.

There is a manifest marked distinction, which ill men with ill designs, or weak men incapable of any design, will constantly be confounding, that is, a marked distinction between *change* and *reformation*. The former alters the substance of the objects themselves, and gets rid of all their essential good, as well as all the accidental evil annexed to them. Change is novelty; and whether it is to operate any one of the effects of reformation at all, or whether it may not contradict the very principle upon which reformation is desired, cannot be certainly known beforehand. Reform is not a change in the substance, or in the primary modification of the object, but a direct application of a remedy to the grievance complained of. So far as that is removed, all is sure. It stops there; and if it fails, the substance which underwent the operation at the very worst, is but where it was. To innovate is not to reform.—*Burke.*



## 725.

The world will not endure to hear that we are wiser than any have been which went before. In which consideration there is cause why we should be slow and unwilling to change, without very urgent necessity, the ancient ordinances, rites, and long-approved customs, of our venerable predecessors. The love of things ancient doth argue stayedness, but levity and want of experience maketh apt unto innovations. That which wisdom did first begin, and hath been with good men long continued, challengeth allowance of them that succeed, although it plead for itself nothing. That which is new, if it promise not much, doth fear condemnation before trial; till trial, no man doth acquit or trust it, what good soever it pretend and promise. So that in this kind there are few things known to be good till such time as they grow to be ancient.—*Hooker*.

## 726.

We ought not to be over anxious to encourage innovation in cases of doubtful improvement, for an old system must ever have two advantages over a new one; it is established, and,—it is understood.—*Lacon*.

## 727.

All systems and institutions, whether civil or ecclesiastical, which are incapable of moving along with the tide of general improvement, will sooner or later be swept away by its progress.—*W. B. Clulow*.

## 728.

The opponents of national or political innovations are commonly those who are equally averse from alteration in the state and sentiment of their own minds. A person will hardly dread the thought of exterior or public change whose ideas in general are undergoing a process of incessant

change or augmentation. Yet this is certainly the case with every thinking or disciplined mind; for what is intellectual advancement, but a series of intellectual innovations?—*W. B. Clulow.*

729.

It would be easy to draw such a picture of the laws and institutions of almost any country as, without including a single circumstance decidedly incorrect, might induce a person unacquainted with the actual particulars of the case to imagine, that scarcely the slightest grievance or misery existed among the community. The suppression of some facts and a certain arrangement or colouring in the exhibition of others, may have all the effects of positive falsehood in misleading the judgment.—*W. B. Clulow.*

730.

He that looks back to the history of mankind will often see that, in politics, jurisprudence, religion, and all the great concerns of society reform has usually been the work of reason slowly awakening from the lethargy of ignorance, gradually acquiring confidence in her own strength, and ultimately triumphing over the dominion of prejudice and custom.—*Dr. Parr.*

731.

Light, whether it be material or moral, is the best reformer; for it prevents those disorders which other remedies sometimes cure but sometimes confirm.—*Lacon.*

732.

This is not the liberty which we can hope,—that no grievance should ever arise in the commonwealth; that, let no man in this world expect; but when complaints are freely heard, deeply considered, and speedily reformed, then is the utmost bound of civil liberty attained that wise men look for.—*John Milton.*

733.

Man who, speaking of him collectively, has never reasoned for himself, is the puppet of impulses and prejudices, be they for good or evil. These are, in the usual course of things, traditional notions and sentiments, strengthened by repetition, and running into habitual trains of thought. Nothing is more difficult, in general, than to make a nation perceive anything as true, or seek its own interest in any manner, but as its forefathers have opined or acted. Change in these respects has been, even in Europe, where there is most of flexibility, very gradual; the work, not of argument or instruction, but of exterior circumstances, slowly operating through a long lapse of time.—*H. Hallam.*

734.

For the Constitution which we now enjoy we are indebted to many various causes, in many successive ages; to the sagacity of statesmen—to the fortitude of patriots—to consequences which fell not within the good or the evil intentions of the primary agents—to the jealousies, as well as confederacies, of powerful classes—to the defeats, as well as successes, of contending parties—to the weaknessess and vices, as well as the talents and virtues, of the ruling powers. But a Constitution worthy of remaining, or even likely to remain, among a civilized people, never has been contrived, nor ever will be, by any one man, or any one body of men.—*Dr. Parr.*

735.

The Government of England is a government of law. We betray ourselves, we contradict the spirit of our laws, and we stake the whole system of English jurisprudence, whenever we entrust a discretionary power over the life, liberty, or fortune of the subject to any man, or set of men whatso-

ever, upon a presumption that it will not be abused.  
—*Letters of Junius*.

## 736.

We should never suffer any invasion of our political constitution, however minute the instance may appear, to be passed over without a determined, persevering resistance. One precedent creates another; they soon accumulate and constitute law. What yesterday was fact, to-day is doctrine. Examples are supposed to justify the most dangerous measures, and where they do not suit exactly, the defect is supplied by analogy.—*Letters of Junius*.

## 737.

No men are prone to be greater tyrants, and more rigorous exactors upon others to conform to their illegal novelties, than such whose pride was formerly least disposed to the obedience of lawful constitutions, and whose licentious humours most pretended conscientious liberties.—*Charles I.*

## 738.

The liberty of the press is the palladium of all the civil, political, and religious rights of an Englishman; and the right of juries to return a general verdict, in all cases whatsoever, is an essential part of our Constitution, not to be controlled or limited by the judges, nor in any shape questioned by the legislature.—*Letters of Junius*.

## 739.

By looking back into history, and considering the fate and revolutions of government, you will be able to draw a guess, and almost prophesy upon the future. For things past, present, and to come, are strangely uniform, and of a colour, and are commonly cast in the same mould. So that upon this matter, forty years of human life may serve for a sample of ten thousand.—*Marcus Antoninus*.

740.

Men of comprehensive and penetrating genius are often more vehement in reprobating erroneous or foolish acts of legislation than to others appears necessary. The truth is, they have a deeper insight into the absurdity or pernicious tendencies of what they oppose than the generality dream of.—*W. B. Clulow.*

741.

Acts of legislation are too momentous in their consequences to be debased by ostentatious courtesy, or wanton rudeness, to any members or any classes of the community. In the discussion of political topics, men of observation see only folly, or affectation, or flattery, in the profession of separating measures from men; and surely in the more solemn process of enacting penal laws, the framers of them ought to keep in view the possible imperfections of those who are to administer, as well as the actual maglignity of those who may violate them.—*Dr. Parr.*

742.

Law, in the proper sense of the word, is entitled to absolute obedience; it is the support of liberty, civil and religious, but cannot take away either; and legislators who through servility, corruption, or tyranny, who through ignorance, superstition, or prejudice, have ordained institutions to this purpose, may be said to have issued *edicts*, and these they may have enforced by penal sanctions; but they have not, properly speaking, established *laws*; for it is essentially necessary that the object, and the matter of law, be fundamentally holy, just, and good; or, in other words, consistent with the ordinations of God and the rights of man.—*Dr. Peckard.*

743.

The blessings of Revelation are meant to

improve human nature progressively, not to change it suddenly and totally—to correct, not destroy, the influence of national opinions, customs, and institutions—to mitigate, not annihilate, physical evils, and to forward their proper uses, as furnishing opportunities for moral good among creatures whose industry, patience, fortitude, and benevolence, are to be exercised in a state of moral discipline.—*Dr. Parr.*

744.

That religion is false which, professing to be intended for the use of all nations, is distorted in its doctrines, and narrowed in its precepts, by the prejudices and manners of any one particular age and any one particular country. That religion is probably true which, challenging the enquiries and demanding the obedience of every age and every country, is calculated to promote their temporal as well as eternal interest; to co-operate with every useful quality in their government, laws, and manners; and gradually to correct whatever is defective and injurious in them.—*Dr. Parr.*

745.

The world will never be released from the superstitions of the Roman Church till men confine themselves, in matters of religion, to free reason and plain Scripture.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

746.

There are three great designs in Popery: 1. To keep the Civil Magistrate in awe; 2. To maintain the Clergy in state and honour; 3. To keep the people in ignorance, and so to enslave them.—*Dr. Whichcote.*

747.

The Church of Rome may be considered as the most formidable combination that ever was formed against the authority and security of civil govern-



ment, as well as against the liberty, reason, and happiness of mankind.—*Adam Smith.*

748.

I believe there is essentially and inseparably in Popery something of deadly tendency to the welfare of a state. Does any mortal doubt, whether if ever it were to regain an ascendancy of power, an uncontrolled dominion in this country, it would reveal the fiend, and again revel in persecution.—*John Foster.*

749.

We refuse, as our predecessors, and rightly enough, to permit popes, cardinals, and an “infallible Church,” to interpret our duties for us; but who is so independent of the dogmatic interpretation which the “*spirit of the age*” insidiously gives to the simplest of them?—*J. F. Boyce.*

750.

Mankind appear to be in league against their own interests, and betray the same spirit in matters of secular concern as in those of religion. Let a wiser and better course of things be exhibited ever so clearly, or enforced with the utmost cogency, no practical alteration is admitted, or only after repeated struggles against its adoption. The battle with error and apathy must be fought again and again; and often those who make the most strenuous efforts in the cause, never live to witness its triumph, or reap the fruits of their exertions.—*W. B. Clulow.*

751.

We may improve the moral as well as political state of that country by assisting in the establishment or execution of salutary laws. We may shew the sincerity of our patriotism by the general activity of our benevolence, and by our solicitude to promote alike the spiritual and temporal welfare of those who are endeared to us by social inter-

course. We may be industrious, and the encouragers of industry. We may be learned, and patrons of learning. We may be innocent, and the protectors of innocence. By our counsels we may suggest, or by our contributions we may facilitate extensive projects for the employment of the idle, the reformation of the dissolute, and the relief of the sick, the aged, and the indigent. We may enlighten ignorance, correct prejudices, restrain intolerance, assuage animosities, and diffuse around us the blessings of Christian charity. We may direct our neighbours, our families, our countrymen, to the knowledge of every Christian truth. We may animate them at once by precept and example, to the practice of every Christian duty. In reality, every accession to national virtue brings with it an additional security for national prosperity; and surely he who, by the authority of his station or the influence of his advice, accustoms a whole people to the love of truth, justice, and mercy, to faith in Christ, and piety towards God, has a splendid claim to be ranked among the most useful friends of his country and the noblest benefactors of mankind.—*Dr. Parr.*

752.

The main labours of existence should ever be for periods of tranquillity, as these form the rule, and seasons of disturbance and war the exception. The Chinese seem to have acted most steadily on this axiom, their chief energies having been directed for ages to the cultivation of the arts of peace. It is not without reason that, among this extraordinary people, the civilians or men of letters take precedence of the profession of arms.—*W. B. Clulow.*

753.

War, though it may be undertaken, according

to popular opinions and popular language, with justice, and prosecuted with success, is a most awful calamity; it generally finds men sinners, or makes them such; for, so great is usually the disproportion between the provocation and the punishment, between the evil inflicted or suffered, and the good obtained, or even proposed, that a serious man cannot reconcile the very frequent rise, and the very long continuance of hostilities, to reason or to humanity. Upon whom, too, do the severities of war fall most heavily? In many cases they by whom contention is begun, or cherished, feel their influence extended, their dependents multiplied, and their wealth, in the regular and fair course of public business, increased. While fields are laid waste and cities depopulated, the persons by whose commands such miseries take place are often wantoning in luxurious excess, or slumbering in a state of unfeeling and lazy repose. The peaceful citizen is in the meantime crushed under the weight of exactions, to which, for "conscience sake," he submits; the industrious merchant is impoverished by unforeseen and undeserved losses; and the artless husbandman is dragged away from those who are nearest and dearest to him, in order to shed the blood of beings as innocent and as wretched as himself, to repel injuries which he never felt or suspected, and to procure advantages which he may never understand or enjoy. Such are the aggravating circumstances belonging to war when it is carried on against a foreign enemy, even though it be disarmed of many terrors which accompanied it in less enlightened and less civilized ages.—*Dr. Parr.*

754.

Under the natural order of things, the unfolding of an intelligent, self-helping character, must

keep pace with the amelioration of physical circumstances, the advance of the one with the exertions put forth to achieve the other; so that in establishing arrangements conducive to robustness of body, robustness of mind must be insensibly acquired. Contrariwise, to whatever extent activity of thought and firmness of purpose are made less needful by an artificial performance of their work, to that same extent must their increase, and the dependent social improvements, be retarded. The difference between English energy and Continental helplessness is due solely to difference of discipline. Having been left in a greater degree than others to manage their own affairs, the English people have become self-helping, and have acquired great practical ability; whilst, conversely, the comparative helplessness of the paternally-governed nations of Europe is a natural result of the State-superintending policy or the reaction attendant on the action of official mechanisms.—*Social Statics*.

755.

Few are sufficiently aware how much reason most of us have, even as common moral livers, to thank God for being Englishmen. It would furnish grounds both for humility towards Providence and for increased attachment to our country, if each individual could but see and feel how large a part of his innocence he owes to his birth, breeding, and residence in Great Britain. The administration of the laws; the almost continual preaching of moral prudence; the number and respectability of our sects; the pressure of our ranks on each other, with the consequent reserve and watchfulness of demeanour in the superior ranks, and the emulation in the subordinate; the vast depth, expansion and systematic movements of our trade; and the consequent

inter-dependence, the arterial or nerve-like *network* of property, which make every deviation from outward integrity a calculable loss to the offending individual from its mere effects, as obstruction and irregularity; and lastly, the naturalness of doing as others do. These and the like influences, peculiar, some in the kind and all in the degree, to this privileged island, are the buttresses on which our foundationless well-doing is upheld even as a house of cards, the architecture of our infancy, in which each is supported by all.  
—*S. T. Coleridge.*

756.

Let us use sometimes to stop a little and ask ourselves what we are about? whither we are going? and where all will end at last?—

757.

'The sooner thou prearest to die, the sooner thou wilt be delivered from the fears of death. And then the hopes of a better life will carry thee cheerfully through this world, whatever storms thou meetest with.—

758.


Some men talk of preparing for death as if it were a thing that could be done in two or three days; and that the proper time of doing it were a little before they die; but I know no other preparation for death but living well; and thus we shall be well prepared when death comes.—

759.

A good man who has taken care all his life to please God, has little more to do when he sees death approaching than to take leave of his friends; to bless his children, to support and comfort himself with the hopes of immortal life and a glorious resurrection, and to resign up his spirit into the hands of God and his Saviour.—











114777

L

P8717a

NAME OF BORROWER.

